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INTRODUCTION 
We want historians to confirm our belief that the present rests 
upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. But the true 
historical sense confirms our existence amoung countless lost 
events, without a landmark or point of reference.1 
One of the governing assumptions of this thesis is that there is a 
distinct form of historiographic endevour called a genealogy. The 
genealogy is not merely a polemical critique of orthodox 
historiography, but also functions as a working methodology. It is . 
thus capable of reaching significant conclusions. This thesis is an 
attempt to practice a genealogy of the Woodstock Municipality from 
1882, the year of its inception, to 1913, the year in which it became 
a part of the greater Cape Town Municipality. I have chosen this 
period because I believe it demonstrates. in sometimes dramatic form, 
the unique difficulties facing a growing administrative apparatus. 
Furthermore. the Woodstock Municipality was an administrative 
invention which was congruent with a new form or economy of power. 2 
This form of power was above all concerned with a type of 
administration which facilitated discreetly the gentle growth of a 
market economy in the Colony. It was also concerned to "govern" and 
discipline the rapidly growing population in a cost-effective, 
unobtrusive and intelligent way.3 
My analysis of this new economy of power suggests the following: if 
we attempt to render intelligible the emergence of several 
institutions (or regimes of discipline within longstanding 
structures) that were contemporary with the period under 
investigation. we might find that this new form of power took hold at 
1 
the institutional level. Correlatively. we might also find 
significant differences being enacted at the level of disciplinary 
practice. One of the further advantages of an institutional analysis 
,t,C 
is that it will allow U\historicise objects (like the human body), 
isolate discursive practices (moral languages of "responsibility"), 
and analyse forms of knowledge (the emergence of medical knowledge 
about the population), within the context of a "different" 
methodology. We will thus be posing a polemical threat to those who 
believe that the body has no history; that language is reducible to 
the intention of a centered subject; and that knowledge "evolves" in 
conjunction with a continuous, teleological rationality. 
The chapter which follows this brief introduction is divided into 
three sections: in the first I devote some time to a chronological 
summary of a series of works by the French philosopher-historian, 
Michel Foucault. This is necessary because it sketches the 
theoretical backround to my use of the Foucauldian method of 
genealogy. It also serves the function of introducing the reader to a 
body of work with which he/she might not be familiar. Finally it 
serves to establish (if only tentatively) the general direction in 
which the argument is leading. 
Section two is devoted to a more pointed examination of two key 
papers in the Foucauldian oeuvre. The analysis of these two papers 
brings us to the construction of a methodology in the final section 
of the chapter. The intermediate step is important because the two 
essays (The Order of Discourse and Nietzsche. GenealoS,Y, History), 
particularly the latter one, illuminate the philosophical 
underpinnings of the genealogy as system and method. 
In an attempt to realise the polemical intentions of my introductory 
2 
chapter in concrete form, I attempt in chapter two to understand the 
textual strategies at work in a minor piece on Woodstock entitled 
Rediscovering Woodstock. I seek to prove that this essay conforms in 
several significant ways to techniques which are associated with what 
I identify in the first chapter as the History-of-Ideas or one of its 
variations. Altough my discovery of the techniques wherehy historical 
meaning is situated and constructed is related at the level of 
assumption to chapter one, it is not a demonstration of my 
methodology per se. The application of my methodology occurs for the 
first time during the case-study section of the thesis. This begins 
with the genealogical analysis of the Woodstock Municipality itself 
as one of my four key municipal in~titutions. 
It seems appropriate to begin our genealogy with an investigation of 
certain events within the early history of the Woodstock Municipality 
as an institution. Chapter three thus sets the scene for the chapters 
which follow: this similarity initially takes place at the level of 
method. I also intend in chapter three to provide concrete evidence 
that I am identifying certain events, arranging them in series, and 
relating them to a set of questions and problems - otherwise known 
as the construction of a generality - which I will now attempt to 
outline. The posing of certain questions and prohlems will hopefully 
result in the formation of one greater question. that is. how, within 
the context of slightly different institutional agenda's and 
prerogatives. various institutional agencies organise time. space and 
subjects within frameworks that are disciplinary in nature. And how, 
through our retroactive identification of events in the history of 
various institutions, can we come to analyse the meaning-effect of 
these events without reconstituting them as the "truth"? 
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I intend in chapter three, therefore, to come to terms with the 
constituent features of municipal knowledge and to ask the question: 
through which procedures did the municipality attempt to control life 
within the municipal area, and did this attempt to gain mastery 
involve any forms of discipline as Foucault defines it? With regard 
to chapter three we should remember that it bares superficial 
resemblance to a section on Official Administrative Discourse in 
chapter two. The section on O.A.D. merely acts as a general 
introduction to official language in the broadest possible sense, 
unlike the chapter on municipal knowledge, which is specifically 
concerned with the manner in which the institution managed life 
within the municipality ( or multipli_city as Foucault calls it) 
itself. 
Craig's Battery, which is the institutional case-study that I use in 
chapter four, is carefully chosen in the sense that I will seek to 
demonstrate that the battery was able, mainly because it was a 
monolithic institution, to manage the environment and those within it 
with a great deal of control. We will see how the control of both 
space and time within the context of a closed institution led to a 
disciplinary regime which was able to encourage a system of 
self-regulation. From the disciplinary point-of-view, regimes of 
self-regulation are evidence of "perfection" and thus appear in 
marked contrast to the municipality's ad hoc attempts at the control 
of the municipal environment. In an appendix to this chapter (which 
appears at the end of the thesis as Appendix A) I analyse several 
photographs of Fort Knokke, which was a Fort close to Craig's 
Battery. The photographs demonstrate that the Cape Town archive 
actually participates in the construction of history, unlike any 
commonsense myth's which hold otherwise. 
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A cold Dickensian refuge which was built for the express purpose of 
"rehabilitating" "prostitutes" provides the material for the 
case-study which makes up chapter five. From a close textual analysis 
of an event which led to the laying of an inscribed commemorative 
foundation stone. we will be able to identify the constituent 
features of discipline in the House of Mercy. noting in particular 
how the Anglican nuns who administered the House attempted to 
inculcate the values of the petit-bourgeois woman of leisure in those 
unfortunates who happened - by dint of an absolutely indiscriminate 
logic - to find themselves there. 
My final case-study is an attempt to understand, through the analysis 
of a series of reports, the paradoxical logic which underscored the 
disciplinary regime of the Woodstock Cottage or Suburban Hospital. We 
will see how an attempt to transcend the imposition of a European 
temporal mean - and move towards "a Modern General Hospital" -
was severely flawed, given the sense of Colonial uncertainty which 
characterised the period. We will also witness the administrative 
debacle which surrounded the "event" of the "Fresh Air Scheme"; the 
scheme, which was never properly implemented, was an initiative 
intended to "upgrade" the hospital. This was ironic because it 
advanced a sophisticated theory of discipline as a sub-text. 
In conclusion, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the 
construction of the chapter which follows. There are those who might 
find the transition to a discussion of the Foucauldian canon a little 
rapid, and altough the purpose of the introduction might not 
immediately be apparent, I believe that the significance of the 
summaries will emerge over time. I thus urge the reader to be 
patient, and trust that he/she will recognise the significance of the 
section which follows, if not immediately, then shortly thereafter. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in, Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, trans. Donald F 
Bouchard and Sherry Simon. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1977), p.155. 
2. This triple objective of the disciplines corresponds to a well 
known historical conjuncture. One aspect of this conjuncture was 
the large demographic thrust of the eighteenth century ....... The 
other aspect of the conjuncture was a growth in the apparatus of 
production, which was becomipg more and more extended and 
complex; it was also becoming more costly and its profitablity 
had to be increased. The development of the disciplinary methods 
corresponded to these two processes, or rather, no doubt, to the 
new need to adjust to their correlation. ( emphasis added). 
Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith. (London: Penguin, 1986), p.218. 
3. An item in file 3/WSK 164 in the Cape Archives suggests that the 
population of Woodstock was 5 800 in 1891. In 1904 it was 29 432, 
t.iw,e, 
and at the..\.at which the article was written (3rd October 1906) 
the estimated population was 34 000. These figures indicate that 
the the population trends in the Municipality correspond to what 
Foucault in a different context identifies as a "large 
demographic thrust", see above. 
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CHAPTER 1: FROM PHENOMENOLOGY TO GENEALOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
This preliminary chapter is intended as a lengthy introduction to the 
ideas of the French philosopher-historian, Michel Foucault. The first 
section provides the reader with "pocket-sized" introductions to the 
Foucault canon. It is in no way arbitary and is designed to establish 
the theoretical foundations upon which I will later build. The 
fleeting and even general tenor of the first section gives way in the 
second to a more challenging consideration of two seminal Foucault 
essay's namely, The Order of Discourse and Nietzsche. Genealogy. 
History. These two essays represent the transition between the 
archaeological and genealogical "periods" of Foucault's work. The 
analysis of the two essays above thus allows me to move towards the 
construction of a methodology in the final section of this chapter. 
The methodology allows me to construct an analytical blueprint which 
will be applied in the case-study section of the thesis which will 
begin with a study of the Woodstock Municipality as an institution in 
chapter three . 
.Ll: POCKET-SIZED FOUCAULT 
Folie et deraison. Histoire de la folie a lage classique (1961) 
Despite the compelling descriptions and extravagant metaphors, Michel 
Foucault's first recognised work, Madness and Civilization (1961), 
can be interpreted as an ultimately unsatisfactory attempt to 
reconstitute a pure state of being (madness) behind the folds of 
reason itself. The work traces the monarchical and public response to 
7 
and reception of madness from the Middle Ages, through the 
Renaissance and the Classical Age, up to the present day. 
The book is noticeably concerned with social space and the manner in 
which it is utilized by the authorities of the day. Firstly Foucault 
stresses the role of the European leper or Lazar houses only to 
contend that by roughly the end of the European Middle Ages, these 
spaces were summarily vacated to make way for a new heteromorphous 
construct, namely the mad, indigent, malcontent and constitutionally 
unsound. This alteration in the mode of apprehension can be traced to 
a King's edict which sought to intern the Parisian floating 
population - a group of individuals which harboured all manner of 
latent possibilities and threats. Once they were "confined", and this 
"Great Confinement" according to Foucault was not limited to France 
but literally swept across Europe at roughly the same time, the 
political alliance between the Monarchy and the Bourgeoisie could 
pursue its ascendancy. Yet the phrase "mode of apprehension" with its 
creeping phenomenological overtones may not do justice to the scope 
of the alteration in moral and political sensibility which 
characterised the period. Furthermore it omits the strong economic 
rational inherent in the "incarceration" of the unemployed for it is 
important to recognise that internment was least of all motivated by 
philanthropism. The process of confinement was directed by following 
interlinked recognitions: the governing fathers of the city could no 
longer merely expel its unwanted populace, they had to take the 
unproductive under their wing, to locate and observe them and of 
course keep them under the influence of legal jurisdiction. 
The beginning of the nineteenth century witnesses a discernible and 
important change in the perception of the confined population. 
Economic imperatives become threatened by moral outrage and the 
8 
period ushers in the image of the virtuous reformer. It was no longer 
desirable that the criminal, unemployed and insane be categorized as 
one. Secondly, if the confined had remained unproductive all these 
years they were now understood as an untapped source of cheap, 
exploitable labour. Yet what of the virtuous reformers that appeared 
earlier? The state of things called for an immediate re-ordering; the 
burgeoning humanist machinery rolled forwards with the primary 
function of protecting the mad from themselves. Thus began the 
process of the attempted yet controlled liberation and humanisation 
of the insane. Both Tuke in England and Pinel in France were at the 
forefront of a process which attempted to reform the insane from 
within the institution. Their methods varied but basically they were 
concerned, according to Foucault, to create a conscience in the mad 
themselves, and to confirm the mad's alterity they had to pathologise 
them as transgressors of certain ahistorical universals. 
The asylum no longer punished the madman's guilt, it is true; but 
it did more; it organised that guilt; it organised it for the 
madman as a consciousness of himself, and as a non-reciprocal 
relation to the keeper; it organised it for the man of reason as 
an awareness of the Other, a therapeutic intervention in the 
madman's existence. In other words, by this guilt the madman 
became an object of punishment always vulnerable to himself and 
to the Other; and, from the acknowledgment of his status as 
object from, the awareness of his guilt, the madman was to return 
to his awareness of himself as a free responsible subject, and 
consequently to reason.1 
My summary of Madness and Civilization has thus far omitted the 
central figure of the doctor who is not to be valued as.a medical 
practitioner per se but rather, as a wise individual. His importance 
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does not result from his access to a strata of coherent knowledge but 
from his role. Although perhaps we should not stress the relationship 
between the doctor and psychiatrist too closely, their proximity as 
figures with a common interest is undeniable. Towards the end of 
Madness and Civilization Foucault draws our attention to the figure 
of the psychiatrist. He maintains that Freud was the important 
conclusion of a line which started with Pinel and stretched across 
the eighteenth century. Freud was extremely important because, unlike 
those reformers and medical men who had practised before him, he was 
not trapped in hollow positivism and scientistic myths. Freud was 
able to account for his relative "success" by de-mythologizing the 
importance of the asylum and isolating the doctor - patient 
relationship as an object of knowledge. However, in revealing the 
inability of those before him to account for and reflect on their 
methods he too lapsed into "scientism" for he knew full well, 
according to Foucault, that the meaning and authority of 
psychoanalysis did not come from science but from the "body" of 
knowledge, the pathologising discourse which blossomed all around 
him. 
Madness and Civilization traces the contours of the European 
experience and understanding of madness from the Middle Ages up until 
the present day. In what may retrospectively be termed a reckless 
moment, Foucault suggests that the presence of madness signifies the 
possibility for the study of reason in history for madness stands on 
the very threshold of reason, occasionally illuminating the silent 
vacuum over which it presides. Thus the study of madness must in fact 
be a study of history as well. In valorising madness as a fundamental 
"otherness" Foucault believed that he could "pry open" history 
because as an experience madness was beyond history itself. But in so 
doing, in seeking the deep truth of not only history but of all 
10 
"reasonable" discourse, Foucault made an error. He had sought to 
anchor his theory on the insufficiences of a potentially meaningless 
subject (the mad person) and furthermore he sought to abstract a 
theory of reality and reason itself from this weak point. 
Naissance de la clinique. Une archeologie du regarde medical (1963) 
Foucault's next book, The Birth of the Clinic, broadens both the 
concerns and the imagery of Madness and Civilization. It is by no 
means a different version of the same book, yet a certain thematic 
consistency is in evidence; the boo~ reinforces the idea that the 
eighteenth century bore witness to a certain medicalization of 
society. The book traces the onward march of post Enlightenment 
strategies of rationality and like Madness and Civilization it 
contains an investigation into the meaning of various conceptions of 
institutional space and those who inhabit it. 
Like Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic is set against 
a backdrop of rapid social growth and generalised instabilty. The 
thirty year period between the French Revolution and eighteen-twenty 
suffices to represent the changes that occurred in the broad medical 
field. The book's central contention is that the eighteenth century 
gives rise to two parallel events of great significance. On a broad 
scale, one can observe a basic alteration in medical consciousness, a 
greater rationalisation of techniques, the streamlining of medical 
education and procedures and, as the title of the book suggests, the 
Birth of the Clinic, a fact of great importance, as we will see 
shortly. 
On a specific level we see the emergence of anatomo-clinical 
11 
medicine, a discursive space which was unequivocally to supplant the 
methods and the logic of that which passed before it. To enable us to 
understand the transformation from one type of medical discourse to 
another, we will have to deconstruct the underlying features of both 
systems. The classificatory medicine which dominated France prior to 
the revolution can be understood as follows; its ambition was 
narrowly hermeneutic, that is, to decipher symptoms from essences 
which were thought to circulate throughout the body and decipher 
diseases from those symptoms. Foucault refers to the above semiotic 
as a "medicine of the species" whose primary concern was 
encyclopaedic, to classify and tabulate all manner of symptoms and 
thereby attempt to return the pati~nt to health. This closed system 
was in sharp distinction to what Foucault identifies as a "medicine 
of social space", a fluid, open-ended construct the concern of which 
was not the particular symptom but the health and well-being of the 
entire population. It should be noted that a "medicine of social 
spaces" was primarily administrative in ambition and can be 
characterised by its concern with such subjects as child-rearing, 
general hygiene, the cleanliness of food and the expansion of the 
population. In short, it was a politics of health. Unlike nosology 
(what was previously referred to as medicine of the species) this 
onward-marching discursive configuration was relatively unstable in 
the sense that it was ever-expanding and subject to revision. 
In 1766 the Societe Royal de Medicine was formed. Foucault sees the 
foundation of the society as a crucial event in the process which led 
to the replacement of the traditional classificatory medicine by 
anatomo-clinical medicine, the introduction of a new training regime 
for doctors centered on the clinic, the reorganisation of medical 
practice and, no less important, of hospitals. The formation of the 
society signifies the emergence of an entirely new sensibilty in the 
12 
approach to the broadest medical problems, what may in fact be termed 
a new strategy or disciplinary manoeuvre. This manoeuvre was 
characterised by the following shifts in awareness: firstly it was 
recognised that disease was an outcome of social mis-management 
caused mainly by the practices of the Ancient Regime. This 
recognition resulted in a complete re-structuring of the medical 
profession; hospitals were to become either fully medicalised (up 
until the revolution they had served a number of ambiguous functions 
including providing shelter of the poor) or discontinued altogether. 
The health services should be conducted under the auspices of a 
central authority and clinics should be introduced as the central 
institutional component of the profession. The role of the 
newly-formed clinic should not be over-emphasised because parallel to 
its formation one sees a host of new features which were in sharp 
distinction to the type of medicine practiced prior to the 
revolution. 
The major shift in medical perception arose in the very activity of 
seeing, explains Foucault. The gaze of the trained doctor became more 
complex, not only did the medical personage see, but he heard and 
touched as well. These three elements made up what Foucault refers to 
as "the medical gaze", a form of medical perception which viewed the 
same basic object, the human body, in a radically different way to 
the doctors of the former classificatory age. There were also broader 
philosophical changes in the underlying intellectual strata of 
medicine. Following enlightenment nominalism and the philosophy of 
language, the new medical nominalism stressed that, "symptoms were 
like alphabets and diseases like words", 2 and unlike the former 
medicine, nominalist science asserted that there were absolutely no 
essences behind visible symptoms. 
13 
What I have attempted to sketch out in the broadest possible terms is 
the displacement of one type of medical consciousness by another over 
a period of roughly thirty years. The new anatomo-clinical medicine 
and the complex re-alignment of medical discourse meant that man 
became both the subject and object of knowledge. His experience of 
himself and his limitations as an individual were linked to the 
ephemerality of his being and the eventuality of death. Thus we are 
able to consider the wider significance of The Birth of the Clinic 
for it initiates the project which Foucault was to continue in The 
Order of Things, the study of man, and his importance for the 
formation of the Human Sciences. 
Les mots et les choses. Une archeologie des sciences humaines (1966) 
Foucault's so-called structuralist masterpiece, The Order of Things, 
was published in 1966. The use of the phrase "so-called" in the above 
is not an incautious one because superficially the echoes between The 
Order of Things and the holistic structuralism of say Claude 
Levi-Strass is quite startling. As we are about to see, however, the 
comparison is somewhat misleading for Foucault owes far more to the 
French historians of science Bache lard and Canguilhem and the German 
nineteenth century philosopher, Nietzsche, than he does to de 
Saussure. 
We are by now familiar with Foucault's periodisation. The book 
divides the recent European past into three periods with a suggestion 
of an ill-defined fourth. These three Episteme are successively: the 
Renaissance, the Classic and the Modern. It is Foucault's contention 
that there are a set of rule-governed criteria which dictate what can 
or cannot be said within each epistemic configuration and his project 
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is to identify and define the unconscious ground-rules or, more 
accurately, the positive unconscious of knowledge. Foucault's primary 
concern is thus to chart the seemingly inexplicable re-organisation 
of the field of knowledge from one episteme or epistemic 
configuration to the next. During the Renaissance for example 
Foucault suggests that the order of knowledge was governed by a 
single basic term, that of resemblance. Crntained within the term of 
resemblance were the following secondary tropes: adjacency, analogy, 
sympathy and antipathy. The last two of these, sympathy and 
antipathy, were extremely important because they managed to add to 
resemblance a certain extra dimension yet prevented all signs from 
becoming one, from collapsing int? the same. We should at this stage 
note that resemblance contained both the form and the content of the 
sign and it was only during the Classical age, according to Foucault, 
that the sign split. 
The world was no longer seen as itself; language was wrested free 
of things, entered an arbitrary relation to them as 
representation, as one form of representation. 3 
Resemblance as a master-term begins to become discredited around the 
time of Descartes and Bacon. As a result of the splitting of the sign 
new concepts such as analysis, comparison and order became the 
touchstones of the new epistemic field. The age witnesses the 
emergence of three sciences based on the idea of order - General 
grammar, Natural history and the analysis of wealth, the analysis of 
words, beings and needs in terms of signs which were in turn 
understood by their relationship to identity and difference. Unlike 
the Renaissance, the internal dynamic of the Classical age means that 
language is thought but it is not an immediate representation of 
thought, it is also an ordered tabulation and linear re-arrangement 
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thereof. The general grammar of the Classical age can be sub-divided 
into the following five terms: proposition ( the theory of the verb), 
designation ( the theory of nouns), articulation, derivation and the 
name. 
Classical order distributed across a permanent space a network of 
identities and difference that separated and united things; it 
was this order that governed the theories of discourse, natural 
beings, and the exchange of wealth. What occurred at the end 
of the Eighteenth Century was a change in the foundations of 
knowledge as far-reaching as that which accompanied the advent of 
the Classical period. 4 
What was discovered as the eighteenth century drew to a close was, 
in a word, history. We can account for this audacious and provocative 
remark as follows: intellectuals of the Classical age understood time 
as something unremarkable and distant. For theorists of the modern 
age, however, with the increased emphasis on the organic, time was 
conceived as a component within knowledge itself. Knowledge developed 
and became, it was suddenly historicised. General Grammar, as it was 
once known was threatened and eventually replaced by philology, a 
subject which was born out of the collapse of the Classical system of 
representation. Language was pluralised and fragmented, it too became 
imbued with the significance of a history. 
As a result of the emergence of history as a system, language as a 
component of knowledge became a victim of the same constraints but 
it also acquired a degree of depth all of its own. During the 
eighteenth century attempts were made to rid language of all its 
subjective impurities and in similar fashion the dream of a purely 
symbolic language exerted a certain intellectual fascination. 
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Because language no longer offered a transparent view of the world it 
attained an ambiguous status for it became both a problem and a 
virtually bottomless pool of possible interpretations and exegetical 
procedures. Foucault is thus able to claim that Marx, Freud and 
Nietzsche were all, in their distinctive ways, concerned with 
exegesis; Das Kapital was an exegesis of value, Nietzsche's 
philosophy was an exegesis of certain Greek words and Freud's 
life-work was devoted to an exegesis of that which resides beneath 
consciousness. 
Foucault's suggestion that the age also saw the emergence of man is 
possibly even more scandalous th~n his contention that the modern 
period initiated history as it is understood today. How then does man 
emerge? We must understand firstly that man became both a new object 
and subject of knowledge. Epistemelogically speaking the age 
witnessed the rise of the Human Sciences, an event which would simply 
not have been possible for the prior age. The Human Sciences arose in 
the wake of the collapse of representation and the study of man as an 
object/subject was the central item on which they predicated their 
existence. We must be clear on the issue of the Human Sciences 
though. By the Human Sciences, Foucault does not mean the trinity 
(Biology, Philology, Political Economy) which dominated the Classical 
age but rather he is referring to the subjects which caused their 
death; Sociology, Psychology and Literary/Cultural Studies. Let me 
explain; during the Classical age representation was fixed and 
objective, it was a window through which the world was understood. 
Obviously man did the understanding and apprehending but he had no 
need to understand and scrutinize himself in the same way that he had 
during the Modern Episteme. During the modern age man's gaze turned 
inwards because language contained an element of opacity, 
representation was problematized, and man became aware of how he was 
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represented to himself. We are thus better able to understand the 
newly-forged role of Psychology, Sociology and Literary/Cultural 
Studies; they studied man as a concept, they studied man's 
experience, his experience and his unconscious. 
Modern man's capacity to think about the conditions which allow 
thought to take place introduce a quintessentially modern problem. 
Foucault refers to this problem as the emergence of the unthought. 
The arrival of the unthought is tied up with modern philosophy's 
hubris, its desire to interrogate constantly the unknown, which 
drifts tantalisingly beyond the horizon. Foucault suggests that 
thought thinks both itself and the lfnthought in a very active way. 
Modern thought, through the figure of man is, therefore, a specific 
kind of action. 
The Order of Things ends with the somewhat confusing, possibly even 
hysterical suggestion that "man" as both a subject and object of 
knowledge is passing out of sight and into the shadows, perhaps to 
vanish from our field of knowledge forever. But how are we to 
contextualize this assertion and where exactly does Foucault go from 
here? These questions will hopefully be answered in the forthcoming 
sections. 
L'archeologie du savoir (1969) 
Michel Foucault's fourth book, The Archaeology of Knowledge, can be 
described in many ways, but most of all the book is an authoritative 
treatise on the archaeological method as well as a scathing attack on 
the History of Ideas. The book sets itself up in opposition to a set 
of assumptions which pre-define orthodox histories and in this regard 
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Foucault cites three individuals with whom we are already acquainted: 
Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Marx initiated a critique of continuist 
histories because he stressed that in the final analysis the truly 
important aspects of history were not controlled by the consciousness 
of the individual subject but by factors beyond his or her control. 
Nietzsche and Freud both continued this process of critique in their 
respective ways. The Archaeology of Knowledge can in other words be 
read as an extension of the method of critique although it does not 
resemble or rely upon the projects of the aforementioned to any great 
degree. 
Foucault's attempt to extend and ~e-define the process of critique 
initiated by the three "masters of suspicion" begins by selecting a 
range of terms and procedures inimical to the History of Ideas. He 
begins by unpicking and laying bare the following notions; Ouevre, 
influence, tradition, evolution and spirit. After he has done this he 
proceeds to recast the History of Ideas not as the successive 
improvement of knowledge across time but merely as a collection of 
similar statements. These statements are at no time reducible to a 
unitary guiding consciousness or transcendental ego and have no 
subjective intention which forms them. They are, in this sense, 
anonymous. Statements can be understood if we relate them to what 
Foucault calls the enunciative modality or "the laws of formation 
which operate behind things", namely: status, position and sites. 
Quite obviously not just anyone can speak with authority on any issue 
which might just appear to be attractive, and thus we have an 
indication of the importance of status. The role of position can be 
made meaningful when we look at the position of statements in a 
respective field and compare them to changes in various institutional 
classificatory procedures over time. 
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The third element, that of site, simply relates to the area or space 
from which statements are made - a hospital, a clinic or a university 
for example. It should also be realised that statements should be 
distinguished from both propositions and sentences; although both 
propositions and sentences can become statements, the process cannot 
be reversed. These material expressions (known as statements by 
Foucault) are subject to other defining characteristics, for 
instance, statements are not isolated expressions, they must be 
related to the broader textual field in which they appear. 
Furthermore, statements are not reducible to a transcendental 
subject, nor are they to be interpr'::ted as an expression of a lost 
origin. 
If a proposition, a sentence, a group of signs can be called 
"statement", it is not therefore because, one day, someone 
happened to speak them or put them in some concrete form of 
writing; it is because the position of the subject can be 
assigned. To describe a formulation qua statement does not 
consist in analysing the relations between the author and what he 
says but in determining what position can and must be occupied by 
any individual if he is to be the subject of it. 5 
There are a further three terms which have a great deal of importance 
because they have a definitive bearing on the way in which statements 
are produced: the positivity provides a collection of statements with 
a coherence over time, What makes the positivity possible is the 
historical a priori, a system of rules from within the positivity 
itself, and the archive, which is not an inert, stable library of 
knowledge.but rather a system which makes the creation of different 
statements (in accordance with the a priori) possible. The archive 
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can never be adequately described because it is potentially 
inexhaustible, the archive would appear to be the source from which 
everything emerges ... 
Foucault refers to a collection of statements as a discursive 
formation and a discursive formation is formed in the following way. 
Firstly, the object of discourse has to arise and locate itself, it 
has to appear in a certain space such as the family, the school or 
the workplace, in Foucault's words these "surfaces of emergence" are 
integral to the eventual creation of a discursive formation. 
Secondly, Foucault speaks of the need of certain guardians of a 
discourse to practice a process of ~itual exclusion of 
disqualification, this particular rule is referred to as that 
practiced by the "authorities of delimitation". The third necessary 
rule for the formation of a discourse is the rule which follows 
particular "grids of specification", the manner in which various 
constituent elements within discourse itself can be related to and 
compared with one another. These three basic rules colour and effect 
each other in the most fundamental but nevertheless complex way. 
Furthermore, the three rules when combined do not constitute an 
object of concern, the object of the discourse and the discourse 
itself link together to form the conditions of possibility for 
discourses themselves. 
The opening paragraph of this particular section suggested that The 
Archaeology of Knowledge was a scathing attack on the History of 
Ideas but it omitted to mention how we are to understand the latter. 
Foucault believes that the History of Ideas is dominated by three 
major themes, those of genesis, continuity, and totalization. In 
definite contrast to this the archaeological method is concerned with 
history in its discontinous and non-totalizable state, a form without 
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locatable beginnings or chimerical ends. Foucault stresses that the 
History of Ideas treats discourse in terms of two basic values: the 
old and the new ( or more precisely the separation of truth from 
error), and the traditional and the original ( or, more accurately, 
the slow accumulation of things said or written). The History of 
Ideas attributes meaning and coherence to all that it studies whether 
it be a traditional history of art or an unravelling of the 
underlying factors which precipitated the formation of New Critical 
orthodoxy. The archaeological method functions in accordance with the 
following four criteria: the attribution of innovation, the analysis 
of contradiction, comparative descriptions and the mapping of 
transformations. More precisely, t}le archaeologist attempts firstly 
to de-objectify an object by the isolation of its discursive support. 
The relentless impoverishment of one aspect of human experience, 
namely madness, by institutional and epistemelogical imperatives, is 
one such example. An archaeology attempts to describe transitions 
from one period to another. A suitable example in this regard would 
be the transition from nosology to anatomo-clinical medicine of the 
early eighteen hundreds as described by Foucault in The Birth of the 
Clinic. The archaeological method is once again at variance with more 
traditionally oriented history in its attempt to lay bare either 
irregularities or continuities within knowledge but does so beneath 
the level of the speaking subject. We need look no further than the 
collapse of representation as a result of the problematization of 
language during the Modern Episteme to furnish us with an example. 
Finally, the archaeological method ~ri;;~\~~~ the term of difference, 
rather than seeking to gloss over its importance as traditional 
history is prone to do. Rather, it is an exploration of the 
debilitating consequences of unproductive contradictions, not their 
elision. 
22 
Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison (1975) 
As the title of Foucault's fifth book Discipline and Punish - the 
Birth of the Prison suggests that his study is a return to his former 
intellectual pursuits - the study of one specific regime of knowledge 
within a clearly identifiable institutional space. This recognition 
is at best a partial. if not misleading one because Discipline and 
Punish clearly qualifies as an extension of Foucault's project in 
that he represents his first fully-realised conclusions about the 
implications that power/knowledge has for modern life. Thus the book 
is not about the history of prisons and imprisonment so much as it is 
a book about punishment, surveillance and the subtleties of power. 
Discipline and Punish relates directly to the enterprise which was 
evidenced in both The Order of Things and The Archaeology of 
Knowledge because Foucault's contention is that the transition from 
one form of power to another is roughly simultaneous with the 
appearance of the human sciences as discursive fields which as we 
know have "man" as their primary object of knowledge. In their 
questionable search for knowledge about the individual the human 
sciences initiate a method which is remarkably similar to the one 
proposed by contemporary regimes of punishment. Their aim in both 
respects is to "psychologize" the subject. In the case of legal power 
the strategy took the form of creating an individual with a soul, a 
conscience and a will. But for the time being we will leave this 
proposition standing, floating as it were over the summary which is 
about to follow. 
The Ancient Regime's system of punishment was characterised by 
"supplice". Unfortunately no English equivalent of this word exists 
but it can be understood as the combination of a pseudo-theatrical 
spectacle and the exertion of corporal punishment. "Supplice" 
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represented an altogether different perception of power to that 
exerted in the future period of "relative enlightenment", where the 
system of power/knowledge undergoes a discernible change from brutal 
inhumanity (but a purposeful and finely-tuned inhumanity at that) to 
rituals of surveillance and classification, where subjects become 
objects in the continual sweep and interplay of norms and procedures. 
Imprisonment was relatively rare during the seventeenth century but 
the eighteenth century gave rise to a radical alteration in the use 
to which houses of internment were put. There was a noticeable 
transformation on both the level of offender classification and the 
system of punishment to which pri.,soners were forced to submit. In 
fact, imprisonment can be seen as an alternative to torture and the 
more violent forms of corporal abuse. Why however was there a 
discernible shift in methods of punishment? Firstly, punishment as a 
spectacle was politically dangerous, and secondly, the system of 
legal power was such that it no longer needed to impress itself upon 
the body of the condemned in the form of torture but rather power 
followed a curve which demanded a diminuition of theatricality and a 
transfer from "public" to "private" space for virtually all types of 
punishment. What were the underlying currents in the shift from one 
form of power to another'? To help us to answer this question it is 
necessary to discuss the roles played by the eighteenth century legal 
reformers. 
The legal reformers of the second-half of the eighteenth century 
condemned the use of "supp lice" as a type of punishment. They 
concerned themselves with the creation of a new definition of legal 
power. This need to revitalise and improve the judicial system took 
place with two major aims in mind. Firstly to curtail severely the 
over-abundance of sovereign power, and secondly to tighten the 
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existing loopholes in the law which allowed petty crimes to go 
undetected. We should interpret these alterations within the context 
of what Foucault suggests was the inexorable move towards a more 
disciplined society, although this statement should not go 
unqualified. We should not labour under the misconception that 
power/knowledge increases quantitatively, it merely becomes more 
variegated and less immediately visible. In line with the attempted 
refinement of the existing judicial structures and system, the law of 
social contract was given shape. This law asserted that a crime was 
no longer an infringement against the king but an act against society 
itself. Concomitant with the stress on social contract was an 
alteration in the entire geometry qf law, a system of finely-tuned 
punishments which had as their basis a greater "respect" for the 
transgressor as a human being, and sought not an equivalence between 
crime and punishment but alternatively to minimise punishment 
carefully though the apparently "gentler" yet no less sinister 
example of persuasion and attempted rehabilitation. The features of 
the new "corrective strategy" employed by the model prisons and 
reformatories are of great significance because they echo across time 
and initiate a system of discipline which we as members of modern 
society have doubtless inherited. The features of this new 
configuration of disciplinary power are not that difficult to define; 
disciplines rely on the institutionalized supervision and ordering of 
both time and space. They also rely on the enclosure of the 
disciplined (whether those concerned be in schools, prisons, barracks 
or hospitals) and their classification down to the minutest details. 
Furthermore, the techniques whereby patients, workers and soldiers 
are kept under control can be summarized as follows: 1 - Hierarchical 
observation, 2 - Normalizing judgement and 3 - Examination and 
continual assessment.6 In relation to technique number one we may 
note that discipline cannot function at all if a complex system of 
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surveillance does not undeiwrite and operate in the institution 
itself. Secondly, judgement and potential disqualification are of 
course factors central to all normalizing discourse. And thirdly, no 
system of normalization can do without a rigorous regime of 
assessment on all levels. 
I completed the opening paragraph of this section somewhat 
inexcusably - with a promise which I hoped would linger on the edge 
of this summary. It was a promise which hinted at a certain 
epistemological similarity. 
Penal law and the human sciences have a common matrix in a . 
specifically modern mode of exercising power, a mode which has 
given birth not only to the institution of the prison, but also 
to man himself as the object of a scientific discourse. 7 
This particular quote suggests that we should be under no illusions 
as to the supposedly noble origins and liberating tendencies of the 
Human Sciences, for they too are part of what they condemn and are in 
no way ''beyond" the operations and strategies of power. It is with 
this Nietzschean turn that Foucault has endeavoured during Discipline 
and Punish to hammer away at Enlightenment-derived platitudes about 
the nature of reason and man. He contends that we are not necessarily 
progressing towards freedom but are experiencing relative unfreedom 
as a result of the strictures of disciplinary power, a power which 
attaches itself to and moulds the human body. It is once again the 
human body which Foucault is concerned with in his next book, The 
History of Sexuality. vol I. 
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Histoire de la Sexualite: La volonte de savoir (1976) 
Michel Foucault's sixth recognised work, The History of Sexuality 
(1976), should not be considered as a variation on the History of 
Ideas theme, nor should it be understood as a Post-Structuralist 
compendium of playful erotica, but rather it should be read as a 
radical reversal of our common-sense inheritance vis-a-vis sex and 
its relationship to experience and truth. 
The book is at pains to demonstrate that all versions of 
Freudo-Marxism are nothing but convenient delusions. In fact Foucault 
questions the theory which contenps that the advent of capitalism 
placed taboos on sex and repressed ( and continues to do so) "true 
sexuality". He asserts that firstly we have no "true sexuality" to 
speak of and secondly the "repressive hypothesis" fails to account 
for the fact that it was not the cornerstone of the productive 
process ( the adult working male) who was severely restricted 
sexually, because contrary to received opinion, the Victorian age was 
only superficially a prudish one. Besides which, the "repressive 
hypothesis" relies upon a conception of power that is for Foucault 
manifestly incorrect. For the Freudo-Marxists power is controlled and 
regulated either by the state or the bourgeoisie or both, and its 
movement takes place from top to bottom. Foucault suggests instead 
that power is at once ubiquitous and productive and rather than 
stressing control from above we should conceive of power as a grid of 
intersecting relations emanating from below. Thus it is not enough to 
hold that the Victorian age in general, and the capitalist worker in 
particular, were transversed by repressive power because, as Foucault 
demonstrates, discourse about sex, truth and sexuality, whether it be 
in the form of health, confession, or self-examination, proliferated 
during the age which we normally take as a primary example of 
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cloistered, guilty sexuality. 
During the eighteenth century the "sexual field" was dominated by 
three systems of law which governed sexual behaviour: Civil law, 
Christian pastoral and Canonical law. The basic object of these laws 
was the institution of marriage and the definition of what was 
considered acceptable or illicit in sexual practice. A great deal of 
significance was attached to the conception of what was considered 
natural and the absolute fragmentation of the "sexual field" during 
the mid-eighteenth century transformed ( and caused along with the 
changing modes of sexual perception) a different understanding of the 
unnatural/natural dichotomy. The .changes in the "sexual field" can be 
understood as alterations along two different but mutually compatible 
axial lines; changes in the rules of sexual alliance and legal-moral 
discourse and changes in the rules relating to sexuality and pleasure 
which can be related to an alteration in psycho-medical discourse. 
The second component of the new discourse on sexuality and pleasure 
(which can be termed bio-power and welfare) became increasingly 
concerned, if not obsessed, with a vast new range of character-types 
and objects. Quite suddenly the child became the subject of a great 
deal of heated debate. The categories of the hysterical woman, the 
perverse adult, and the homosexual were created by the demands of a 
new configuration of power/knowledge. Themes which were central to 
the important new issue of the population's health and welfare also 
began to emerge. The following were perceived as significant: birth 
and death rates, contraception, fertility rates, and public 
cleanliness. These issues attained importance because the entire 
atmosphere of life had changed now that the economic functioning of 
the newly-industrialised countries demanded a monitoring of the 
population. Furthermore the former unnatural/natural dichotomy was 
displaced by a more general normalizing and pathologizing apparatus. 
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Secondly the new psycho-medical discourse began to be usurped by a 
psycho-medical amalgam, one which is exemplified by none other than 
Sigmund Freud. 
During the eighteenth century Western Europe witnessed an immense 
proliferation of discourses on and about sexuality. They were all 
tied in various degrees to the belief that if people could find their 
sexual truth it would automatically signify that they had found a 
"truth" about themselves. One of the predominant features of this 
belief was the confession. As the confession became secularized and 
incorporated into non-religious practice and ritual, it tended to 
mask the dictates of power/knowl~dge and the role of the 
father-confessor came to be reproduced in a number of different 
guises; that of the teacher-confessor, doctor-confessor, and 
social-worker confessor. The confession came to be disseminated 
throughout society as a form which encouraged the expression of a 
supposedly pure and unmediated subjectivity. A hidden monument to the 
perhaps mistaken belief in the talking-cure and the power of 
experience to understand the workings of its own unconscious. 
1.2: BACKGROUND TO A METHODOLOGY 
The first half of this introductory chapter was designed to introduce 
the unfamiliar reader to the most important of Foucauldian ideas. It 
might plausibly be suggested that I have in this regard misread 
Foucault's work, I have projected a conceptual and thematic 
continuity on to his work in a questionable if not false way. What is 
worse, it might be asserted that I have recuperated and thereby 
de-radicalised what I have touched. On the other hand, however, 
hopefully I have succeeded in establishing, albeit in a somewhat 
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tentative way, a working vocabulary and a foundation on which to 
build. During the section which follows this is exactly what I intend 
doing. With the help of what I feel are Foucault's two most important 
essays, The Order of Discourse and Nietzsche. Genealogy. History, I 
will attempt to outline a blueprint which will allow me to work 
toward a methodology for my own project, that is. a study of events. 
institutions and the emergence of the subject therein. within the 
dominant context of the Municipality of Woodstock. 
In the brief introduction which frames Foucault's essay, Robert Young 
sees fit to take the reader back in time to Foucault's very first 
book, Madness and Civilization. It. will be remembered that during 
this book Foucault attempts to understand the rise of reason in the 
West through an analysis of that shadowy, enigmatic realm which 
surrounds reason on all sides, unreason or madness. Yet how does the 
theorist try to re-create the meaninglessness of madness, how does he 
make it speak a tangible "truth"? Young believes that this question 
haunted Foucault and led him instead to pursue different yet related 
questions. For example, what are the procedures which make up our 
will-to-reason, our will-to-knowledge? This positive unconscious of 
knowledge does not relate directly to madness but asks instead what 
are those mechanisms internal to discourse itself which form and keep 
it in circulation. And furthermore, how powerful and pervasive is 
discourse if it can effectively banish ( and continue to do so) a 
certain type of knowledge - that of madness. 
The structure of The Order of Discourse is circular. The essay begins 
in an attempt to insert itself into the already spoken and it ends on 
a ritualised note of hommage - we are dealing with French academic 
protocol here - to Foucault's former philosophy teacher at the 
Sorbonne, Jean Hyppolite. This "already spoken" is of course 
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Hyppolite's language, the language of a past master and guide to whom 
Foucault is greatly indebted. Hyppolite's presence thus appears to 
loom over the entire paper, infusing Foucault's work with a sense of 
oedipal tension, of rivalry and finally, of the sense of liberation 
which ensues after the creation of a philosophical space which curves 
beyond the reach of the master.8 
The second section of the paper begins in the following manner: 
Here is the hypothesis which I would like to put forward tonight 
in order to fix the terrain - or perhaps the very provisional 
theatre - of the work that I am. doing: that in every society the 
production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, 
organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures 
whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery 
over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable 
materiality.9 
Foucault's paper introduces a primary distinction. The distinction is 
between discourse, which is understood to be free-flowing and 
libidinal and the institution, an organization or matrix of knowledge 
which at every attempt tries to channel and limit discourse. The two 
are inextricably linked and function together in a system of mutual 
inter-reliance rather than separately. Foucault thinks that there are 
three major principles of institutional exclusion which "forge" 
discourse: what cannot be said - in other words, what is forbidden 
- what constitutes the severance of madness from reason and what 
maintains an underlies our will-to-truth. Foucault maintains that, 
The third system (the will-to-truth) increasingly attempts to 
assimilate the others, both in order to modify them and to 
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provide them with a foundation. The first two (the forbidden, the 
division of madness) are constantly becoming more fragile and 
more uncertain to the extent that they are now invaded by the 
will-to-truth which for its part constantly grows stronger, 
deeper, and more implacable.10 
Foucault contends that this will-to-truth is caught up in both desire 
and power. Thus, on the discursive level, any "truth" is not simply 
natural and given but crossed by the dictates of both power and 
desire. Having exhausted the system of exterior functions which limit 
discourse, Foucault goes on to analyse the system of interior 
constraints on discourse. These principles of "classification" do not 
relate to desire and power but to events and chance. Let me explain; 
firstly there is the role of commentary, the ongoing process of 
expression and re-ordering with respect to the narratives which are 
essential to the reproduction of society. Secondly, there is the 
function of the author, a function which serves to reduce meaning to 
an originating consciousness. With regard to both the role of 
commentary and that of the author Foucault writes, 
The commentary principle limits the chance element in discourse 
by the play of an identity which would take the form of 
repetition and sameness. The author principle limits this same 
element of chance by the play of an identity which has the form 
of individuality and the self.11 
Thirdly, there is the function of the discipline which is opposed to 
both the role of commentary and of the author. This is so because, in 
the first place, disciplines, unlike commentaries, are concerned with 
the production and dist~ibution of new statements whereas 
commentaries attempt to decipher pre-existing meanings. With respect 
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to authors, disciplines, which are a system of rule-governed, yet 
anonymous procedures, are anti-authorial in their bias because their 
project is not to reduce meaning to an "inventor" but to formulate 
proposals in order to understand, and create, truths. Finally in this 
regard Foucault states, 
We are accustomed to see in an author's fecundity, in the 
multiplicity of commentaries, and in the development of a 
discipline so many infinite resources for the creation of 
discourses. Perhaps so, but they are nonetheless principles of 
constraint; it is very likely impossible to account for their 
positive and multiplicatory ro).e if we do not take into 
consideration their restrictive and constraining function. 12 
Lastly there is a "third group of procedures" which attempt to 
control and delimit discourse. In order to understand this third 
group we must analyse their determining conditions of application and 
their manner of restriction. These can be dismantled under the 
following headings: Ritual, which is composed of qualifications, 
positions, gestures, with reference to those who speak. Doctrine ( or, 
"doctrinal allegiance") which is a system or pattern of truth which 
puts both speaker and statement in jeopardy if they choose to utter a 
heresy or to contravene a code of enunciation. Towards the end of the 
fourth section of his paper, Foucault also has certain thoughts about 
the function of education in "our" societies, 
Any system of education is a political way of maintaining or 
modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the 
knowledges and power which they carry. 13 
What are the methods upon which analysis predicates itself? In this 
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regard Foucault proposes four compatible and mutually inter-related 
principles. Firstly there is the "principle of reversal". Where the 
History of Ideas stressed the importance of a tradition or author, 
critical analysis should reverse this obsession and instead valorise 
the function of rarefaction. The "principle of reversal" does not 
analyse discourse in its linear productive splendour but focuses on 
the supposedly negative ambition of "cutting-up", of severing 
discourse from its epistemological anchors. Secondly there is the 
"principle of discontinuity". It is imperative that discourse be 
studied as discontinuous "practices". Discourses do of course 
encroach upon each other but it is important to maintain them 
separately and not to reconstitute .a massive, continuous unthought or 
unsaid beneath the surface of discourse itself. Thirdly, Foucault 
recognises the fact that we must not analyse objects in the manner of 
the hermeneuticist. In other words the recognition that objects do 
not pre-exist us but are in fact constituted by discourse itself 
leads to the "principle of specificity". Fourthly, Foucault sketches 
out the principle or rule of exteriority. With respect to this rule 
he states that the analyst should not proceed inwards towards a 
forbidden core of meaning but should move outwards in an attempt to 
investigate the discourse's "external conditions of possibility". 
Foucault writes, 
Four notions, then, must serve as the regulating principle of the 
analysis; the event, the series, the regularity, the condition of 
possibility. Term for term we find the notion of the event 
opposed to that of creation, series opposed to unity, regularity 
opposed to originality, and conditions of possibility opposed to 
signification. These other four notions (signification, 
originality, unity, creation) have in a general way dominated the 
traditional history of ideas, where by common agreement one 
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sought the point of creation, the unity of a work, an epoch a 
theme, the mark of individual originality, and the infinite 
treasure of buried significations.14 
After a brief digression on the nature of the event and series and 
the relationship that these two principles have to the project of the 
Annales historians, Foucault prepares to elaborate some of the 
philosophical problems that might be associated with the 
above-mentioned notions; event, series, regularity and conditions of 
possibility. These choice musings follow the logic of paradox and 
initiate a strategy of refusing to make themselves transparent. With 
regard to the discursive event, FmJcault notes that, 
Naturally the event is neither substance nor accident, neither 
quality nor process; the event is not of the order of bodies. And 
yet it is not something immaterial either; it is always at the 
level of materiality that it takes effect, that it has effect; it 
has its locus and it consists in the relation, the coexistence, 
the dispersion, the overlapping, the accumulation, and the 
selection of material elements. It is not the act or the property 
of a body; it is produced as an effect of, and within, a 
dispersion of matter. Let us say that the philosophy of the event 
should move in the at first sight paradoxical direction of a 
materialism of the incorporeal.15 
With reference to the idea of the discursive event, Foucault asks how 
one is to understand the related notion of series which are 
"discontinuous in relation to each other". Foucault suggests that it 
is literally necessary to "break-up" the subject into an array of 
conflicting positions, as well as contesting the succession of "the 
instant" (I take this to approximate the moment and to be synonymous 
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with the passing of time) in a manner in which enables the analyst to 
construct or at least approach "a theory of discontinuous 
systematicities". Between "a materialism of the incorporeal" and a 
discontinuous systematics, the vigilant analyst should insert the 
idea of chance, "We must accept the alea as a category in the 
production of events".16 
At the beginning of the seventh section of Foucault's essay he 
clarifies the manner in which he hopes to use the methodological 
outline which he has proposed thus far. He divides this process in 
two; firstly there is what he refers to as the critical set, a system 
of analysis which has as its conceptual underpinning the principle of 
reversal. This principle attempts to understand how systems of 
exclusion and prohibition and classification and limitation have 
operated historically. In this regard Foucault offers a number of 
helpful examples which either refer to work he has already done or 
work which he still hopes to do. Secondly, there is the genealogical 
set which puts the aforementioned second, third and fourth principles 
to work. These principles are those of discontinuity and specificity 
and the rule of exteriority. The genealogical set would thus attempt 
to find out how particular discourses come to be formed and under 
what constraints, "what was the specific norm of each one, and what 
were their conditions of appearance, growth and variation" 17 At 
the bottom of the next page Foucault is at pains to point out that 
the two critical tasks cannot be separated, in fact, one might be 
prompted to suggest that the two tasks are even complimentary, 
although their perspectives are somewhat different. To conclude, it 
is only correct that the last word be Foucault's. 
The critical portion of the analysis applies to the systems that 
envelop discourse, and tries to identify and grasp these 
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principles of sanctioning, exclusion, and scarcity of discourse. 
Let us say, playing on words, that it practices a studied 
casualness. The genealogical portion, on the other hand, applies 
to the series where discourse is effectively formed; it tries to 
grasp it in its power of affirmation, by which I mean not so much 
a power which would be opposed to that of denying, but rather the 
power to constitute domains of objects, in respect of which one 
can affirm or deny true or false propositions. Let us call these 
domains of objects positivities, and let us say, again playing on 
words, that if the critical style is that of studious casualness, 
the genealogical mood will be that of a happy positivism.18 
Foucault's essay, Nietzsche. Genealogy. History, written in 1971 and 
first published in translation in Language. Counter-Memory. Practice, 
provides me with some of the material which will help to sketch the 
conceptual backdrop to the construction of a methodology in section 
1.3. The essay is an attempt to lay bare the groundrules which will 
contribute to the formation of what Foucault refers to as "Effective 
history" - a certain type of historiographic undertaking which 
attempts to activate a "counter-memory". Not surprisingly the essay 
is first and foremost an anti-metaphysical tirade and although the 
phrase history-of-ideas is never mentioned, we can take it as given 
that the hidden object behind Foucault's attack is a certain form of 
idealist historiography, namely that exemplified by the title 
History-of-Ideas. 
The essay begins with a meditation, or more specifically an exegesis, 
on the nature, meaning and significance of three well-used 
Nietzschean words, Ursprung, Herkunft and Entstehung, all of which 
loosely refer to the concept of origin. The word Ursprung has a 
number of rather indistinct meanings. For Nietzsche it does however 
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mean, "a pursuit of origins"19 as well as signifying "a guilty 
conscience"20 and "a discussion of logic1121 . The word Herkunft 
can be translated with a greater degree of precision and is the 
equivalent of descent and stresses difference rather than 
resemblance. Entstehung designates emergence. The last two words, 
namely those of Herkunft and Entstehung are the words through which 
Foucault attempts to explain some of the guiding contestatory 
principles of the genealogy. 
In order for us to understand some of the crucial aspects of the 
genealogical method it is necessary for us to clarify ( once again) 
some of the determining aspects o.f traditional history or the History 
of Ideas. Traditional histories attempt to ground themselves in the 
consoling identity of the origin. To this premise is opposed the 
following Nietzschean assertion, "the lofty origin is no more than a 
metaphysical extension which arises from the belief that things are 
most precious and essential at the moment of birth"22. The quest 
for origins (Ursprung) is a theoretical device which enables the 
historian to locate meaning in sameness and identity, whereas the 
genealogist understands history as, "The concrete body of a 
development, with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended 
periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells; and only a 
meta physician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of the 
origin.1123 
Thus, instead of reaching for the lost origin, the genealogist 
proceeds to celebrate the differential nature of descent (Herkunft ). 
Foucault quotes from Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals when he 
writes, 
Genealogy does not resemble the evolution of a species and does 
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not map the destiny of a people. On the contrary, to follow the 
complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their 
proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute 
deviations - or conversely, the complete reversals. The errors, 
the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that give birth 
to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it 
is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what 
we know and what we ·are, but the exteriority of accidents. 24 
An analysis which privileges the term descent (Herkunft) does not 
seek to re-affirm homogeniety at the beginning of things. Its concern 
is to shatter, to fragment, to seek qeterogeniety in history, which 
is a series composed of discontinuous moments, fractures, reversals. 
In short, the past is dominated by chance rather than meaning and 
identity. The genealogist's project thus, is not to uncover meaning 
and identity - usually "found" by orthodox historians who are not 
prepared to acknowledge their desires in the creation of historical 
meaning, for to do so whould be to undermine their pretention to 
objective science - but to actively intervene in the analysis of 
events and the emergence of supposedly "universal" objects (like the 
human body, for instance) and the different regimes of knowledge to 
which it has been forced to submit. In fact, 
Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the 
articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a 
body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's 
destruction of the body.25 
Foucault begins the essay's fourth section with a definition of 
'Enstehung' or emergence and he notes that it should never be viewed 
as the final point or absolute in any history. Through the trope of 
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emergence genealogy attempts, "to re-establish the various systems of 
subjection: not the anticipatory power of meaning but the hazardous 
play of dominations." 26 
The "force" which is emergence, is, it appears, not reducible to the 
intentions of active subjects. It occurs at a "non-place" but is 
nevertheless a confrontation of a moral kind. This confrontation is 
the "play of dominations", a relationship/non-relationship which is 
characterised principally by rituals. 
This relationship of domination is no more a "relationship" than 
the place where it occurs is a place; and, precisely for this 
reason, it is fixed throughout its history, in rituals, in 
meticulous procedures that impose rights and obligations. It 
establishes marks of its power and engraves memories on things 
and even within bodies. It makes itself accountable for debts and 
gives rise to the universe of rules, which is by no means 
designed to temper violence but rather to satisfy it. 27 
Now that we have been provided with the briefest outline of the 
importance of Herkunft and Enstehung to the practice of genealogy it 
is important to ask, as Foucault does, what exactly is the 
relationship between the two concepts? Foucault proceeds to answer 
his question by suggesting that Herkunft and Enstehung should 
supplement the practice of "Effective history", a genealogical 
enterprise which steadfastly opposes all forms of metaphysical 
history ( or Egyptianism ). Histories which are, in other words, 
dominated by the search for truth, their identification of the end of 
time, a "historian's history" which bases "its judgements on an 
apocalyptic objectivity" and an "eternal truth"28_ The "effective 
history" of which Herkunft and Enstehung are part is primarily 
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directed towards the human body, an object which, if we are to 
believe traditional historians, has remained unchanged and constant 
across time. Effective history does not accept this as given for, 
"Effective" history differs from traditional history in being 
without constants. Nothing in man - not even his body - is 
sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or 
for understanding other men. The traditional devices for 
constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing 
the past as a patient and continuous development must be 
systematically dismantled. Necessarily, we must dismiss those 
tendencies that encourage the.consoling play of recognitions. 
Knowledge, even under the banner of history, does not depend on 
"rediscovery" and it emphatically excludes the "rediscovery of 
ourselves". 29 
The "short-vision of effective history" can be compared to the 
totalizing gaze of traditional history through its differing 
approach. In this regard the "event" is of prime importance for this 
thesis is an attempt to order events (which happened in or around 
certain institutional contexts) in a series or narrative sequence. 
Thus for "effective history" the event is not a major happening such 
as a "war", a "treaty", or a "battle", "but the reversal of a 
relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of 
a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a feeble 
domination that poisons itself as it grows lax, the entry of a masked 
'other"'30_ 
"Effective history" can be distinguished from traditional history in 
the following ways: unlike traditional history, effective history 
acknowledges that it is perspectival, in other words, it claims to be 
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merely one perspective amoung others, and not necessarily a truthful 
one at that. The "curative science" otherwise known as "effective 
history" does not become a victim of the malice of orthodox 
historians, who are not protected by the myth of objectivity or the 
lingering of pervasive universals. Furthermore, the "historical 
sense" which underlies "effective history" 
... gives rise to three uses that oppose and correspond to the 
three Platonic modalities of history. The first is parodic, 
directed against reality, and opposes the theme of history as 
reminiscence or recognition; the second is dissociative, directed 
against identity, and opposes ~istory given as continuity or 
representative of a tradition; the third is sacrificial, directed 
against truth, and opposes history as knowledge. They imply a use 
of history that severs its connection to memory, its metaphysical 
and anthropological model, and constructs a counter-memory - a 
transformation of history into a totally different form of 
time.31 
And this interpretation of critical or "effective" history is what 
finally allows us to acknowledge the meaning of the genealogical 
method; 
The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover 
the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its 
dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of 
emergence, the homeland to which meta physicians promise a return; 
it seeks to make visible all those discontinuities which cross 
us.32 
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1.3: A METHODOLOGY 
I have taken great pains to demonstrate that Foucault is no 
"ordinary" philosopher. Rather, like mercury, he always seems to be 
in the process of becoming something else. This has the effect o~ 
alienating the reader, who is thus inevitably one step behind the 
magician's next trick. What I have done in this introductory chapter, 
therefore, is to introduce the reader to Foucault's work in 
chronological order, introducing him/her gently to Foucault's 
preoccupations and concerns. I have shown for example how, from a 
very early period, Foucault has been suspicious of conventional forms 
of history. I have shown how his interest in the philosophers of 
science, like Bachelard and Canguilhem, has led him to an 
appreciation of the idea that history need not be concerned with 
spatio-temporal unities, but might be a form which honours 
spatio-temporal heterogeniety; the genealogy is one such attempt to 
respect temporal difference. In fact, it is possible to "read" 
Foucault as a philosopher who adapts methods forged in the 
life-sciences and applies them to the social or human sciences. This 
is demonstrated very well in his genealogies, where he suggests that 
the genealogy is a method capable of unlocking the history of the 
body. This is in contrast to "orthodox" historians who have in 
general assumed that the body remains untouched by history. 33 I 
have also shown how Foucault has increasingly been concerned with the 
need to solve particular problems in specific contexts. This 
genealogy is an attempt at extending that ambition. 
In order to distil as much methodological worth from this most 
anti-methodological of all recent philosophers, I have progressively 
narrowed the focus of our considerations. The second section of this 
introductory chapter was a narrowing of the first and in similar 
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fashion I intend to make this, the final section of this chapter as 
transparently methodological as I can. 
I have already hinted at the methodological significance of the event 
( see above, section 1.2. ). The event is of vital importance to this 
project because, in relation to the questions and problems posed 
around the issue of the emergence of a municipality as an institution 
in the introduction, I hope to place a series of events in narrative 
sequence. In contrast to orthodox forms of historiography, where the 
historian tends to neglect the issue of his or her desire in the 
construction of historical meaning - this is usually linked to a 
naive trust in pre-existing "facts" -. the logic of the event and 
its subsequent narrativisation is the outcome of the genealogists 
immersion in the topic: the manner in which they retroactively 
project significance back onto the past. For the most part then, my 
desire to seek out the meaning-effect of events within the context of 
four municipal institutions is a result of a generalised 
dissatisfaction with the writing on local history. (This will take 
concrete shape in the chapter which follows.) It is also borne of a 
fascination with the writings of Michel Foucault, who himself was 
intrigued with the emergence of certain institutions in the modern 
age. Foucault is unique in that he contends that disciplinary 
institutions emerged from the same epistemological matrix as man and 
the human sciences. They are thus able to offer "consoling" 
counter-examples to the enlightenment dream of a progressively 
liberating rationality. 34 Far from being an attempt to mimic 
Foucault, this genealogy is an attempt, therefore, to register the 
meaning-effect of the emergence of a paradigmatically modern series 
of municipal institutions, and the position of the event in relation 
to those institutions. 
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It is important to note at this point that the questions and problems 
raised in the introduction were of paramount importance, because 
questions posed at the beginning of any genealogy tend to define the 
status and significance of events. In effect this means that another 
researcher could embark on a genealogy of the Woodstock Municipality 
but do so in terms of a different generality, a different range of 
questions. These questions would accord different significances to 
the "same" events because the events would presumably be assembled 
and interpreted differently. In this case, we would be obliged to 
scrutinize the status of the "same" event because in effect it would 
be different, in the sense that its significance would be altered in 
relation to the choice of the events - the narrative series -. 
around it. 
If we are to understand the importance of the event and the series we 
need to accept that language and thought are independent of each 
other. The constitution of the event takes place when language and 
the event coincide in consciousness: the retrospective construction 
of the event in thought is a phantasm which gets retroactively 
projected by the historian back onto the "actual event" and goes to 
make up the membrane or skin of its meaning-effect. By asserting that 
we are dealing with the meaning-effect of an event I do not mean to 
suggest for instance that the founding of the Woodstock Municipality 
did not happen as an event in the real. I am simply suggesting that 
the "event" is part of a narrative which has everything to do with my 
construction and arrangement of it as such. Before the logic of 
phantasm becomes too overwhelming, however, it is necessary to 
undertake a slight philosophical detour. 
We should note that when Foucault writes about the event (see above) 
he has in mind this logic of phantasm. 35 This idea (borrowed from 
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the French post-structuralist philosopher Gilles Deleuze) asserts 
that the event in the real is repeated as a Platonic bad copy or 
phantasm in thought. By pushing the the Platonic notion of good and 
bad copies of an original to their outer limit, Deleuze is able to 
assert that the phantasm actually preceeds the original. Plato was 
aware of the bad copy's destructive potential because it was able to 
offer a critique of the Idea as truth. Deleuze's contribution was to 
note that the bad copy disrupts the status of the original ( as a bad 
copy it refers to nothing but itself, it is thus retrospectively 
creative because the original cannot be an original without appearing 
in series in relation to those around it). The bad copy also 
subversively unravels all corresporydences between all variants of the 
"original" "good-copy" combination (like that between essence and 
appearance, for example) precisely because the reality of the bad 
copy make the implied equivalence between "original" and·~ 
"bad-copy" meaningless. 36 
The implications which follow from the above are as follows: Deleuze 
puts forward the famous example of a battle. He asks, "Where is the 
battle?"37, particularly if the battle is made up of a 
Breughel-like canvas of separate actions involving a series of sinall 
battlefield dramas. Clearly, none of these micro-actions can be said 
to constitute the battle as such, "So where is the battle?". 
According to Deleuze, "the battle" appears to function in the same 
way as a sea-mist, spreading gently across the battlefield, retaining 
its "identity" as that which is separate from the series of actions 
but at the same time making up the tissue of the drama's 
meaning-effect.38 The phantasm does not produce the event, but like 
the example of the sea-mist, it hovers over the battlefield like a 
simulacrum, bringing the event into existence when the event and 
language coincide. According to Robert Young, 
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Foucault recognizes in Deleuze's account of events as 
singularities, points or intensities on a surface ready to be 
actualised in any particular form or meaning, the potential for 
pushing further his own notion of history as a genealogical 
series. Such a genealogy works by repeating the (non)event, as an 
event, in thought - in a structure comparable to Freud's 
"deferred action" or "retroactivity". No more than the latter 
does it seek to lay claim to "the real" or Truth as such. 
Foucault inflects this model by focussing on the possibility of 
constructing the series so as to repeat the disruption and 
discontinuity of the (non-origiriaI) event.39 
The logic of the phantasm is one way of activating the meaning-effect 
of events. The event, which is to some degree constituted by the 
historian, is not analysed for its "truth" but rather for its 
meaning-effect. Thus altough the genealogy is to some extent a 
polemical critique of certain expressions of contemporary 
historiography. it does not pretend do anything more than narrate a 
series of events against a generality posed in the present. Herein 
lurks the transgressive and politically contestative element of the 
genealogy as a history of the present: for not only are the questions 
raised important (see introduction), but so too is the "event" of the 
writing of this thesis. In exploiting the philosophical space between 
the "event" and the retroactive projection of desire which 
phantasmically creates that event, I am attempting to critique all 
forms of history which insist on the consoling play of identities 
between past and present. My methodology will allow me to isolate 
certain events within the context of the institutions in which they 
"happened" and then scrutinize them for their meaning-effects or 
intelligibility. Thereafter I will attempt to isolate certain 
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features within the respective institutions in line with the 
generality that has already been posed in the introduction. These 
features will inevitably revolve around the constitution and 
emergence of the subject rather than the attempted reconstruction of 
the subject's experience. I will try to analyse the discursive 
practices (both within and without the respective institutions) and 
disciplinary regimes, their limits and their relationship to other 
regimes and discursive practices in the series. 
In looking toward chapter two, in which I "deconstruct" a piece of 
recent historical writing which conforms in many ways to that to 
which Foucault is strongly oppose(;!, I wish to make clear the 
following: the critique of Rediscovering Woodstock is not a 
gratuitous intervention, but is necessary because it is an expression 
of what I am writing against.40 The polemic against "Rediscovering 
Woodstock" is not a specific articulation of my methodolo'°' as such, 
but is a practical application of Foucault's ideas which is 
consistent at the level of assumption to the strains and biases in 
his work. The isolation of certain events and their relationship to 
the institution in which they happened will make up the bulk of the 
rest of the thesis. This is therefore the portion of the thesis in 
which my methodology will be the most productively employed. 
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discipline's inability to apprehend Foucault with anything 
approaching sympathy. Bove suggests that Taylor is a "limit-case" 
for understanding how a philosopher who is as hostile to the 
analytic tradition as Foucault is, is incorporated via some 
extremely problematic and reductive readings into the analytical 
canon. Bove does not assert anything so crude as to suggest that 
Taylor misrepresents Foucault, but he does focus on the manner in 
which Taylor - from within the discipline of analytical 
philosophy - is forced to flatten and thus deradicalize 
Foucault's thought. In order to understand Foucault's work, 
Taylor operates a system of double translation whereby Foucault's 
work is paraphrased and then .reduced still further, so that his 
writings become a series of transparent, style less "positions", 
stories about truth and power, for example, which can then be 
found to be logically inconsistent, and can therefore be 
dismissed as irrelevant. Bove condemns Taylor for not considering 
the limitations of his own discipline. He suggests that Taylor 
has allowed Foucault's work to be "recollected" and reduced to a 
series of immobile "positions" and is thus participating in the 
Power/Knowledge complex which Foucault critiques. Bove implies 
that Taylor cannot be ironical or self-critical about the nature 
of his own disciplinary formation because to do so would draw 
attention to its use of a limiting regime of truth, and thus 
power, and would in turn de-mythologize its supposedly 
disinterested stance vis-a-vis knowledge and truth. Bove goes on 
to trace the relationship between "grand humanist intellectuals" 
like Taylor (although Taylor is variously described as an organic 
and universal intellectual) and the "liberal state" in that it is 
precisely these kinds of moves, saturated with "power" and 
"ideology" as they are, that characterize the production of the 
liberal state. 
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Whilst sharing Bove's suspicion of analytical philosophy as an 
institution which is forced to limit the more threatening 
dimensions of radical thought, Bove's criticisms do not leave me 
entirely convinced of the validity of his claims. I am struck by 
the high artificiality as well as the manner in which academics 
have used Foucault's work to empower themselves professionally, 
through critiques of others' institutional settings and 
formations. These formations are understandably resistant to 
critical self-examination, given that they collude with the power 
apparatus and function as distributors of a circumscribed truth. 
I note with mild amusement that Bove calls attention to Taylor's 
manifest failure to provide his readers with a historical account 
of the (genealogical) formation of analytical philosophy. Yet 
Bove does nothing of the sort himself. Surely Bove is only able 
to criticise Taylor from within a specific disciplinary 
conjucture - that of Literary Studies/Comparative Literature -
which is, in turn, part of the Academy, a notorious institution, 
which apparently regulates, and is even strengthened by, internal 
dissent. Under the guise of liberal tolerance, the University 
seems to encourage mutually-hostile and even self-cancelling 
discourses and thereby reproduces its hegemony. Bove is only able 
to criticize Taylor because he is articulating himself from 
within a disciplinary formation which itself has a specific past 
which has contibuted to its greater threshold of tolerance. 
However, he too is not historically sensitive enough, for to be 
so would draw attention to the construction of the University in 
general and Arts and Humanities departments in particular (from 
within which he is writing) and thus, by drawing attention to the 
institutional conditions of possibility, he would limit the 
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effectiveness of his critique. Without an adequate historic 
discussion of the University, Bove finds that, almost in spite of 
himself, he might be inextricably linked to the production of the 
liberal consensus which he eschews. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault, trans., by Sean Hand. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1988) p. 92. 
39. Young, R. White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. 
(London: Routledge, 1990), p.83. 
40. For a similar, though less exhqustive critique, refer to the 
conclusion of this thesis, in which I question the methods 
employed by one of Foucault's American commentators. 
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CHAPTER 2: A POLEMIC AGAINST ORTHODOXY 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter two is both a continuation of my introductory chapter, as well 
as an adaption and extension of some of the ideas contained therein. 
The chapter takes the form of a critical re-writing of an essay 
entitled Rediscovering Woodstock. This re-writing has a specifically 
Foucauldian bias and it is thereby intended to familiarize the reader 
with certain perennial concerns and themes. Hopefully, the argument 
will be less rarified than were the ~ummaries provided in the 
preceding chapter. As such this chapter is intended as an important 
bridge between the summarizing and creation of a methodology in 
chapter one and the case-studies of chapters three to six. 
I have chosen to "deconstruct" Rediscovering Woodstock in two ways: 
the first method is immediate and is confined to chapter two. The 
second takes place over the entire course of the thesis, as the 
chapters which involve case-studies are attempts to render fsubtly as 
possible those forms of insurrectionary and discredited knowledge of 
which Foucault has always been so fond. 
In its ordinary and inoffensive way, Rediscovering Woodstock upholds 
many of the assumptions which I am attempting to challenge. In its 
apparently neutral and fair-minded pursuit of the truth, for example, 
the essay is an extremely self-interested expression of the 
will-to-power. The profound difference of a restless past is con-
trolled under the guise of similarity (sameness) and thus continuity 
and ultimately identity between past and present is confirmed. 
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I should make the reader aware at this point that one of my ambitions 
with this genealogy is to draw attention to not only disciplinary 
technologies and the ordering of penitents' or patients' subject-
ivities; but also to explore several examples of disruptive difference: 
incidents, forms of behaviour and accidents, which have been neglected 
by the historical discourse, of which Badham 's essay is part. This is 
because it is a discourse which cannot accommodate threatening local 
knowledge, those struggles and memories which as examples of alterity 
fall both beneath the view of worthiness (science) and, which threaten 
reasonable discourse's very constitution. 
In chapters three to six, I will be lo9king, in classic genealogical 
fashion, at the textual surfaces of four institutions in order to 
reconstitute their disciplinary technologies and unique forms of 
institutional truth. In so doing, I suggest that there is an entire 
range of local activity and culture which has passed beneath the view 
of historians like Badham. 
What this genealogy is attempting to do is to understand, from the 
point of view of a vaguely demarcated present, aspects of the past 
which were strange enough to establish themselves as radically 
different, even discontinous with our present. Nevertheless, I am also 
trying to reconstitute a segment of the past ( 1882 - 1913) and hope 
in so doing to be able to trace a part of the logic which leads to 
where we find ourselves today. For this, after all, is what a genealogy 
is all about: it is an attempt to understand the present (however 
imperfectly) in terms of subordinated aspects of the past. Unlike 
Badham's essay, my undertaking is not a retrospective projection of 
current norms and values on to the past, and thus a covert 
justification of our present, rather it is a recognition that if we are 
able to capture the past in any way at all, it will be in our 
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sensitivity to heterogeniety and difference. 
2.1: HISTORY 
I think it appropriate to begin with a consideration of the word 
"rediscovering" in the title Rediscovering Woodstock. Rediscovery 
implies an expanse of emptiness between an 'original' and a later 
period of discovery. What shape did this emptiness take'? Badham's 
article states that the emptiness was that of an active forgetting or 
lack of interest on the part of historians.1 
"Woodstock is dying of neglect" wrote C. Pama in 1979; Almost a 
decade later, this is still the case not only in terms of its 
generally dilapidated run-down appearance but also of historical 
research of the area. Historians have tended to overlook this once 
dynamic centre which underwent rapid change in the late nineteenth 
century, being second in size to central Cape Town, the focus of 
most urban history.2 
The emptiness was therefore textual, an absence within local historical 
discourse. But this is not all; Cape Town, which is more attractive 
than Woodstock has claimed researchers attention and, Woodstock is a 
municipality which has forgotten itself; the words "generally 
dilapidated run-down appearance"3 are of prime importance because 
they provide the necessary justification for the restoration of 
'consciousness' for 'rediscovery'. 
The metaphor of the forgotten dominates the final paragraph of 
Rediscovering Woodstock's brief introduction. This time it is combined 
with a suggestion that not only has Woodstock been forgotten but that 
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Woodstock's 'essence' remains invisible to a superficial 'reading', 
particularly to train passengers, people who literally slide across the 
municipality's surface.4 
The trains rattle past. For the passengers, Woodstock is little 
more than the back of buildings, bright pro-temperence billboards, 
a patch of grass and windswept melkboom. This is a far cry from 
Woodstock at the turn of the century.5 
We thus find ourselves in the midst of a spiral which by implication 
suggests that invisibility can be equated with lack, lack of knowledge 
or even non-knowledge. In opposition to this, the final sentence 
implicitly promises to remedy this lack, to restore our faith in 
historical knowledge with a reading which goes beneath the surface, 
that is, a deep reading. The history of Woodstock, through the 
'intervention' of a socially conscious researcher, will once again be 
united with itself. We have thus witnessed the closure of the 
hermeneutic circle. The fusion of subject and object, and the article 
has come to a premature end before it has been properly begun. This 
false closure is part of Badham's conception of history. For her, 
history is ( amongst other things) something which people possess. 
History is a fetish, a purely mental appropriation of what presently 
exists and has existed in the past. If Bad ham enters into a 
relationship of rediscovery followed by one of repossession, she is 
either required to presume a shared subjectivity between minds or she 
is forced into the extreme position of having to admit that in spite of 
her altruistic intentions, the good people of Woodstock just don't 
care. There is a third option though; that the historian/philanthropist 
is bound by a consensus between defined parties and that he/she would 
have a mandate for 'rediscovery' before any investigation begins. As we 
shall see shortly this third alternative is clearly impossible. Aside 
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from the reader's realisation that the municipality's history belongs 
to all who live there, this 'all' is only defined insofar as we 
acknowledge them to be inhabitants of the municipality rather than, 
say, members of a class. Thus Badham's conception of the subject 
extends no further than it being a member of a place which is 
arbitrarily defined. There is no innate reason why Table Bay, Devil's 
Peak and Salt River should signify as the boundaries of the 
municipality. The characteristic of place and presumably the attendant 
sense of belonging appears to be a rather vague qualification on which 
to base an urban history. Particularly since I would argue against 
Badham that Woodstock is not a fixed entity and as a result is neither 
geographically nor ontologically Stf!ble. I would suggest that because 
it was made and unmade on an almost daily basis, continually shifting 
its definitions of what was other or 'out there' the municipality was 
not only a shifting spatial construct, but a shifting discursive 
construct as well. There is also an epistemological consideration which 
needs to be accounted for; taking one's cue from the Order of Things 
one could argue that geographical boundaries are dissolved by weightier 
(perhaps archival) blocks of knowledge which transcend and govern local 
minutae. In following the above logic we would conclude that 
geographical and spatial issues are secondary to governing 
epistemologies which out-flank disciplined constructions of space under 
the official heading Woodstock Municipality. 
In general Badham's essay fails to consider the relationship which 
exists between words and things. Part of my project in this thesis is 
to assert that the municipality is not only a thing-in-the-world, but 
as it were, a geography of words. A municipality has both a 
material/physical as well as a discursive reality and in many important 
ways the Woodstock Municipality was a discursive creation; a creation 
of words, laws, rules, procedures etc. It is these words which 
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participate silently and invisibly in the creation of the municipality, 
even when it appears to have been forgotten. 
This brings us to another problem within Badham's work, the problem of 
representation. By representation I mean the following: that Badham is 
relying on an extremely traditional definition of the intellectual in 
her work; that she can present a people's past to them is taken as 
given. The premiss that history can be siphoned-off and presented by 
the historically sensitive researcher needs to be scrutinized, for it 
cannot passively be accepted as true. 
There is a moral dimension associ<;1ted with the 'rediscovery' of a 
submerged history. A case might therefore be made to describe the 
underlying intellectual tendencies of the above reading as being 
liberatory. By liberatory I mean that repressed histories can be 
liberated and restored to their "rightful owners", no matter how 
problematic a definition of "their rightful owners" is actually 
provided. History can thus be activated or sprung, it can be imbued 
with an energy which will transcend obstacles (like the failure of 
memory for example) and ultimately come to rest. I am sceptical about 
historical ideas rooted in a discourse of liberation because this 
discourse basically understands power in terms of possession. If 
possession can be altered (say the toppling of a state/class alliance 
who possess both the administrative apparatus and the means of 
production) then it logically follows that the "nature" of power will 
also be controlled. 6 
Badham's discourse does not, even at this comparatively early stage, 
attempt to examine in depth the possible reasons for the existence of 
absences within history itself, and neither does she seem to realise 
that "rediscoveries" are products of academic ideology, an ideology 
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which in order to be functionally healthy needs to contribute to the 
production of the past which can always be safely re-inscribed within 
academic institutions themselves. 
The paragraph which follows immediately beneath the heading 'Early 
History and Development' promises to launch the expected 'deep 
reading'. However it provides little more than an extended 
description of pastoral bliss. 
Writing about Woodstock in the 1890's, A.F. Keen described it as 
"a peaceful country village" with open farmland and 
mountainside - grapes to be.picked on the Van Der Byl's farm 
(Roodebloem ); milk, thick with cream, from the herd of jersey 
cows; meat and vegetables from the German farmers at the early 
morning market in Sir Lowry Road. This was indeed the "suburb of 
vineyards and vegetables. 7 
Furthermore the passage appears to articulate a dual return; a return 
to both nature and Europe. I suspect that this dual return is a 
search for historical origins and thus is ultimately a quest for 
identity. It is through the mode of the pastoral that Badham attempts 
to dredge Woodstock back into a situation in which it is identical 
with an original "Europeaness". She is thus enacting a procedure 
which runs parallel to one of the primary discursive strategies 
applied by what I later refer to as Official Administrative 
Discourse, for one of the major consequences of O.A.D. is that it 
seeks to prevent subjects from confronting the geographical/spatial 
otherness of an African reality and this is precisely what Badham, in 
her evocation of the atmosphere of a "peaceful country village" has 
sought to do. At an unfortunately early stage in her article 
therefore, Badham precludes herself from confronting the fact that 
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Woodstock was a municipality in Africa and this, in part, accounted 
for the uniqueness of its historical inheritance. 
In the sentence which follows Badham proceeds to itemize a number of 
leisure activities: 
There were also tickey-beers at the Altona Hotel, walks up the 
mountainside with its few isolated buildings and fynbos, picnics 
in Woodstock cave, swimming and joining the Coloured fishermen 
bringing in their catch at the Woodstock beach, gas street lamps 
and developing industries. 8 
. 
Leisure activities are not the only item being catalogued however. In 
what eventually becomes a heady bricolage we note the somewhat abrupt 
inclusion of 'gas street lamps' and 'developing industries' in the 
system. It is this final term which sets up a significant 
contradiction in Badham's discourse; I suggest that 'developing 
industries' and the 'peaceful country village' alluded to a sentence 
or two ago cannot exist within the same conceptual universe because 
'peaceful country village' harks back to a period which was logically 
prior to 'development' and industrialization. The problem is hardly 
crippling however and had Badham chosen to analyse the growth of the 
municipality in terms of overlapping modes of production and the 
resultant temporal and spatial disjunctures within the community she 
might have been better equipped to locate economically the leisure 
process. As it is, her history seems to be curiously suspended, 
floating without foundation above the (concrete) realities of 
small-scale industrial discipline and capital accumulation. 
Furthermore, when Badham is describing a 'peaceful country village' 
she is not only describing an ideal but in a rough and crude way she 
is unconsciously tracing the logic of instrumental reason, that is, 
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the ongoing rupture which firstly occurs between reason and nature 
and which is then progressively widened by the gulf which separates 
man from man. Thus her blend of utopianism and idealism seems to have 
a pessimistic edge, but it is an edge which I think could have been 
blunted had she realised the original importance of her descriptions 
of subjective, leisure time. A time which was surely different to the 
uniform monotony of commodified time. A time which was 'meaningful' 
rather than simply being the uniform succession of hollow moments. 
Ironically, had Badham chosen to anchor her urban history 
economically, it would have mitigated against her own utopian and 
idealistic tendencies. 
Even at this early stage the implied 'deep reading' has failed to 
emerge. Instead of providing a theoretical alternative to the 
superficial vision encouraged by the view from a train, we are issued 
with individual mosaics which we suspect are being patiently 
accumulated in order to provide either an approximation of life or a 
portrait of the times. However, this patient accumulation of 
pictorial detail has a tendency to aestheticize the objects of its 
concern. Take the following examples for instance: 
The rectory was surrounded by its gnarled hedge, 9 
and, 
and, 
There was Hickson's sweet factory and Globe Engineering with its 
chimney stack, 10 
In those days, there was a well kept cemetery behind the 
church. II 
In this aestheticized landscape, 'chimney stacks', 'gnarled hedges' 
and 'well kept cemeteries' become icons which signify that there is 
62 
something called a universal artistic impulse which can be 
artificially divorced from death, worship and labour. History thus 
becomes presentable, even pretty. It is scrubbed clean and in its 
cleanliness it is remote indeed from the drudgery of labour and the 
fear of death. 
Furthermore, Badham's strategy of itemization or, phrased 
differently, her taking of an inventory, is a means whereby the 
multi-layered complexities of the past can be controlled. The taking 
of inventories immobilizes history in order for it to be scrutinized 
by a subject who is located in a position of false omniscience. 
Cars were also part of that future: traps, spiders and carts were 
the means of transport in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.12 
A more insistent measure of control is the use of pictorial and 
highly naturalistic devices which advance the idea that the past is 
both transparent and immediately sensible. Take the following : 
or, 
Albert Road itself was either dust, or mud in the rainy 
winters.13 
At present it is impossible in our walks abroad to trust our feet 
to look after themselves, and very often difficult in the 
blinding dust to keep the necessary watch over them. so that 
those who are not highsteppers are apt to come to grief. 14 
We, as readers, are therefore invited to savour the photographic 
authenticity of 'real' life at street level. 
63 
2.2: ADMINISTRATIVE DISCOURSE 
Badham uses her sources in a dual manner throughout Rediscovering 
Woodstock. She uses them as information but she also uses her sources 
as indexes of credibility, as authentifiers. Furthermore, when 
reading her history there is a persistent suspicion that to a certain 
extent Badham moulds her history around the content of available 
sources. This would in some way account for the incoherence of her 
project. So, for example, her article tends to over-rely on the 
memories of A.F.Keen and Ernst Rip. Badham does not seem to consider 
as problematic the fact that these 'memories' form the contours of 
her history. With different sources.parts of her article would 
necessarily be different. We are thus able to witness the hidden yet 
nevertheless extreme relativism of her naive social/urban history. I 
am suggesting therefore that without a suitably sceptical attitude 
towards one's use of sources, one's entire historical project could 
be jeopardized. To over-rely on the concentrated subjectivity of the 
memory, interview, or the simple recounting of experience fails to 
come to terms with the fact that articulations of history in the 
above forms mean that history is already textualised and by 
implication the study of history takes place within an already 
textualised world. The implications of this realisation are far 
ranging and the responses of historians are equally wide. However, I 
think that I can safely attest that Badham fails to address the issue 
of the relationship between "originality" and source in any 
meaningful way. 
The idea that sources-as-individuals and individuals-as-sources are 
valuable in terms of the memories and experiences they willingly 
impart is continued throughout the Badham article but is particularly 
noticeable with the mention of (E. Rip, the Woodstock mayor, Bishop 
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William West Jones, A.F. Keen) in its early stages. The oral 
dimension of Rediscoverinc Woodstock accepts the idea of centered 
human consciousness and accepts the idea of sources as reliable 
witnesses. Yet again Badham does not examine the problems as to 
whether human consciousness is an adequate foundation for knowledge. 
Furthermore, we may note that there are certain similarities between 
the confession as a de-secularized form of subjective experience and 
the demands of oral history. 
So for example, we should be aware that oral history is subject to 
the same aporia as Foucault identifies as characterizing the 
confession and the confessional sit.uation; Foucault notes in The 
Histmy of Sexuality, Volume 1, that 'man' is a confessing being, 
'he' confesses habitually and the existence of a confessional 
situation provides the individual with the illusion that he has a 
privileged relationship with the truth.15 Foucault is thus saying 
that 'truth' about the self is as much to do with a ritual bound 
production of certain supposedly 'valid' statements as it is to do 
with a 'deep individual essence' (if such a thing even exists, in 
fact, Foucault would say that it too is fictional knowledge induced 
by the operation of power). Oral history is therefore part of the 
mechanism which utilizes the confession in order to produce "truth 
effects". 
In continuing our analysis of sources I would like to submit the 
language used by the Rector of St Mary's Anglican Church and the 
aforementioned 'Woodstock Mayor' to a close reading. In the interests 
of accuracy I will quote the relevant passage in full: 
In 1875 the Metropolitan of the Anglican Church described 
Papendorp as "a very dreary suburb of Cape Town along the shore 
65 
of Table Bay", two years later the rector of St Mary's reported: 
''The moral tone of the village is fearfully low".16 
This characterization was perpetuated by the Mayor of Woodstock 
who on 1897 stated that "Old Papendorp had a very bad character 
indeed, most of which has been redeemed by Woodstock .... the 
only fault remaining is that of the wind". Just over ten years 
later, a magazine article of the time noted "if you wish to 
appreciate the dismal and depressing effect of a wind sweeping 
over a galvanized iron-town, you must visit Woodstock in a 
south-east wind.17 
The language used in the above extracts is undoubtedly the language 
of well-tuned bourgeois awareness. It is the language of guardians 
who are policing the municipality's moral conscience and thus it is a 
language which is actively discriminatory against those whose morals 
fall short of the assumed standard. The language used by the rector 
of St Mary's is suitably genteel. Its euphemistic nature encourages 
the reader to pursue meaning actively, in order to imagine of what "a 
fearfully low moral tone" might consist. 
Can the phrase be taken to mean that the majority of the population 
rejected the overtures of the Church or that levels of alcoholism and 
prostitution were extremely high? The rector's discourse is confined 
to pursue a strategy of implication. His comments are thus statements 
which involve a certain coyness and ambiguity; he talks from a 
position of authority yet his words are severely restricted by the 
protocol of what cannot be said. The personification of the 
municipality (Papendorp) as, "a very bad character indeed", can be 
read as a blanket condemnation, yet equally, the statement is 
hampered by its strategy of implication. a language which can only 
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hint at and not identify the specific elements of social 'evil'. The 
statements by both the rector of St Mary's and the Woodstock mayor 
betray a self-conscious prudishness which is congruent with their 
social standing. Furthermore. both men are practicing a 
self-censorship which is far from disinterested. They are both 
speaking in the name of power. a power which. as one of its defining 
characteristics. masks a substantial part of itself. In this case the 
mask is one of middle-class gentility. Our analysis of the 
administrative discourse of the municipality's moral guardians takes 
an even more discernible shape in the form of the following extract : 
The same observer found littl~ appeal in Woodstock, describing it 
as "a town of factories, of workmen's houses, of middle-class 
shops and rival church spires with ugly and irreverent 
surroundings". He writes of the frequently windswept Albert Road 
with "its uneven and shabby houses, its dusty little huckster 
shops and its occasional waste spaces strewn with rubbish"; ''The 
tin-roofed cottages with advertisements painted on their walls"; 
''The black mass of gas works 18. 
The mayor of Woodstock describes the municipality's lay-out as a 
space with a motley and fundamentally incoherent design. Badham 
reinforces this impressions later on in her article when she writes, 
''The growth of Papendorp is clearly shown in advertisements 
frequently appearing in the Cape Argus in the early 1880's. The 
development was unplanned and the growing community unorganized".19 
The municipality thus symbolises confusion and threat for it harbours 
an alien and barely intelligible logic. This logic is in an important 
sense beyond the mayor's grasp but at the same time the logic 
envelops him; it is an expression of a personality and culture unlike 
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his own, one which he can witness but is unable to share. The mayor 
is able to comment on the living conditions and daily imagery of 
working-class and petty bourgeois life if only to condemn the 
features of this life as "shabby" and "dusty", "ugly" and 
"irreverent". His only recourse after a faultless demonstration of 
incomprehension is thus dismissal. We should note carefully the 
mayor's set of codified responses and understand them not simply as 
reflections or mediations of "reality" but as responses to a cluster 
of images and representations ("shabby houses", "dusty little 
huckster shops", "waste space's strewn with rubbish"), already 
encrusted in the informal and semi-official discourses of the day. 
2.3: OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCOURSE 
In order to understand Official Administrative Discourse (O.A.D.), 
that is, the laws, the procedures and the rituals by which Woodstock 
was governed on the municipal level, we should note that the 
discourse mobilised by the Woodstock Municipality was undoubtedly a 
partial and uneven expression of what can loosely be called British 
Colonial Discourse. The study of British Colonial Discourse is 
definitely on the historical agenda, 20 but in its broader 
manifestations it is beyond the scope of this thesis. What I intend 
to do, however, is to describe the specific local features of 
municipal discourse, that is, its internal economy and configuration. 
This portion of chapter two is thus a formal analysis and is only 
indirectly concerned with the rate and success of discursive 
application. 
Official Administrative Discourse was simultaneously creative and 
regulative, at once pre-defined and improvisational. It was creative 
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in the sense that it produced and named objects. So for example, the 
very fabric of the municipality was unashamedly British; the 
combination of the words "Wood" and "stock" with their gentle 
evocation of evergreen forests and woodburning suggested a world 
which was determinedly European. This strategy was reinforced by the 
selection of street names; Kitchener, Roberts, Dundonald, and 
Brabant, names which referred directly to an imperial past, a past 
which over the years receeded in importance. 
The discourse was also highly defensive in that it operated in terms 
of a steadfast refusal, a refusal to "engage" with the specific 
characteristics, be they racial, ecol'!omic or environmental, of the 
Western Cape. Municipal discourse was only able to accomodate the 
above difference by opposing it to a set of imperialist premises 
already functionally pre-determined. This is not to suggest that the 
refusal was necessarily effective or even successful. In fact, if we 
ask the question, did municipal discourse ever attempt to understand 
the distinctive otherness that was Woodstock, then the answer is 
surely no. The above question gives something of a false impression, 
however, for O.A.D. is not concerned with understanding so much as it 
is concerned with ordering and cataloging. If, however, we ask the 
related question, did the administrators of the municipality manage 
to preserve relative "harmony" through the constant monitoring and 
surveillance of the population, then the answer is certainly yes. 
If one excludes the Mayor, whose function was primarily symbolic, the 
municipal records suggest that the most important individual in the 
Woodstock Municipality hierachy was the Town Clerk. The Clerk was not 
only a node through which information was relayed, but he was a 
co-ordinator as well: the day to day administration of the 
municipality involved the placing of advertisements for vendors in 
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the local newspapers, dealing with public complaints, acting on 
matters of public health, circulating vaccine notices, etc. Virtually 
every item of administrative importance was in one way or another 
either directly attributable to him or required his approval. The 
Town Clerk was thus in a position of extreme power for he and his 
fellow workers had an entire administrative apparatus at their 
disposal. 
I think that a cursory and necessarily incomplete survey of this 
administrative apparatus is in order. Unfortunately the survey will 
mould itself around what has been preserved, so it is mainly an 
analysis of correspondence rather ihan an analysis of the formation 
or structure of local government. We should under no circumstances 
allow the apparently innocent fact of "preservation" to go unnoticed. 
Knowledge is only preserved because our society has definite 
attitudes towards certain kinds of documentary knowledges. So, for 
example, it is thought that documentary knowledge of the kind stored 
in archives and libraries is important because these institutional 
"spaces" house representations of historical truth. Documentary 
knowledge is supposedly the bedrock of history and through its 
painstaking accumulation "we" will be able to reconstruct life as it 
once was. In other words, and to phrase it quite bluntly, the archive 
and library, are expression of our society's institutionalised 
will-to-truth. 
Much of the knowledge contained in the municipal records (which are 
now stored in the State Archives) takes the form of reports - there 
are reports from the sanitary superintenderit, plague reports from the 
chief valuator, reports from the director of the census. The records 
also contain a wide range of applications: applications for 
permission to build-on to an already-existing structure, and 
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applications for the renewal of general-dealers licences. The records 
also contain notes about fluctuating municipal boundaries, the 
desirability of municipal unification and the formation of boards and 
committees (the Water Board, for instance). Furthermore it should not 
be forgotten that the municipality was a corporation, that is, a 
money-making enterprise whose agents collected regular rates and 
subscriptions. The Municipality/Corporation was also directly 
involved with inspection; the inspection of houses ( and by extension 
the inspection of those who lived there) occupied and empty. The 
inspection of the sanitation network ( drains, stercus pails, springs, 
the Liesbeek River). The inspection of food (and the mechanisms on 
which it was weighed) and finally t~e inspection/surveying of land 
and space. It can thus be ascertained that the function of the 
municipality as a structure of local government was wide-ranging in 
the extreme and knowledge was accumulated and stored to the point of 
being encyclopaedic. The quest for knowledge was neither neutral, nor 
was it simply functional. Some of it was profoundly judgemental and 
had a definite disciplinary edge. However, before we return to the 
important question of discipline within the municipal power structure 
I would like to tentatively put forward some ideas which could 
explain this matrix of knowledge which made up Official 
Administrative Discourse. 
The municipal records appear to subscribe to similar conventions and 
principles of cohesion as the 'documentary' whether it be in the form 
of either a film or journalism. Both the "documentary" in the generic 
sense and the municipal records are types of naive knowledge in that 
they presume direct access to a "reality" which they faithfully 
reflect in order to represent. This representation then serves as a 
trustworthy, supposedly truthful portrayal of the "outside-world". 
Documentary practice is predicated on the failure to recognise that 
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'the outside world' is selectively filtered through the 
epistemological net which constitutes the documentary genre in the 
first place. In turn, subjects experience themselves and their 
socially constructed identities through the films they watch, the 
books they read, the questionnaires they are bound to have to fill in 
and sign, and the regime of insidious surveillance to which they have 
no alternative but to submit. We can understand (via the municipal 
records) therefore, that the O.A.D. of the Woodstock Municipality was 
a documentary machine which on the one hand created cultural 
identities which allowed the inhabitants of the municipality to 
experience themselves as municipal subjects and on the other hand 
fixed those subjects in a rigid taxonomy which tended to render them 
passive and object-like.21 · 
In conclusion the Official Administrative Discourse of the Woodstock 
Municipality was a discursive formation which accumulated, tabulated 
and stored knowledge about the populace in a thorough but somewhat 
paranoid manner. It "viewed" the population as both a resource ( a 
labour pool or a community capable of patriotic leanings) and a 
threat ( a labile and fickle group capable of spontaneous uprising). 
We can suggest therefore that it was not merely a mechanism for 
actual and discursive surveillance but was also a type of welfare 
organisation in that it was concerned with the health and well-being 
of its members. 
2.4: BIO-POWER 
At a comparatively early stage in her article Badham raises the 
important issue of industrial growth, 
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There was Hickson's sweet Factory and Globe Engineering works 
with its chimney stack. Besides the Church, on Albert Road was a 
blacksmiths and a general dealers store (belonging to Amos 
Bailey) while opposite was Davidson's Tannery. 22 
Once again however the information is presented in a strangely 
indiscriminate way. One wonders if Badham employed any criteria 
whereby she selected material because the overall effect of the above 
quote is to leave the reader bemused by the material's apparent 
directionlessness. This burgeoning, although admittedly small-scale 
development (see above) is presented yet is inadequately 
contextualised. Foucault is instruc~ive in this regard because he 
draws attention to the fact that capitalism has always relied on 
disciplined individuals, 'docile bodies' which could be inserted into 
'factories', 'works' and 'tanneries' if not at will then certainly 
efficiently and with a minimum amount of disruption. Furthermore, 
capitalism simply would not have been able to proceed in a relatively 
stable manner unless raw material in the form of fixed, healthy 
populations and stable workforces were already available or at least 
in the making. The Foucauldian concept of bio-power is particularly 
helpful in this respect and more will be written about it as this 
section proceeds. 
The reader should also be made aware of the Church's complicity in 
the creation and perpetuation of the discourse of bio-power, I refer 
in this regard to Badham's utilization of sources. The Church (this 
will be validated in later chapters particularly in chapter five) 
played an important role in creating a reliable 'body' of structural 
knowle~ge about Woodstock and its inhabitants. Church archives 
contained registers as well as documents and information of a more 
general nature. This knowledge undeniably contributed to the 
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supposedly innocent policing, moral and otherwise, of the 
municipality's population. 
Badham also discusses the early influence of the Church and from what 
sectors of the community they drew their parishioners and 
congregation. Her presentation of information is startling in its 
naivete and lack of critical awareness however. She does not consider 
that Churches were in an ideal position to collect and accumulate 
both formal and informal knowledge. Furthermore, she fails to account 
for the fact that the Church (whether it be Dutch Reformed or 
Anglican) was undoubtedly in a position to produce guilt among its 
parishioners. An analysis of the pr9duction and application of guilt 
combined with an understanding of the Church as a documentary 
apparatus which preceded the establishment of the Woodstock 
Municipality would prove to be an important corrective to Badham's 
lack of historical insight. 
It has become necessary to provide a working definition of bio-power. 
As we shall soon see this definition is not taken from Foucault 
himself, but from two of his American commentators, Paul Rabinow and 
Hubert Dreyfus. Before the definition is provided however a certain 
amount of qualification seems necessary; 
Power as the governing concept in Foucault's work is neither fully 
explained, nor is it carefully defined. Foucault's anti-method is 
steadfastly opposed to what he sees as the theoretical closure 
imminent in the search for all definitions. It is probable that 
Foucault would view the quest for all-encompassing, accurate, and 
logically sustained definition(s) as a wilful immobilization of 
thought. He would, in fact, read the search for definitions as being 
not only chimerical but as an ironic demonstration of power's ability 
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to influence the most basic rhetorical strategy. I am suggesting 
therefore that we needn't necessarily provide our own corrective to 
Foucault's thought ( although this is sometimes useful) but should be 
aware of the Nietzschean inspired laughter which echoes through the 
hollowness of our attempts to turn Foucault into a reasonable and 
conventional philosopher because these are precisely the attempts 
which he takes pleasure in frustrating. Without further ado then, 
In Foucault's story, bio-power coalesced around two poles at the 
beginning of the Classical Age. These poles remained separate 
until the beginning of the nineteenth century, when they combined 
to form the technologies of po~er which still recognizably 
characterize our current situation. 
One pole was concerned with the human species. For the first time 
in history, scientific categories - species, population, and 
others - rather than juridical ones became the object of 
political attention in a consistent and sustained fashion. 
Efforts to understand the processes of human regeneration were 
closely tied to other, more political ends. 
The other pole of bio-power centered on the body not so much as 
the means for human reproduction, but as an object to be 
manipulated. A new science, or more accurately a technology of 
the body as an object of power, gradually formed in disparate, 
peripheral localizations. 23 
I think that we are reasonably safe in assuming that the population 
category was a site of considerable administrative importance. 
The black population, having been set apart, were seen as a 
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problem. 24 
Although Badham hints at the reasons why the black population was set 
apart, the phrase (see above) remains unexplained. To my mind this 
suggests that there is room for a slight extension within the theory 
of bio-power, an extension which accounts for the racial bias within 
both 'compartments' of bio-power. In other words, the importance of 
race as a pseudo-scientific category should be inserted into the area 
of bio-power concerned with the human species - and allied to this, 
corresponding attention should be paid to the racial aspect of bodily 
technology and discipline. 
Although it is not necessary to get to the "truth" of the situation 
another quote from Badham's 'original' text could be helpful, 
Saunders suggests that at no time in the 19th century were ethnic 
boundaries as well defined as they are today and between say, the 
African and 'Coloured' communities there was much passing of 
individuals. 25 
Nevertheless she continues, 
At the same time, both Africans and non-Africans saw Africans as 
having a separate identity based both on a distinctive history 
and cultural experience and on physical differences.26 
These assertions can quite easily be recast; so for example with 
reference to "ethnic boundaries" we may reformulate the quote by 
forwarding another interpretation; that 'Race' as a term within the 
matrix of bio-power had yet to attain stability and thus it was 
prevented from being "influential", in other words it was 
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discursively under-determined. The second quote is instructive 
because it hints toward a time in the future when this "acceptance" 
of racial separateness, of "African identity" as something immutable 
and "natural" came to be profoundly immobilizing because it meant 
that the "African" was seldom read as occupying a different position 
on the plane of identities. Firstly he ( for example) was an "African" 
and then only were Africans husbands, farmers, workers etc. 
Bio-power was formally articulated in the shape of the census and 
various types of report and registration, 
Census figures show a relative!)' small African population, 
although it is stated that in 1889 Woodstock had the highest 
proportion of Africans in its population in greater Cape Town. 
This may be due to Africans registered as "mixed or other" or 
else not enumerated. 27 
Along with other means of recording information registration is a 
theme which Foucault devotes a great deal of space to in Discipline 
and Punish. 
These small techniques of notation, of registration, of 
constituting files, of arranging facts in columns of tables that 
are so familiar to us now, were of decisive importance in the 
epistemological "Man" of the sciences of the individual. One is 
no doubt right to pose the Aristotelian problem: is the science 
of the individual possible and legitimate'? A great problem needs 
great solutions perhaps. But there is a small historical problem 
of the emergence, towards the end of the eighteenth century, of 
what might generally be termed the 'clinical' sciences; the 
problem of the entry of the individual ( and no longer the 
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species) into the field of knowledge; the problem of the entry of 
the individual description, of the cross-examination, of 
anamnesis, of the file into the general functioning of scientific 
discourse. 28 
It seems that the productivity of racial difference managed to 
disrupt the registration forms to such an extent, that they were 
literally shifted into another conceptual space. However, we can also 
interpret the above as administrative knowledge having a relatively 
weak purchase on Africans. For although Africans were on the 
empirical level herded into the amorphous category of "mixed or 
other", the category itself lacked SQecificity. It was "open" enough 
to guarantee a certain symbolic freedom for it did not painstakingly 
divide "Africans" into progressively finer tribal units for example. 
We can thus conclude that discourse in this respect was naive and 
simple, for it provided a space of symbolic fluidity which was 
relatively untouched by the objectifying tendencies of disciplinary 
power. 
The Annual Report to the United Society for the Propagation of 
the Gospel, 1871 stated, "that Papendorp was" .... the refuge of 
the utterly destitute who eke out their means of livelihood by 
amassing together shells on the beach to sell to lime-burners. 
There is one small tannery here; a few people are engaged in 
fishing .... " There was little industry to attract people. 29 
The above quote illustrates that Papendorp in 1871 was impoverished 
and backwards, populated by heathens. In other words it was an ideal 
sphere in which the Church could widen its influence. The quote also 
demonstrates that the Anglican Church was ultimately part of a broad 
coalition of interests which perceived the village as an economic 
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entity, as an object which could eventually contribute to the 
Church's wealth. In this regard the word "propagation" with its 
expansionistic and acquisitive overtones, is instructive. As are the 
words, 'refuge', 'utterly destitute', 'eke', which appear in the 
first sentence. They indicate that the local population were trapped 
in their poverty and their lack of economic mobility corresponded to 
their lack of conceptual and spiritual mobility. Philanthropy was 
thus conceived by the Church ( and hopefully it would be understood by 
those who received the Church's benevolence) as a fundamentally 
humanitarian gesture. The report attests to the existence of a 
documentary apparatus as early in the municipality's history as the 
1870s. Although this may seem to 9e a claim of negligible importance, 
it certainly does establish that the village was a site of knowledge 
of a formal and concentrated kind ten years before its formation as a 
municipality. The final portion of the above extract, 'there was 
little industry to attract people', can be understood as an index of 
bio-power's relative unimportance in the municipality's early 
history. It was only during the 1890s that bio-power began to exert 
control: 
In the 1890s Woodstock was more of a residential area popular 
with the poorer section of commuters as it was the closest 
southern suburb to the city. 30 
In fact, the 'growth' and 'development' of Woodstock as an industrial 
area enables us to witness the parallel significance of bio-power. As 
Paul Rabinow points out in The Foucault Reader, 
Disciplinary control - is unquestionably linked to the rise of 
capitalism. But the relationship between the economic changes 
that resulted in the accumulation of capital and the political 
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changes that resulted in the accumulation of power remains to be 
specified. 3 l 
At this point I would like, with the help of an extended quote from 
the Badham text, to sketch out some thoughts of a general and 
tentative nature - that is - the relationship between the 
accumulation of capital and the accumulation of power, 
In spite of this, commercial enterprises such as the renowned 
confectionery of J.J. Atmore and numerous general dealers' stores 
were established. A number of inhabitants were artisans involved 
in tanning, smithing and masonry (see Table 3). Early industries 
were able to establish themselves after the rush of settlers 
during and after the AngloBoer War. In 1902 there were a number 
of manufacturing prospects - Kam p's Cold Storage, De Beer's 
Cold Storage, a large brewery, Saunderson's Saddlery, the 
possibility of a large soap factory, extensive land bought by the 
Milling Company for a bakery and employees' accommodation.32 
Badham goes on to quote Bickford-Smith as follows: 
These activities can hardly be dramatized by suggesting that they 
amount to industrialization.33 
This is important, particularly when we consider that when Foucault 
writes about discipline on the factory floor, that he is referring to 
a scale of industrial growth which is simply not comparable to that 
of Woodstock. It therefore remains to elaborate as best we can the 
relationship between Capital and Power. Superficially at least 
Woodstock appears to be a peculiar and distinctive example. Firstly, 
if the quote is considered as a reasonably accurate reflection of 
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existing "industrial growth" then the 'manufacturing prospects' at 
the tum-of-the-century were for the most part small scale. They were 
in other words of negligible size and did not necessitate massive and 
uniform disciplinary interventions of the kind that Foucault refers 
to in Discipline and Punish. Secondly, because industrial growth did 
not take place on a large scale, the owners of managerial elite of 
small factories, 'cold storage plants', 'confectioners' and 'tanners' 
were not required to enter into obviously restrictive rituals of 
de-personalization, punishment and regulation. My suspicion is that 
productive relations were probably flexible and relatively informal. 
There was thus a certain amount of freedom in which capitalists and 
workers could negotiate and bargaJn. This brings me to my third 
point: I am reasonably secure in the assertion that the case-study of 
Woodstock provides a valuable and pertinent counter-example to 
Foucault's description(s) of ideal expressions of the optimum 
relationship between the disciplinary dimension of bio-power and 
capital accumulation. As we have seen, the relationship between 
disciplinary mechanisms and emergent capitalism was in all likelihood 
not as absolute or well-defined as uncritical readings of Foucault 
would seem to imply. Finally, it should he noted that there will 
always remain strong possibilities that specific local examples may 
contradict the apparently more programmatic aspects of Foucault's 
"histories". We must be careful however not to chart the curve of the 
municipality's industrial 'growth' in the name of a 'truth' which is 
more refined, but in the name of a rigorous ethics which practice a 
non-exhaustive vision of history - that is a genealogy - in an 
exhaustive way. 
In this, the final segment of the section on bio-power I will analyse 
the following quote, because, if we can trace the contours of the 
moral economy which was disseminated and kept in circulation by the 
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key institutions of the municipality and Church, we will be able to 
see how value judgements about health and cleanliness were made. 
Primary concerns were those of disease or health and the dirt and 
filth that had been accumulating. These appear also to have been 
the concern of the Church, although the methods of approach 
tended to differ. The links between the Anglican Church and the 
Municipality were thus established from its inception, and 
continued despite occasional tensions. 34 
The words 'disease', 'dirt' and 'filth' are key terms because they 
radiate with the light of moral anxiety. Furthermore they indicate a 
certain twitchiness, a certain pathologizing dimension which 
associates 'health' and 'disease' with sexuality. We are reminded 
therefore that discourse harbours certain reticences and often finds 
it difficult to 'admit' that sexuality exists. I am speaking here 
both of the majority of Badham's sources, as well as Badham herself 
- the language she uses and what it refuses to say. One would think 
it likely that the theme of "disease"/'health" would initiate an 
investigation into related concerns such as gender-issues, 
prostitution, reproduction etc., but the interstices of the quote say 
much, for there is much, in saying nothing, that discourse says about 
itself. In the anxiety and fear that this "nothingness" exerts, the 
historical researcher is required to be particularly vigilant for the 
anxiety demands an attentiveness in excess of an ordinary close 
reading. This 'style' ofreading is really no more than a shift in 
emphasis, yet it is a variation which corresponds to the place that 
sex and sexuality have come to occupy in the order of discourse. Thus 
the words, 'dirt', 'disease' and 'filth' produce a "noise" in excess 
of themselves mainly because they act as discursive hints and markers 
of their own inability to express the unsaid. As readers we are 
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therefore required to provide our own educated guesswork when it 
becomes obvious that the limits of what cannot be said are found to 
suddenly shift. This is not in the interests of some final historical 
closure but in the interests of a contestatory reading which is 
acutely sensitive to discursive fluctuation. To make the point once 
again; more often thaf not the words 'dirt', 'disease' and 'filth' 
were over-abundantly yet prudishly meaningful. The words functioned 
as pegs on which to 'hang' dominant moral discourse and they, in a 
sense, introduced the possibility for intervention or at least they 
started the logic of intervention rolling. To conclude, 
But, at the same time, these n~w techniques of power needed to 
grapple with the phenomena of population, in short, to undertake 
the administration, control, and direction of the accumulation of 
men (the economic system that promotes the accumulation of 
capital and the system of power that ordains the accumulation of 
men are, from the seventeenth century on, correlated and 
inseparable phenomena): hence there arise the problems of 
demography, public health, hygiene, housing conditions, longevity 
and fertility. And I believe the political significance of the 
problem of sex is due to the fact that sex is located at the 
point of intersection of the discipline of the body and the 
control of the population.35 
CONCLUSION 
During this chapter I have demonstrated how Andrea Badham's 
Rediscovering Woodstock is an unconscious enactment of the 
will-to-power through benevolent domestication of the past. In her 
essay she has controlled her history of the Woodstock Municipality 
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extremely effectively through the deployment of certain key 
strategies and devices. For instance, her use of the pastoral mode is 
significant in that it enacts a return to an absent origin. A site of 
authenticity, pleasure, and importantly, truth. This origin is, 
ironically, European and by gesturing back to it, Badham negates the 
specificities of the local knowledge36 that Foucault thinks ought 
to be activated against the exclusivity of the types of history which 
Badham is practicing. Furthermore, if an identity hetween, as I refer 
to it, "an ori(:inal Europeaness" and the present can he estahlished, 
then the contin encies o ~is histo and its ne lected oh·ects and 
details can be safely set aside, banished through a process of 
infinite deferral, to somewhere which is actually nowhere. 
Badham's desire to pursue identity in history has several 
implications: it means that she tends to conceptualise history as if 
it is linear and continuous. This in turn presupposes the centrality 
of "man" as the essential subject in the historical process. History 
is therefore the medium in which "man" comes to express a "true 
self'. As I hope to have made the reader aware of already, Foucault's 
understanding of history is very different: his anti-subjectivism 
leads him to displace the subject and suggest that discourses 
interpolate subjects and offer them positions within configurations 
already predefined, positions from which to speak. Within 
institutional situations the power of discourse underpins 
disciplinary technologies which stamp control on to the soul and body 
of the "penitent", patient, or Royal Engineer. 
Unlike Badham's reading of the past as a mirror in which, inevitably, 
we are able to recognise ourselves, Foucault's genealogical studies 
of institutions like the prison are attempts to write histories of 
the present by tracing the moments of discontinuity and difference in 
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the past. Foucault suggests that the silences, forbidden areas and 
accidents of the past can only be discovered in what is most familiar 
and this is why my genealogy is a study of surfaces 
(foundation-stones, reports, plans, photographs) which, I hope, will 
reveal the rich otherness of Woodstock's forgotten past. 
The use of the pastoral is only one of the stategies whereby the past 
becomes a manaGeable object. Badham 's original claim to "rediscovery" 
is also a truth claim, a claim to the value and accuracy of her work 
which it is hoped will make it immune to criticism. Whether it is 
through strategies of "rediscovery" entirely lacking in 
self-reflexivity, devices such as aestheticization which cauterize 
the disruptive difference of ugliness. or the taking of inventories. 
Badham's history is a powerful system of control which normatively 
limits and excludes that which threatens its constitution. Chapters 
three to six are self-conscious attempts to practice "rediscovery". 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. I use the phrase in ironic sense and the similarities between my 
use of it and Nietzsche's are extremely limited. Were we to take 
the concept of "active forgetting" to its logical conclusion we 
would forget or pretend to forget all the important names 
associated with Woodstock, including the name Woodstock itself. 
The purpose of a Nietzschean derived process of "active 
forgetting" would be to imagine how the name and representation 
Woodstock comes to be associated with certain representations. A 
genuinely radical genealogy w~lUld thus actively pursue 
forgetfulness to the extent that history was threatened to such a 
degree that the genealogist exclaimed in wonderment ''The name 
Woodstock has been forgotten, therefore the municipality never 
existed!" Given that the mastery of this willed-delusion is 
virtually impossible is one forced to admit the inadmissable, 
that the genealogy is a doomed enterprise? 
2. Badham, A. Rediscovering Woodstock. Contree No 21. 1986, p.21. 
3. ibid., p.21. 
4. This paradigmatic modernist moment conforms in certain crucial 
respects to the genealogical perspective. The genealogical method 
is at odds with the hermeneutic strategy of digging for a hidden 
meaning. Instead it prides itself upon taking a position which 
valorises the superficial view. My genealogy is thus strongly 
opposed to Badham 's historical quest for the hidden signifier. 
5. Badham, A. Rediscovering Woodstock. Contree No 21, 1986, p.21. 
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6. The problem with the "politically-conscious" history ( no matter 
how honourable or well-intending) is that it rests on a prior and 
enabling assumption of the continued relevance of the traditional 
intellectual. In contrast, Foucault posits the need for an 
anti-universal intellectual who is not the representative of the 
Party, the higher good, or the "emissary" of the neglected 
tradition which furnishes us with an improved version of the 
truth. 
7. Badham, A. Rediscovering Woodstock. Contree No 21, 1986, P.21. 
8. ibid., p.21. 
9. ibid., p.21. 
10. ibid., p.21. 
11. ibid., p.21. 
12. ibid., p.21. 
13. ibid., p.21. 
14. ibid., p.21. 
15. Referring to confession in the seventeenth century, Foucault 
writes the following: "But the important point no doubt is that 
this obligation was decreed, as an ideal at least, for every good 
Christian. An imperative was established: not only will you 
confess to acts contravening the law, but you will seek to 
transform your desire, your every desire, into discourse." 
Foucault, M. The History of Sexuality Volume I, Pengiun Books, 
(London: 1984), pp. 20-21 
16. Badham, A. Rediscovering Woodstock. Contree No 21, 1986, P.21. 
17. ibid., p.21. 
18. ibid., p.21. 
19. ibid., p.21. 
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20. A minor and perhaps even slightly absurd example would have been 
the book issued to the wave of British emmigrants who settled in 
Natal in the late 1840's. Entitled the "Emigrant's Guide to Port 
Natal", this book would have occupied the one end of the 
continuum and on the other would have been, say, Official Acts of 
Parliament. 
21. Although I do not believe that Official Administrative Discourse 
and Colonial power were entirely congruent, Homi Bhabha suggests 
the following: "Colonial power produces the colonized as a fixed 
reality that is at once an "Othe.r'' and yet entirely knowable and 
visible. It resembles a form of narrative in which the 
productivity and circulation of subjects and signs are bound in a 
reformed aryf ecognizable totality. It employs a system of 
representation, a regime of truth, that is structurally similar 
to realism. 
Bhabha, Homi K. The Other question: difference. discrimination 
and the discourse of colonialism in Literature. Politics and 
Theory, Papers from the Essex Conference, 1976 - 1984, eds, 
Barker, Hulme, Iversen, Loxley. (London: Metheun, 1986) p.156. 
22. Badham, A. Rediscovering Woodstock. Contree No 21, 1986, p.21. 
23. Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Rabinow, Paul. Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics. (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 
1982), p.134. 
24. Badham, A. Rediscovering Woodstock. Contree No 21, 1986, p.23. 
25. ibid., p.23. 
26. ibid., p.23. 
27. ibid., p.23. 
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28. Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
trans. Alan Sheridan. (London: Penguin, 1986), pp.190, 191. 
29. Badham, A. Rediscovering Woodstock. Contree No 21, 1986. p.24. 
30. ibid., p.24. 
31. Rabinow, P. The Foucault Reader. (London: Penguin, 1987), 
pp.17,18. 
32. Badham, A. Rediscovering Woodstock. Contree No 21, 1986, p.24. 
33. ibid., p.24. 
34. ibid., p.25. 
35. Rabinow, P. The Foucault Reader. (London: Penguin, 1987), p.67. 
36. In an article entitled "Intellect].Jal Work as a Political Tool", 
Keith Gandal writes: 
He [Foucault] wanted to allow and even inspire a practice of 
criticism which proceeded, not with expert, theoretical or 
scientific knowledges, but with "low-ranking knowledges". 
''These unqualified, even directly disqualified knowledges," 
said Foucault, "(such as that of the psychiatric patient, of 
the ill person, of the nurse, of the doctor - parallel and 
marginal as they are to the knowledge of medicine - that of 
the delinquent, etc.) ... involve what I would call a popular 
knowledge though it is far from being a general common sense 
knowledge, but is on the contrary a particular, local. regional 
knowledge .... It is through the re-appearance of this 
knowledge, of these local popular knowledges, these diqualified 
knowledges, that criticism performs it's work." 
Michel Foucault quoted by Keith Gandal in "Intellectual Work as a 
Political Tool", in History of the Present, Spring 1986, Berkeley 
University, p.17. 
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CHAPTER 3: A PRIMITIVE FORM OF CONTROL 
INTRODUCTION 
I will argue the following in this chapter: although it is possible 
to see the "invention" of the Woodstock Municipality as congruent 
with a new economy of power, an analysis of the official 
correspondence suggests otherwise; that is, that power remained 
"heavy" and labour-intensive, despite its apparently panoramic reach. 
A more theoretically informed understanding of the relative "failure" 
of municipal power is to suggest that it had not yet reached "the 
threshold of a discipline". 
In a word, the disciplines are the ensemble of minute technical 
inventions that made it possible to increase the useful size of 
multiplicities by decreasing the inconveniences of the power 
which, in order to make them useful, must control them. A 
multiplicity, whether in a workshop or a nation, an army or a 
school, reaches the threshold of a discipline when the relation 
of the one to the other becomes favourable.1 
One of the obvious ways in which power defines a multiplicity (in our 
case, the municipality qualifies as a multiplicity) is to define it 
spatially. While this might appear to be straightforward, the records 
seem to suggest that the fixing of boundaries was always problematic. 
While one could have assumed that the production and formalisation of 
space (boundaries, sub-divisions, enclosures for the suppression of 
tuberculosis) and time (an intense standardisation of norms and 
procedures) would have assured the creation of a "useful" 
municipality, the history of Woodstock proves otherwise. I conclude 
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that during its formative stages as an institution, the Woodstock 
Municipality, with occasional exceptions, appeared unable to 
administer ( and discipline) the population in anything more than an 
imperfect and largely makeshift way. 
I suspect that one of the reason's for administrative knowledge 
lagging one step behind the reality it sought to control and describe 
was that life in the municipality during the period was highly 
volatile. The portrait of everyday life that one gathers from the 
record's suggests a vibrant and disordered social reality within the 
broader context of a municipality that was struggling to establish 
itself. This "disorder" was in part C?used by the presence of a 
cosmopolitan, new, and mainly european immigrant population, as the 
rapid population increase placed a great deal of stress on limited 
resources and amenities. 2 
During the same period the municipality witnessed the influx of black 
peasant's and the records indicate a strong degree of administrative 
reluctance to allow them equal status to those in the white 
community. We also know from other studies of the political economy 
of the Western Cape that the period under investigation was 
economically insecure and this would perhaps account for the great 
entrepeneurial initiative (the records are full of applications for 
general traders licences) which appeared to characterise the 
period.3 
Resources and amenities were not always readily available - the 
struggle for sufficient quantities of clean water, for example - is 
a motif which runs constantly through the municipal records.4 
Municipal services were either in dissaray or in the process of being 
instituted as formal procedures: the regular collection of stercus 
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pails, the building and lengthening of roads and the ritual 
inspection of schools spring to mind as examples.5 
The constant war waged against filth and disease indicates that there 
were aspects of the environment which needed to be monitored and 
brought under control. One such site was the notoriously insanitary 
Liesbeek River. The records abound with memo's to the effect that the 
river constituted a threat to public health and members of the 
municipality are to refrain from washing and bathing there. 6 At 
various times the records also contain evidence of the existence of 
smallpox, glanders, enteric fever, diptheria, typhoid and 
tuberculosis.? Finally, we shouldn'J fail to remember the presence 
of large-scale diseases like the plague which swept the Colony at the 
turn of the century. 
The relative instability of the period covered does apppear to have 
overwhelmed some of the strategies and inventions used by municipal 
knowledge to bring the municipality under control. For local 
residents, power would have been seen for what it was. primitive and 
obvious. To refer back to the Foucault quote at the beginning of the 
Introduction. I feel that it is safe to suggest that power was 
everywhere inconvenienced. and it is ultimately this factor which 
prevented the multiplicity from "reaching the threshold of a 
discipline".s 
Section 3.1, The Shape of Municipal Knowled~e, consists of a close 
textual analysis of municipal discourse and knowledge. The analysis 
will focus on the strategies (inspection), local inventions (the 
calling of an impromtu census), and forms of writing ( reports, 
letters, permits) which constituted municipal knowledge. I plan to 
draw attention to the relative sophistication of both the permit 
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system and the census as a strategy which was "invented" by the 
municipality to monitor and control black municipal residents. In 
this regard I ask if these two forms of administrative procedure help 
to steer the municipality in the direction of a "disciplinary 
threshold", that is, towards a position where it might become a 
self-sustaining and independent disciplinary institution. 
Section 3.2, The Regulation and Production of Municipal Time/Space, 
analyses the municipal attempts to control both space and time within 
the multiplicity. As we shall see, some of these attempts were more 
successful than others: for instance, capitalist growth appears to 
have caused the municipality a degree of administrative difficulty in 
that the logic of capitalist development seems to have loosened the 
municipality's grip on both the temporal and the spatial dimensions 
of the multiplicity. 
The very existence of the municipality as an administrative apparatus 
presumes an a priori disciplinary attitude towards the control of 
Colonial space and time. This attitude finds its most cogent 
expression in the upkeep of borders and the the division and 
sub-division of space. Insofar as the control of time was concerned. 
the municipality implemented a range of regulations which had the 
effect of constraining the element of chance within time itself. 
Municipal domestication of both time and space was definitely the 
order of the day. 
Regulations function in the following manner: they homogenise the 
unpredictability of time by making it manageable; time which is 
controlled is time which is predictable; controlled time is likely to 
yield predictable results. An environment which is "managed" around 
the poles of time/space is an environment which can be controlled and 
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regulated. Regulation however. contains certain "primitive" forms of 
observation. like inspection for example. and thus brings certain 
disadvantages: it is costly. heavy-handed and crude. What is needed 
is another form of administration altogether. something which is 
subtle. coersive and economica11y intelligent: something that will 
transcend. in other words. "the threshold of a discipline". The next 
section will explore the relative failure during the period to 
implement a workable system of self-regulation. 
We have noted briefly the advantages of a self-regulating as opposed 
to a regulated system. In section 3.3, The Failure to reach a 
Disciplinazy Threshold, I will anal¥se the reasons for the failure of 
the municipality to implement a system which could increase the size 
of the multiplicity and, at the same time, decrease the inconvenience 
of the power which must control that multiplicity. From a brief 
analysis of a letter, which involves us remarkably (if indirectly) 
with Foucault's genealogical injunction to concentrate on matters 
closest to the body, we will attempt to arrive at a conclusion as to 
the nature of the factors preventing the transition to a smoothly 
functioning, self-regulating discipline. 
The municipality would idea11y have liked to administer a system of 
power, anchored around the control of both space and time, which was 
fluid and self-regulating. A self-regulating subject would have been 
the projected outcome of this "ideal system". By self-regulating, I 
mean to evoke something akin to a socialised and conscientious 
subjectivity rather than suggesting that the members of the 
municipality were forced to submit to a set of oppressive strictures 
congruent with an older, less inspired, economy of power. The period 
under analysis provides evidence of a relatively new administration 
strugggling to come to terms with an exceptional1y vibrant and 
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changing reality however. and this. perhaps more than anything else. 
mitigated against the production of a unique disciplinary system 
which was sophisticated enough to actively encourage any form of 
self-regulating subjectivity. 
3.1: THE SHAPE OF MUNICIPAL KNOWLEDGE 
One of the reason's for my earlier unproved assertion, that municipal 
power was rather labour intensive, was the commonplace existence of 
inspection as a form of both knowledge gathering and control. I 
contend that had municipal power. been more "advanced", then 
inspection might well have given way to the infinitely more 
preferable "device" of self-inspection for instance. As a method, 
inspection betrays a degree of administrative insecurity. It 
illustrates an almost neurotic desire to control which is formalised 
at the administrative level. 
The correspondence contained within the Woodstock Town Clerk's files 
tells us that the municipality saw fit to appoint a beach Constable 
in the years prior to the turn of the century.9 It was his duty to 
inspect the beach as well as the local lobster factory on a daily 
basis. Unfortunately, there is no evidence whatsoever of his reports 
in the municipal files. This in itself is puzzling because it leads 
one to assume that administrative procedure at the time was not 
codified to the extent where everything was compiled, filed and 
collected. We are not dealing. in other words. with the self- evident 
production of administrative knowledge. This suggests a serious 
shortcoming on the municipality's part. We are left to surmise 
whether they were filed at all or whether his "reports" were simply 
verbal. 
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In a letter dated 15th December 1904, sent from the Sanitary 
Department to the Woodstock Town Clerk, the Department requests two 
things: the purchase of an infectious diseases van and a salary for 
the inspector of markets.1 O An earlier letter, dated 19 September 
of the same year, and exchanged between the same two Departments, 
refers to the newly formed role of the food and health 
inspectors.11 Thus we witness a expanding administrative awareness 
of the importance of food markets as sites of possible infection, 
points of contact for the insalubrious, gathering places for the 
dangerous etc. The important factor in this appointment was that the 
inspection of markets was now rit~alised as a recurrent strate~: the 
inherently chaotic nature of the social was to be observed, described 
and thus, to a degree, controlled.12 
An even less subtle strategy for the control of a rapidly changing 
population was the census. A census is different to an inspection in 
that it takes place at regular intervals and that the entire 
undertaking is usually instituted at a countrywide level. The 
remarkable aspect about the following example therefore. is that its 
objectives and motivation were unashamedly political; the "census" 
was no more than a convenient smokescreen behind which lurked a 
flagrant abuse of municipal power. In a report to the Woodstock Works 
and Sanitary Committee dated 31st of March, I 904, the Medical Officer 
of Health for the Colony writes, 
I am having a full census of coolies in the town taken also 
arranging night visits to verify the same, also in as much as 
there is quite an equal danger in the poor jew quarter's I 
intend treating them in the same manner.13 
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This "census" was thus a convenient peg on which to hang not only 
racial paranoia but the bureaucratic fear of a racially mixed and 
partially hidden population. Equally, the quote gives us a graphic 
illustration of contemporary racial attitudes. Why, one wonders, was 
it necessary to "arrange night visits" ? Was it an administrative 
counter to the "coolies" and "poor jews" propensity to congregate in 
numbers at night time, when they believed that no-one was looking? or 
did it perhaps have something to do with their "wretchedness" and 
inate sense of "dishonesty"? Whatever the rationale behind the 
"census" we can see on this occasion that it was far from a 
disinterested pursuit of the "facts" but a racist intervention. not 
practiced elsewhere in the community. which was based on 
administrative iGnorance and fear. 
The twin bureaucratic strategies of inspection and census-taking, in 
both its formal and informal guises, tended to correspond to, or, in 
more extreme cases, produce certain forms of writing. We must ask 
ourselves therefore, what the forms of disciplinary writing that the 
municipality relied on were, how they functioned, and what they had 
in common? The generic form of administrative writing par excellance 
was the report. 
In a series of five reports written and presented to the "Chairman 
and members of the Sanitary Committee" by the Woodstock Sanitary 
Superintendent between the fourth of October and the twelfth of 
December, 1911, several areas of importance are isolated and 
commented on. These areas are as follows: the local refuse tip, the 
Liesbeek River, the stercus siding, the condition of the 
Corporation's ambulance, the Infectious Diseases Hospital and the 
presence of ice-cream vendors in the municipality. 14 None of the 
reports are particularly noteworthy except perhaps for the 
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administrative recognition that those who were to a lesser or greater 
extent mobile (like ice-cream vendors) constituted a unique problem 
for the municipality. This is an issue that we will return to in a 
later section however. The reports seem to represent a period in 
municipal history in which potentially infectious areas had been 
recognised as such, were under surveillance and sanitary matters in 
general were under control. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that the reports are 
reasonably regular ( 4th October, 16th October, 14th November, 28th 
November, 12th December) and thus provide evidence of the 
institutionalisation of an administr31tive procedure. Confirmation of 
this appeared in a letter from the Acting Under Secretary of the 
Interior who, in two separate letters, dated the 3rd and the 15th of 
August 1911 respectively, informed the Woodstock Town Council that 
the department had decided to discontinue weekly notification about 
the state of disease in the municipality.15 · 
Another form of writing which appeared in the administrative corpus 
was the letter. Unlike the report, which circulated administratively 
and was internal to administrative discourse, letters were received 
from residents of the municipality. Thus the letter was a form of 
writing which was participatory and, in a limited sense, democratic. 
In 1904, for example, the Woodstock Town Clerk received a letter from 
eleven residents of Observatory who complained about a stinking open 
gutter and this letter is, in its way, emblematic of many such 
letters that are stored away in the municipality files.16 The 
letter's received by the Town Engineer's office are of much the same 
kind: reqests for partitioning or separating walls, the clearance of 
slop and or stercus pails, lack of adequate drainage facilities, the 
erection of sheds and balconies, amendments to pre-existing buildings 
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etc.17 
One notices that many of the themes contained in the letters 
ultimately revolve around the notion of property. Many letter's 
attest to the strong need for properties to be altered and more often 
than not improved. On the one hand the letter's request that the 
municipality devotes more attention to hygiene and sanitation. On the 
other, with their constant requests for extension and division. they 
suggest the formation of a property owning class with its attendant 
ideologies of domestic privacy, autonomy and self-interest. One of 
the consequences of property ownership and improvement is that it 
stimulates more than the civic "virtues" of responsibility and pride, 
it also encouraces the "policing" of one's space and privacy: thus 
making municipal management a less labour-intensive and demanding 
activity. 
Most of the requests appear to be nebulous and it would have been in 
the municipality's long-term interest to grant permission for most of 
the proposed alterations. The threat that bureaucratic reluctance or 
intransigence would have posed for property improvement and the moral 
economy which was developing around it was incalculable. In the 
popular imagination property improvement might well have become 
associated with the constitution and "improvement" of a municipal 
self. The request's received by the Town Engineers office certainly 
indicate that the home, as well as it's immediate surrounds, was 
becoming a site of value and "authentic" experience. 
The letter also functioned as an everyday medium through which the 
various sectors of the Colonial administration could communicate with 
each other. In a letter dated 8th January 1906, sent from the 
Sanitary Department to the Woodstock Mayor, a member of the 
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department draws attention to the presence of smallpox in the 
municipality. A representative from the department was having 
difficulty in locating the source of the disease and the letter 
states, 
So far no clue has been discovered as to where the disease has 
its origin, as it is most difficult to obtain information from 
this class of people.18 
Yet again we find organised power facing the difficulties of 
inspection and information gathering: the municipal agent is unable 
to find any worthwhile knowledge .from "this class" of poor and 
naturally suspicious people because he is an authority figure and is 
thus disqualified from doing so. This is a far cry from a "ideal" 
situation in which the municipality was assured of a swift and 
trustworthy flow of information via either its own agents or a system 
of informers. 
Another form of writing with a more insistently disciplinary 
dimension was the permit. During May 1913, the Woodstock Town Clerk 
received a letter from the Department of Native Affairs. The letter 
contained a reminder to the effect that under Act NO 40 of 1892 as 
amended to Act NO 8 of 1905, that "Natives" were to be confined to 
the "Native Reserves" and were obliged by law to carry permits on 
their person before entering a "European" area.19 
The permit system offers evidence of a precursor to the dreaded pass 
system of later years (from the genealogical point-of-view, we should 
resist the temptation to make too much of the parallel, however, 
altough I do hint at the similarities below). It also suggests a 
rigorous enforcement of space based on the division between a white 
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municipal area and a "Native" Reserve. In this respect, the permit 
system resembles an ideology like Apartheid, which is devoted to the 
flawless demarkation of space, its construction as a disciplinary 
unit ( the Bantus tan, the Township) and its subsequent policing. 
The word, permit, is in itself interesting, because it seems to be 
the materialisation of an injunction. A permit is a method of fixing 
the subject's identity and behaviour in such a way that the absence 
of a permit in certain prescribed places is equivalent to the absence 
of permission to be there at all. One may take this further and 
suggest that from a legal point-of-view, the failure to have a permit 
on one's person means that one sh_ouldn't be there, which means that 
theoretically, one has ceased to exist. Conversely, the presence of a 
permit in other prescribed areas - like "Locations" for example -
is administratively unimportant. In this situation however. it gains 
its power by reminding the permit holder that they are imprisoned in 
a paradox. trapped in a space in which they are arguably "free". 
Altough a permit does not actually write upon the surface of the 
"Natives" body, the permit is a symbolic "mark", which separates the 
holder from him or herself via the introduction of a scrap of paper. 
The psychological violence that the permit causes its beholder is, in 
part, the result of the permits relative invisibility; were the 
disciplinary technology in the municipality a little less subtle, 
then the permit holder's difference would be marked on their bodies 
in an obvious way, thus illustrating a return to a cruder economy of 
power. 
The strategy requiring the permit-holder to always have their permit 
on their person is effective because it is both functional and 
inconspicuous; it does not disrupt the textures of everyday life and 
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it does not stigmatise the permit holder in any self-evident manner. 
Permits, for example, do not remove subjects from civic life. They do 
not prevent "Reserve" dwellers from labouring, consuming and 
recreating. They thus help to create the impression that those who 
hold permits are "normal" and this "normality" is reinforced by the 
permits invisibility. 
At the same time though, the permit is a constant reminder that 
surface appearances deceive, for the permit holder is forced to 
occupy a position which consistently make them objects of both their 
own inturned gaze and potential administrative scrutiny. The fact 
that municipal power can be mobi!ised at any time and without any 
warning, is horrifying. Checks might be at random and thus the holder 
is forced to submit to the climate of fear and "wear" their permit at 
all times. 
Altough "spot-checks" might at first appear gratuitous, they are 
inevitably orchestrated by a cold administrative logic. The check-up 
always succeeds because, either it functions as a reminder, thus 
strengthening the system, or, it actually "catches" offenders. In 
this case, the "offender" becomes an example to those who have not 
succumbed to the perils of resistence. The relation between the 
holder and the administrative officials or police is thus one of 
complete inequality; an inequality which is exaggerated by the very 
arbitrariness of the procedure which might find the permit holder 
guilty of an offence. 
The permit system was the product of a normative municipal discourse 
which sought to control access to the predominantly white areas of 
Woodstock, Salt River, and Observatory. In contrast to primitive 
disciplinary strategies like inspection, the permit system was 
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remarkably sophisticated in that it required only occasional 
administrative intervention. In fact, the strength of the system was 
in direct proportion to the opacity of its inner workings. When 
viewed from the perspective of the permit holder, the system would 
have appeared to be frighteningly arbitrary in the sense that it 
didn't appear to conform to any principles from which a system of 
rules could be generated. 
"Ordinary" systems of discipline are remarkably ingenious in their 
ability to fix, pin-down, and locate subjects in space. What the 
permit system does, is to partially reverse this disciplinary logic: 
it allows the "native" the "freedom~ of doing and moving as she/he 
pleases, but it does so in the context of already dividing their 
consciousness to the extent where they may voluntarily decide that 
mobilty is a risk not worth taking. Discipline has bound the "native" 
to his or her identity. and immobilisation thus takes place at the 
level of subjectivity. rather than at the level of the body. 
Before concluding, I think it would be instructive to note to what 
degree the permit, as an advanced and highly intelligent tactic of 
power conforms to Foucault's definition of the relationship between 
the multiplicities and discipline, 
But the peculiarity of the disciplines is that they try to 
define in relation to the multiplicities a tactics of power that 
fulfils three criteria: firstly, to obtain the exercise of power 
at the lowest possible cost ( economically, by the low 
expenditure it involves; politically, by its discretion, its low 
exteriorization, its relative invisibility, the little 
resistance it arouses); secondly, to bring the effects of this 
social power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as 
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far as possible, without either failure or interval; thirdly, to 
link this "economic" growth of power with the output of the 
apparatuses ( educational, military, industrial or medical) 
within which it is exercised; in short, to increase both the 
docility and the utility of all the elements of the system. ZO 
I have, in this section, focussed on two things: firstly on the types 
of disciplinary strategies employed within the multiplicity (the 
inspection and informal census) and secondly, on the forms of writing 
that the municipality relied on to make administrative sense of the 
"world out there". Before continuing I would like to draw some simple 
conclusions. Despite the fact that l have used an expanded definition 
of what constitutes writing, the recent example of the permit as a 
form of disciplinary writing and control demonstrates a number of 
things: that we cannot analyse municipal discourse at the 
archaeological/genealogical level and expect the discourse to be 
homogeneous and equally developed in all areas. 
Furthermore. this section proves that administrative procedure was a 
unique combination of some near perfect strategies of racial 
oppression and separation. as well as some bureaucratically mundane 
expressions of the will-to-power. As a disciplinary formation 
therefore, municipal knowledge and discourse appears. from the 
limited perspective of a textual analysis of correspondence. to have 
been intriguingly "original": a discourse which, on the whole. was 
far from solving the pressing problems of administrating a mixed and 
growing population and ultimately fell far short of reaching the 
"threshold of a discipline" that I referred to in the introduction. 
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3.2: THE REGULATION AND PRODUCTION OF MUNICIPAL TIME/SPACE 
Even a random glance at the previous section will confirm the 
reader's suspicion: that many of the examples above can also be 
understood by "reading" them as attempts, with varying degrees of 
success, to control municipal space and time. Take the example of the 
"census of coolies" for instance. In this case there was a clear 
institutional need to count and document the presence of 
"undesirables" in or just outside the municipal area. The Medical 
Officer's discourse contained a spatial awareness (he refers to the 
"poor jew quarters") which indicates that a census is primarily a 
count of bodies in space. In fact, t~e idea of a census is 
inseperable from a definite codification of space into certain 
manageable units, like municipalities, for example, and a need for 
institutional power to supplement or refine its knowledge about 
certain sections of the population. 
In passing, it is interesting to note that the areas which needed to 
come under the "influence" of the census, were to some degree 
controlled, and thus liberated from municipal power, by the groups 
- the "coolies", the Jews - who lived there. The census was also 
an attempt therefore, to wrest symbolic control away from the 
communities who had made the space their own. The knowledge gained in 
the census might not be mobilised immediately but might very well be 
the foundation for a more heavy-handed application of power at a 
later stage. 
Disputes about the precise location of the Woodstock/Salt River 
boundaries appear in the Town Clerk's files with the regularity of a 
virtual theme. One of the first recorded items contained in the 
municipal files is from August, 1904, in which the Chief Surveyor for 
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the Colony draws attention to the disputed boundary between 
Woodstock, Maitland and the Salt River Mouth.21 This geographical 
confusion arose ostensibly because the river current had a tendency 
to gnaw the banks through water action and thus the boundaries of the 
respective municipalities were always changing. 
A similar dispute arose between the Municipalities of Cape Town and 
Woodstock when both laid claim to Cambridge Street. The respective 
municipalities argued that the street was within their "boundary 
line" and thus under their jurisdiction.22 The Clerk's records 
contain no evidence of how the dispute was eventually resolved but 
the dispute (if we may call it that) !S indicative of the relentless 
administrative imperative for spatial and social control. This desire 
deemed that ambiguity, confusion etc., was, within the context of 
municipal knowledge and power, potentially catastrophic because it 
could allow commodities, individuals, animals etc., to, 
metaphorically, vanish, to occupy that space so feared by the 
custodians of municipal knowledge, the space that wasn't there. As 
Foucault notes, 
This is why discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; 
it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of 
individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; 
it establishes calculated distributions. 23 
Administrative non-space or, alternatively, space that is represented 
by two competing and mutually exclusive systems of municipal 
knowledge at the same time, is not only dangerous from the 
bureaucratic point of view, it is also worrying from a legal 
perspective. It raises the two related questions of accountability 
and responsibility: who takes legal responsibility for a mistake or 
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accident? What if both municipalities assume that they are "in 
control" of the street? Does that mean that bureaucratic procedure 
will suddenly and comically be doubled? etc. As we can no doubt see 
it was a matter of some administrative importance that the respective 
municipalities clear up the issue. 
The Woodstock Municipality's desire to map and create space did not 
begin and end with the attention it gave to the upkeep of municipal 
borders. It was also in the municipality's interest to preside over 
land that was divided to an even greater degree: as sub-division 
meant potentially greater administrative control. The administration 
was able to plot the movement of people and things with increased 
economy and accuracy and thus, from the point of view of knowledge, 
division and sub-division was a form of partitioning, and thus a form 
of power. 
In a letter to the Town Engineer dated November the second, 1902, the 
Land Surveyors Chas Marais and de Villiers propose the sub-division 
of Milnerton estates. They write, 
We beg herewith to hand you general plan in duplicate of the 
proposed subdivision of that portion of the Milnerton Estates as 
is situated within the Woodstock Municipality for your approval. 
The Milnerton Estates being most anxious to dispose of this 
property at a very early date, we would be extremely obliged if 
you would be good enough to give the matter your early 
attention. The property as you will notice is situated between 
the Salt River Bridge and Montague Bridge, adjoining the 
latter.24 
One senses that it would have been to the municipality's advantage to 
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administer spatially divided land. There would have been perils in 
the future however, as land of manageable size suggests that it might 
be privately bought and thus settled on. Land ownership and the 
possible erection of houses means increased administrative and 
disciplinary difficulties: altough the building of houses presumes 
the existence of addresses, and thus a point of fixity for the 
municipal administration, new houses also suggest the flow of 
individuals and commodities, increased movement and trade. As we 
already know, fluidity and movement has always been a major problem 
for discipline, as discipline is primarily concerned with enclosure, 
immobility and stasis. 
In light of the above it is interesting to note that the municipality 
actually bought land. In a letter to the municipality from an 
undisclosed firm of Attorney's representing a Mr Mostert we 
read, 
About June 1901 we passed transfer to the Woodstock Municipality 
of the farm Oliphants Hoek which had been purchased for the sum 
of £5000 from our client Mr C Mostert. The purchase included 
certain water rights over properties lying below Oliphants Hoek 
on the Wemmershoek stream and along the hanks of the Berg River. 
These rights were secured by Notarial Contract which were drawn 
by us and a Notary proceeded to the site for the purpose of 
securing the signatures of the parties interested. 25 
I suspect that the main reason for the municipality's investment in 
the farm was that it could secure water-rights at the same time. We 
already know from previous references that access to vast quantities 
of water was a. constant problem for the corporation. The quote is 
thus illustrative of the dilemma (very possibly unrecognised at the 
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administrative level) that the municipality appears to have been 
facing at the time. The need for water would have been paramount, 
particularly in the context of a municipality that was struggling to 
supply its population with sufficient quantities of the commodity. 
The decision to purchase Mostert's Farm was thus based on sound 
economic logic: catering for an expanding populations needs by taking 
the appropriate measures to satisfy their requirements. At the same 
time however, land purchase dictates the possibilty that part of the 
land might be settled. If so. we have a situation of potential 
excess. in which the ~rowth of the area. in both the residential and 
the productive sense. would paradoxically loosen the municipality's 
control of it. 
Growth of the broadest possible kind was a double-edged phenomenon: 
expansion of the productive apparatus and the corresponding 
accumulation of capital would have meant a difficult adjustment for 
municipal discipline. And altough Foucault has always been quick to 
point out that the accumulation of men and the accumulation of 
capital are intimately related,26 it is important to stress that on 
the municipal level this mutual dependence was not adequately 
registered. 
The records also lead one towards the conclusion that the new economy 
of municipal power was never quite coherent or intrusive enough as a 
disciplinary technology. As a result it thus did little to contribute 
to the creation of the preconditions for capitalist development in 
the municipality. In this sense it is in stark contrast to the 
military rationality which flowed through the Colony and did much to 
create positive preconditions for the growth of the modern industrial 
age (See in this regard the forthcoming chapter, particularly section 
4.1.). What we find instead is small-scale capitalist growth. 
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entrepeneurship and population increase, threatening to outpace the 
municipality's ability to control the spatial and temporal boundaries 
of that development. 
If the official correspondence which is collected in the Cape Town 
Archives is an accurate reflection of the difficulties encountered by 
the institution, then we can be relatively safe in the assertion that 
growth was a problem for the municipality. This was because it 
ultimately outstripped the municipality's capacities as an 
institution to codicy and control it, whether that codification took 
place in spatial or temporal terms. 
We will be looking at the relationship between capitalist growth and 
the municipality as a disciplinary institution during the next 
section. In an attempt to come to terms with the municipality's 
relative failure to regulate "life" within its boundaries, we will be 
asking why the municipality was unable to initiate a shift from an 
economy of regulation to one of self-regulation. For the time being 
however, we will be looking briefly at the entire range of measures 
practiced by the municipality in order to gain a semblance of 
spatial/temporal control. 
The correspondence collected in the Cape Town Archives suggests that 
the municipality dealt with a range of land and space oriented 
issues. The municipal attempts - some of which have been hinted at 
earlier - at defining and controlling space revolved around the 
following: 1. Definition and clarification of boundaries. This 
included the release, transfer, sub-division and sale of land. 2. 
Building and construction of roads. Within this category we find the 
lengthening and construction of roads, the lighting of roads and the 
construction of pavements. 3. Alterations and improvements to 
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existing structures. This section has a self-explanatory heading hut 
also includes items like council housing specifications. 4. Returns, 
reports and valuations. Herein we include items on empty returns and 
valuation, as well as reports on property value and lists of derelict 
land. 
As far as the first section is concerned one notes the ongoing 
conflict, which is mentioned several times in the municipal records, 
over the exact boundaries between Woodstock and both Salt River and 
Salt River mouth.27 There is also ample reference given in the 
files to alterations between the Woodstock and Maitland bondary.28 
On the matter of land sale and trapsfer, the municipal files contain 
references to the following: the sale of land on both Devil's 
Peak29 and the Foreshore,30 the release of land for the Woodstock 
Cottage Hospital3I and the transfer of the Ndabeni Native Reserve 
to the municipality. 32 
The regularity of references to the construction of roads during the 
period of independence suggest that the building of roads was high on 
the administrative agenda. The files of correspondence make reference 
to the building of Cook, Polo, and Balfour roads33 and the 
lengthening of Beach road to name hut a few.34 In this regard we 
may also note the request for "500 Super Yards of asphaltic pavement 
for Albert Road". 35 Allied to the improvement of pavements was the 
need to provide the streets with adequate lighting and the files 
contain several references to the need for improvement in this 
regarct.36 
In section one we noted the constant stream of letters applying to 
the municipality for permission to renovate and improve private 
property. Add to these applications certain formal municipal 
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guidelines like council housing specifications37 and initiatives to 
provide all Woodstock streets with their own nameplates,38 and we 
have a rough idea of the municipal dimension of improvement and 
alteration. 
Under the heading, "Returns, Reports and Valuations" I would include 
Sanitary Department reports on vacant houses ( so that stercus pails 
didn't have to be removed)39 and returns on empty houses40 -
the records seem to suggest that the two are different. Grouped 
loosely under this heading I would also include reports on property 
value ( they were normally conducted at yearly intervals )41 and 
lists relating to the exact location qf derelict land.42 
From the perspective of the municipal control of time, one can 
reconstruct a web of measures which were designed to regulate life in 
the municipality. Rather than discipline, which according to Foucault 
tends to function as a kind of "infra-law",43 these measures 
function at the the level of the law itself, thus requiring constant 
surveillance, upkeep and ammendment on the part of the police and the 
authorities. The problem with these labour intensive and manifestly 
conspicuous strategies is that they advertise themselves in advance, 
for everyone knows an "inspector" when they see one. 
Under the projected heading, "Regulations and Licenses", one notes 
the following in the municipal correspondence: regulations for the 
carting and carriage of meat;44 regulations pertaining to Cabs and 
other vehicles;45 regulations for the disposal of snoek on 
Woodstock beach;46 and regulations for building.47 The 
municipality required municipal subjects to apply for the following 
licenses: licenses for purveyors of milk;48. licenses for hawkers 
and fruit vendors;49 licenses for ice-cream vendors;50 licenses 
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for dog owners;51 licenses for purveyors of light wine.52 
Applications and permits were another area controlled hy the 
municipal apparatus and the files contain the following items: 
applications for oil permits;53 permits to store paraffin54 and 
applications for certificates to become general dealers.55 It is 
intriguing to note that the police were obliged to oversee 
applications for general dealers' licenses. The municipality was 
thereby able to cleverly elicit their help as a repressive 
institution in an area which it ~uld not control or manage nearly as 
" effectively. 
The municipality also presided over a range of other laws which 
related to areas as diverse as the upkeep of fencing standards, 56 
fixing a speed limit for motor cars57 and standardising a system of 
weights and scales. 58 It is not my intention however, to compile an 
inventory of the absolute welter of regulations, licences and 
penalties which the municipality strove gainfully to implement and 
enforce. It is rather to reconstruct imperfectly the "horizon" across 
which these regulations functioned and thereby suggest that along 
with the obvious legal dimension, they were all concerned. to a 
greater or lesser extent to plot time. 
The invention or imposition of a regulation serves to convert 
difference into sameness. It serves, in other words as a principle of 
repetition, converting the unpredictable hy way of a constant and 
slow return. Regulations represent the formalisation of government 
procedure and are underscored at all times by the law. What 
regulations ( and for that matter, applications) tend to do, is they 
reduce the vitality and multiplicity of the social and they codify it 
into an unchanging logical process. It is possible to understand the 
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panorama of regulations above as an attempt to govern intelligently, 
the indirect effect of which is to turn time into order, time into 
ritual. 
From the disciplinacy perspective the orderinc of time throu~h 
reirulations and the like was problematic because it required 
inspection, supervision and surveillance. These activities are 
time-consuminc, conspicuous, and incline towards the ritualistic. In 
other words. they are ineffective from the disciplinacy 
point-of-view. This poses an obvious problem if the municipality had 
pretensions to order the multiplicity in a coherent manner and thus 
to approach the "threshold of a discipline". We have already sensed 
the municipality's relative expertise in this regard, witness for 
example the introduction of the permit system, and the desperate 
desire to "finalise" the spatial boundaries. The former in 
particular, was a highly sophisticated articulation of disciplinary 
logic if ever there was one. 
Despite the municipality's attempt to order the multiplicity, one 
senses their organisational inability to influence the 
comings-and-goings within the municipality itself, in anything but a 
formal and "superstructural" manner. Municipal government in other 
words, failed to operate successfully in the realm of the 
"infra-law", the underside of legality. This was because as an 
institution it V'~f was tied to the codification and control of the 
legal universe (there are isolated contrary examples) and on the 
whole, never managed to reach a disciplinary "threshold". There is 
another major reason why the municipality is, within the context of 
the case studies which follow, a unique and different institution. We 
will be exploring the reason in the final section which follo~s. 
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3.3: THE FAILURE TO REACH A DISCIPLINARY THRESHOLD 
On the twenty-third of February 1906, Jasper Anderson, the Medical 
Officer of Health for the Colony, wrote the following letter to the 
Woodstock Town Clerk. 
Dear Sir, 
In confirmation of my telephonic message this morning, 
I beg to inform you that from reports I have received, I have 
reason to suspect that the infection of Smallpox is being 
conveyed about the Cape Peninsula by itinerant vendors of fruit 
and vegetables. I shall be gla~ if you will have the drivers of 
all vegetable and fruit carts, which pass through your 
Municipality, inspected as to whether they are suffering from, 
or have recently suffered from smallpox, detaining any you may 
have suspicion of until satisfied that they are not suffering 
from the disease, and of those who have recently had the 
disease, until satisfied that the name and address given is 
correct. Should you come across one by the name of "Dirk", will 
you kindly communicate with me before you release him. 
Yours faithfully, 
A. Jasper Anderson.59 
One of the more resonant words in the quote above is "itinerant", 
with its connotations of gypsy-like freedom and independence. The 
connotations, which strike one as positive today, were of course, 
highly problematic for Jasper Anderson. The "itinerant vendors of 
fruit and vegetables" were a threat to Coldnial health because they 
were potentially ill. Their "illness" was combined with their extreme 
mobility and they were thus highly dangerous from the medical . 
point-of-view. Nomadism, which is the freedom to travel across space, 
115 
is a threat to any disciplinary articulation because "travellers" 
normally find some way of evading or subverting such a regime. The 
predictably heavy-handed measures proposed by the M.0.H. -
"inspection" and "detention" - are thus, at the most basic level, 
designed to stop the vendors from moving freely about. Once they have 
been stopped they can be inspected, forced to give an address, and if 
need be detained. 
At the same time however, we should not seduce ourselves into 
accepting wholeheartedly the apparent "heavy-handedness" of the 
response. This would prevent us from noting the subtlety and 
meticulousness of a discourse whic.h proposes to utilise the Colonial 
division of space - Colonial power invented the municipality, in 
itself a new economy of power, as an institutional grid for the 
organisation of space - in order to single out, or as Foucault 
would have it "render visible", 60 certain individuals. Once found, 
these "itinerent" individuals were inspected, analysed and their 
discourse scrutinised in relation to the truth. The method hy which 
they were analysed consisted of distribution around a disease/health 
norm, and in one particular case - I am thinking here of "Dirk" -
a degree of individualisation. 
Not only do the vendors represent a nightmare for health inspectors, 
but they also provide us with our final reason as to why the 
municipality was unable to reach the "threshold of a discipline". As 
an institution, the municipality was obliged to encourage vendors 
like "Dirk" to ply their trade on the streets of Woodstock. As a 
corporation with a vested interest in the growth of the multiplicity, 
the municipality was actively committed to the free circulation of 
commodities both within and without its borders. Small-scale 
capitalism is destined hy the momentum of its own lo~ic. to slide 
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through essentially artificial ''barriers" like municipal borders. No 
matter how expertly the municipality was able to control the time and 
space within which it operated. it was never able to control trade 
because trade always sicnified mobility in excess of the 
municipality's ability to constrain it. 
CONCLUSION. 
Looking backwards over this chapter it strikes me that we have 
managed to reach a number of valuable conclusions: in 3.1. The Shape 
of Municipal Knowledge, we focus_;ied on the areas in which the economy 
of power within the municipality was at its most creative. The permit 
system and the calling of a census were two extraordinarily 
sophisticated mechanisms of miniature discipline. One is directed. 
however. towards the unfortunate conclusion that municipal power was 
only this neurotically creative in response to a racial "problem". 
Both the census and the introduction of a permit system reveal the 
racial anxiety and fear that lurked within the municipal institution. 
We discovered the double-edged nature of spatial and temporal 
regulations in 3.2. The Regulation and Production of Municipal 
Time-Space. The regulations put into circulation by the municipality 
were inevitably double-edged because they both operated at the level 
of the law and required costly and time-consuming forms of 
administration. Progress towards the "thresho,ld of a discipline" is 
only made when discipline "seamlessly" facilitates both productivity 
and obedience; inspection is too conspicuous a form of intervention 
for it not to be noticeable by the general population. It is thus 
self-evidently repressive and is therefore prevented in advance from 
helping to secure the transition to the status of discipline. 
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I use an event in 1906 which involved the inspection and possible 
isolation of fruit and vegetable vendors as a metaphor to demonstrate 
the incompatibility between commercial endevour and the municipality 
as a fully developed disciplinary institution. In so doing I suggest 
indirectly that the Woodstock Municipality was never able to preside 
over a self-regulating space because it articulated a rationality 
which functioned at an altogether "higher" and more formal level. 
This was in spite of the fact that at times in the municipality's 
history it did manage to initiate systems like the census and the 
need for black people to carry a permit which were incredibly 
effective from the disciplinary point-of-view. This is the implied 
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CHAPTER 4: THE AUSTERITY OF CONCRETE 
INTRODUCTION 
The following chapter is to be read as a direct response to the 
previous chapter, in which we analysed the various strategies and 
techniques employed by the Woodstock Municipality in its mission to 
control the greater municipal area. I suggested in the previous 
chapter that municipal power revolved around the attempted control of 
both space and time. The opening move in this consolidation of 
Colonial power was to create a ml.lnicipality; an administrative entity 
that would oversee an artificial space that was a British Colonial 
creation. This strategy was only ever partially successful and this 
was due to a host of factors, not least of which was the 
municipality's rapidly changing population combined with the dynamic 
and restless nature of the times. In the previous chapter I made the 
suggestion that the ideal system of municipal power - that is, 
socially inconspicuous, economical and unobtrusive - would have been 
one which actively promoted self-regulation. This ideal system was not 
to be however, and the municipality had to be satisfied with an 
infinitely more makeshift system of local government. 
In section 4.1., Some thoughts on a map of Cape Town, I argue that a 
close textual analysis of an Admiralty map of the greater Cape Town 
area dating to 1858-1860 suggests the following: that the Craig's 
Battery gun emplacement on the Woodstock coast was, without doubt, a 
premodern military institution. Secondly, that altough we cannot date 
the beginning of the industrial Revolution in the Colony to the time 
of the map, one is able to note the extensive domination of the 
military in all spheres of local life. This domination created the 
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preconditions for the birth of capitalist modernity in the Colony. 
Section 4.2. narrows the analytical focus somewhat and thus begins 
with an analysis of the control of space and time in Craig's Battery. 
The section will be entitled, Space and Time in the Battery. In marked 
contrast to the municipality's sometimes bumbling attempts to create a 
definitive and self-regulating space, my analysis of space within the 
battery will demonstrate how, in a tightly controlled and localised 
"universe", life can be made to resemble the workings of a well-oiled 
machine. This section also continues the analysis which started in the 
previous chapter, in that it locates the domination of space and time, 
and the corresponding shift in the ,representation and thus 
apprehension thereof, as one of the major features of modernism. As 
David Harvey points out, 
It is important to keep in mind therefore that the modernism that 
emerged before the First World War was more of a reaction to the new 
conditions of production (the machine, the factory, urbanization), 
circulation (the new systems of transport and communications), and 
consumption (the rise of mass markets, advertising, mass fashion) than 
it was a pioneer in the production of such changes. 1 
In the second section, we will thus be analysing an institutional 
space that contained some of the elements which, if Harvey is to be 
believed, precipitated the radical alteration in European 
consciousness called "modernism". After all, the battery contained 
several of the features described by Harvey above, including a 
specialised system of reproduction within a space that paradoxically, 
was similar to both a prison and a factory and was yet neither. By 
"system of reproduction", I mean to .draw attention to the fact that 
the battery was geared to maintaining (thus reproducing) existing 
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military equipment. The analysis of time and space within the battery 
will not simply focus on the disciplinary dimension of military 
control; it will also read the battery as a quintessential, if obscure 
site, which possessed, in concentrated form, some of the basic 
technological features - the machine gun, the telephone - which 
led to the rise of modernism. 
The title of section 4.3., is, An Archaeolo~ of Self-Regulation. In 
the section I "deconstruct" Army Form G949. The form describes a set 
of safety procedures that needed to be undertaken by artillerymen who 
entered and left the part of the battery in which shells were stored. 
I argue in the section that from an.analysis of the forms we are able 
to discern a highly intelligent, transparent and cost-effective form 
of power. This ritual stands in direct contrast to the Woodstock 
Municipality's attempts - some far more effective than others, as we 
have seen - to order and control the population through a system 
which did not have its originating impulse and finally cannot be 
traced back to the Woodstock Town Hall. In Foucauldian fashion I 
contend that it is only through a deconstruction of mechanisms, like 
the process codified in Army Form G949, that we are able to understand 
power at the level of micro-technique. 
The advantage, as I see it, of conducting this microscopic 
archaeological analysis, is that it gives us a refined understanding 
of power relations in modern day societies. It suggests that power is 
an infinitely more complex "system" than vulgar Marxists would have us 
imagine. More importantly however, it problematises the entire notion 
of origins by suggesting that perhaps antagonistic class relations do 
not solely account for political oppression in capitalist economies. 
The advantage of analysing power, knowledge and discipline in various 
institutions within the same municipality is that we are able to 
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appreciate that the various disciplinary regimes are, in their 
dispersal, unique. They rely on different methods and techniques, 
independently of some whole which malevolently orchestrates 
exploitation from above. 
The closing section is entitled, 4.4. Technology and the alteration of 
Time/Space relations in the Battery. During this section I undertake 
an analysis of the machine-gun and the telephone as examples of modern 
technology. I note that both objects would have altered the Time/Space 
relations in the battery considerably and would therefore have helped 
to turn the battery into a definitive modern disciplinary institution. 
Finally, in a written appendix (Appendix A) to this chapter, I analyse 
five photographs of Fort Knokke. This fort was situated next to 
Craig's Battery and was part of the military apparatus guarding Table 
Bay. The photographs show the fort in a state of utter neglect and 
this prompts an analysis of both ruins and photographs as significant 
elements in the discourse of modernism. To my mind the photographs 
allow us to write a story about modernism because they are the result 
of the technological change and subsequent alteration in the 
apprehension of space and time which so radically transformed the 
period. In their peculiar way ruins also represent the age and thus 
photographs of ruins, which were later to be collected and housed in a 
"space" that was itself invention of the modernist period - the 
museum - provide one with the perfect raw material for an appendix 
which I have decided to entitle, Creativity. Destruction and Modernism 
- The Case of the Fort Knokke Photographs. These thoughts are 
included in an appendix because they are pertinent to a wide ranging 
consideration of both modernization and modernism without being 
directly relevant to our analysis of self-regulation in the battery. 
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4.1: SOME THOUGHTS ON A MAP OF CAPE TOWN. 
The plans and drawings for Craig's Battery give the fleeting 
impression that one is looking at a structure that was a throwback to 
medieval times. This impression is created by the thick outer walls, 
raised superstructure and generally sealed appearance and compounded 
by the presence, certainly in early admiralty charts of Table Bay, of 
a watchtower looming behind the battery itself. The battery was an 
"institution" in that it "floated" a system of rules and a system of 
discipline in order to maintain control over the Royal Engineers 
within. The latent medievalism of the battery with its sealed and 
hermetic air is offset, however, by Jhe fact that it contained some 
extremely sophisticated machinery and in this respect was definitely 
an institution of the nineteenth century. It would be foolhardy to 
suggest that the history of the battery as an institution was 
congruent with capitalist modernization in the Colony, it was not. In 
an Admiralty chart of Table Bay dating back to 1858-1860, one notices 
both the Tower and the battery without difficulty. Occupying a slice 
of land almost due west of the Salt River lagoon and a solitary 
windmill of the "Yser Plaat" marshes, the battery appears to he the 
largest man-made structure to the east of Cape Town. The relative 
"emptiness" of the space beyond the twin toll gates to the South-East 
of the town can be seen not only by the complete absence of structures 
of any sort but also by the fact that Mowbray is mapped as a separate 
and somewhat isolated village. 
The map itself contains very little evidence of the factories and 
residential areas that we have come to associate with the expansion of 
the productive apparatus and the birth of the bourgeois epoch. One is 
aware however, of several roads out of Cape Town: one.leading to 
Mowbray and eventually to Simonstown, another "to the interior" and 
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still another up the coast in the general direction of what is marked 
as the "Riet Valei Quicksand". A single railway line snakes its way 
out of the Alfred docks only to separate beyond what is simply marked 
on the map as a railway station. Beyond the station. which stands 
commandingly on the Salt River lagoon's southern shore, the lines 
split: one heading off in the direction of what is curiously refered 
to as "Simons Bay", the other toward Wellington and the interior. The 
underdeveloped nature of the area around the battery serves to prove 
beyond all doubt that the military apparatus on the Woodstock Beach 
was not an extension of capitalist modernisation but was rather a form 
of protection and an insurance ( as we shall see in a later chapter 
that insurance is fundamentally an. attitude towards time) against 
possible attack. 
On closer inspection of the map one notices the presence of 
considerable military structures in the town. Most visible are the 
forts and batteries which were built to protect the town from seaward 
attack. A less visible, but perhaps even more significant category of 
structures in the area at the time, were, what we can call from a 
contemporary vantage point, the carceral continuum. The continuum 
extended from the Military Hospital which was located to the west of 
Fort Knokke, beyond Prince Alfred's Square and Parade towards a 
cluster of buildings behind the Port Office. This cluster contained 
the Somerset Hospital, a Convict Station and a little further on, in 
the direction of Mouille Point, a Laboratory. The preponderance of 
carceral and military institutions in the Cape Town area suggest that 
this particular section of the Colony was a disciplined and highly 
ordered Colonial possession which had been rationalised to meet the 
demands of military power. 
I contend that the persistent militarisation of life in Cape Town 
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created a set of favourable conditions for the beginning of capitalist 
modernity in the Western Cape. Take the Admiralty map of Table Bay 
that I have refered to recently, for example. Any post-enlightenment 
map flattens and homogenizes a heterogeneous space according to the 
dictates of a universal and perspectivally "neutral" way of seeing the 
world. As "objective" spatial knowledge the Admiralty map was a 
powerful and valuable commodity and, as a reliable representation of 
space, it paved the way for continuing military and commercial 
expansion. This particular map contains a vast array of specific 
knowledge - depth soundings for the entire Table Bay area. thus 
facilitating accurate navigation, for instance - and provides the 
opportunity for both the ongoing ~omination and production of space. 
The mapping of the Cape Town area was just one aspect in the 
domination of Colonial space by the imperatives of military 
rationality. Imperial and military power is not confined to a 
trustworthy representation of space however, and we are able to detect 
the creative influence of the military in the following respects: the 
abundance of redoubts, blockhouses, forts and batteries which. in the 
latter case, constituted a protective sea-facing rim behind which 
commercial and religious structures of the town were situated. An 
analysis of these defensive structures location reveals that they 
served to enclose the town and in so doing created a space which could 
be internally policed with remarkable ease. The town also contained a 
sizeable military barracks and parade ground just off Caledon Square 
and the presence of these structures suggest that space in Cape Town 
was ordered in a definite and intentional way; a way which was 
undoubtedly the result of a specific military rationality. 
By 1860, Cape Town had an infrastructural. fabric which included the 
following: well developed rail and road links with the interior, a 
129 
good harbour, a gas-works and a reservoir, potentially cheap supplies 
of convict labour from both the convict station and the prison, and an 
ample amount of apparently uninhabited land close to the town itself. 
If one combines all these factors one notes that by the 1860s there 
existed in the Colony certain important preconditions for the 
emergence of capitalist modernity. Link these non-discursive 
conditions together with the fact that the town was already an 
enclosed and disciplined space (see above) and one has the almost 
perfect setting for the expansion of capitalism in the Colony. 
4.2: SPACE AND TIME IN THE BA TIER Y 
Although I have argued with scrupulous care that Craig's Battery was 
not, strictly speaking, an architectural creation of the modern epoch, 
I do nevertheless contend that it is possible to analyse the 
utilisation of space and the control of time in the battery as 
definitively modern.2 In its most acute and exaggerated form this 
"modernity" manifests itself in the new technology of the machine-gun 
and the telephone; technology which compresses time through the 
subjective nullification of space. At a more mundane level the 
disciplinary technology within the battery positions the body in 
causal networks that resemble, on a smaller scale of course, the 
production lines of large-scale factories. And it was perhaps at this 
level - the level of reproduction and repair - that the 
utilisation of space in the battery was at its most concentrated and 
austere. 
Scrutiny of the battery plans indicate that the use of space therein 
was the result of purposeful and intense planning. The battery was an 
unusually ordered and highly disciplined space in which everything 
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literally "had its place". The sense of everything belonging ( and here 
I include the Royal Artilleryman) in prescribed "places", was a 
natural extension of the battery's manifold functions. The prime 
function to which the system was geared was, however, the firing of 
the heavy artillery (supplemented at times by lighter machine gun 
fire) and ultimately all parts of the process were subordinate to 
this. During the next few pages I will analyse various spaces within 
the battery: first I will focus on the section of the battery that was 
geared to on-site repair work. Secondly I will tease out the 
consequences of the almost complete control of space and time in the 
battery and what that meant in concrete terms. Here it is important to 
realise that it is possible to read the human body in this instance as 
just another cog in the machine-like functioning of the apparatus, but 
we will deal with this in greater detail later. In order to 
demonstrate in greater detail what I mean, refer to the accompanying 
diagram of the Craig's Battery Workshops (See Appendix C). 
I draw the reader's attention to the existence of two interlinked 
rooms; the Fitter's shop and the Royal Engineers' (R.E.) store and the 
existence of an adjoining third room, the Smith's shop, with permanent 
forge which only has a single exit, and the matched and beaded 
garage-type doors (the doors are more evident on the elevation drawing 
rather than on the actual plan). What I propose is to offer a rough 
scenario based on deduction as to the functions of the engineers 
within each room as well as the accompanying attitudes and positions 
taken up by their bodies. The reader will note that genealogically the 
ambitions of this brief study are entirely correct, for does not 
Foucault encourage the effective historian to concentrate on the 
changing rituals of subjection to which the human body was forced to 
submit? 
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There is some doubt in my mind as to the exact function of the Smith's 
shop; was it to mould shells and beat cartridges into shape - note the 
anvil and the work-block, thus providing the engineers in the Fitter's 
Shop (Assembly shop) with the two main components - besides the high 
explosives which were probably kept in the R.E. store - of a shell, or 
was the Smith's shop only related to the other two in terms of 
proximity, its main function being to maintain the trolleys which 
transported the shells along the Rolling Way (see Appendix D) to the 
casemates? There is also the possibility that the Smith's shop was 
used to strengthen or repair parts of the heavy artillery, which would 
have come under tremendous pressure as a result of sustained use. 
Whatever the exact function of th~ Smith's shop the "surfacing" of the 
forge, anvil, skylight etc. within the diagram itself provides us with 
enough information to approximate the bodily attitudes ( stoking the 
forge, placing and extracting the red-hot metal, beating it on the 
anvil or block with available light flowing through the overhead 
skylight etc.) and the more-or-less programmed series of positions 
that the body would have been "forced" to assume. 
In all likelihood the R.E. store contained the ingredients which went 
into the shell itself. These ingredients would, in all probability, 
have been passed through the window (see cross-section C-D in Appendix 
C). Also note the height of the shelf in the R.E. store) between the 
store and the Fitter's shop. In the Fitter's shop the final product, 
through the combination of cartridge, shell and high-explosive 
gunpowder, would have been created and then placed in a rack, put on a 
trolley and wheeled down the concrete ramp eventually finding its way 
to the stores beneath the battery itself. We should note the 
incredible thickness of the Fitter's shop walls (14 inches) and the 
location of the benches and shelves which are ideally placed to 
provide ample space on which to fit their components together and then 
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to lower the finished product down onto an awaiting trolley/ 
push-cart? Also note the existence of the sets of cupboards and 
drawers beneath the large bench next to the South-East facing wall 
(see section A-8 in Appendix C). We must also take into account the 
possibilty that the shells ( or the various components out of which 
they were constructed) were imported directly from Britain. The 
store's and fitter's shop might therefore have been designed 
specifically for the day to day repair work required by the battery. 
Even the most inadequate of reconstructions and thinnest of hypotheses 
enables us at least to consider the skill and strength required of the 
fortified artilleryman. While the battery did not require the marching 
precision, elegance and, "bodily rh~toric of honour113 expected of 
the infantryman, the "rhetoric" of the artilleryman in all probability 
consisted more of attitudes of concentration, gravity and the 
"correct" posture, particularly when dealing with substances as 
dangerous as gunpowder. It was the inherent danger of dealing with 
such a substance that led to the codification of safety procedures and 
it was these safety procedures which to a certain extent escaped the 
logic of vision which underpins Foucault's later notion of 
Panopticism. I make the connection because I believe that the two 
shared a crucial similarity. that they forced the prisoner. or in our 
case the artiller:yman. to become self-regarding, that is. conscious of 
himself as an object under constant surveillance. 
I would like next to analyse the structuring of battery space with 
special reference to the magazines and emplacements for the two 4. 7 
inch quick fire guns on the battery's left flank (Appendix E). A brief 
inspection of the plans shows how symetrical and ordered the space is; 
one also notices how the need for safety has come to dominate the way 
in which the magazines are constructed. The repercussions of this need 
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for safety are that architectural features such as walls, openings and 
stairways tend to define the movements of the human body. The "safety 
issue" thus becomes the functional alibi for a rationality that 
disciplines as it protects; objectification becomes the result of a 
strenuous need to insure against loss of life. 
If one looks at the elevation plan on the top left hand side of the 
diagram (Appendix E) one first notices the incredible thickness of the 
outer protecting walls. The second aspect of the plan that draws one's 
attention is the manner in which the inner Cartridge Store walls are 
"punctuated"; the only comparative lightness of architectural touch 
issues from the spaces that are supposedly "empty", spaces through 
which the body can pass. There is, in fact, only one entrance/exit 
through which the body of the engineer can move ( on the other side of 
the barrier which is itself between the two seats) and the only other 
respite from the thick uniformity of the walls is the issuing hatch 
through which cartridges were passed. 
The consequences of such an extreme form of spatial regimentation 
means that, in effect, time is also controlled. The ritual (to he 
examined in great detail later on during this chapter) of taking off 
one's clothes, crossing the barrier, putting on workclothes, entering 
the Cartridge Store and then passing the cartridges out through the 
issuing hatch means that action is nothing other than the sum of 
repeated gestures. This very repetitiousness tends to suggest that the 
actions. which are repeated within a given time span. become 
increasingly meaningless in anything other than the framework of 
causal logic within which they take place. The ordering of space thus 
helps to construct a ritual in which time is all hut drained of its 
ability to disrupt. In this instance, the programming of space seems 
to suggest that under certain conditions time can he induced to turn 
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in on its self, to become predictible in advance, and thus he 
controlled. 
The organisation of space in the emplacement as a whole results in an 
expanded range of ritualistic and equally "empty" actions. For 
example, the Royal Engineer or Artilleryman would have needed to have 
taken the shells and cartridges out of the magazine and up the stairs 
(see cross-section G-H in Appendix E) where they either would have 
been loaded directly into the quick-firing guns or stored in one of 
the cartridge recesses. These actions would have been programmatic in 
the extreme. The actual firing of the gun would also have resulted in 
the artillerymen taking up assigneg and unchanging positions around 
the gun (firing, loading, emptying the breech etc). These would have 
been worked out in advance. One notes that the entire space - and 
here I include both the magazine and the emplacement - allows for 
absolutely no initiative or originality on the part of the 
artilleryman. Everything is planned in advance and ordered to the 
point where the artilleryman is reduced to a virtual automaton. 
This section was an attempt to understand the way in which production 
rationality constructed and used the body as if it were just another 
functional link in a series of causal chains. These causal chains 
operated in specific sites within the battery, like the smith's store 
or the magazines for the two quick-fire guns. These specific 
"compartments", were geared to either repair, preparation or action. 
The thorough objectification of the body was predicated on the 
legitimate need for safety within the confines of the hattei:y. I argue 
that the need for safety was, however, a manifestation of a 
rationality that operates simeltaneously, for it disciplines as it 
protects. 
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4.3: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF SELF-REGULATION 
This section is an attempt to push our analysis beyond earlier 
generalities about the control of space and time in order to 
scrutinize a micro-technique which functioned at the entrance to the 
underground magazine at Craig's Battery. This technique was codified 
in Army Form G949. The form contained a diagram of the procedures 
which one needed to follow when either leaving or entering the 
magazine.4 I refer to this section as an archaeology in the sense 
that I attempt to unpick one of those infinitesimal mechanisms through 
which power is supposed to flow. If Foucault is in any meaningful 
sense "correct" in suggesting that a.n ascending analysis of power will 
enable a more accurate grasp of how it functions in modern day 
societies, it is in the context of humble beginnings such as these 
that we should test his hypothesis. Before we begin therefore, we 
should be aware of exactly what Foucault thinks about the 
matter, 
The movement fron one project to the other, from a schema of 
exceptional discipline to one of a generalised surveillance, rests 
on a historical transformation: the gradual extension of the 
mechanisms of discipline throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, their spread throughout the whole social body, the 
formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary 
society.5 
What then is at stake'? I am suggesting that a deconstruction of the 
Army Form might offer us something which is both tangible and 
transferable. insofar as we might be able to trace the mechanism 
within it to other corners of "the social body". We might in other 
words be able to detect the spread of these so-called "mechanisms of 
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discipline" and sense them in recocnizahle rituals today. On the other 
hand, the formation of the "disciplinary society" micht not he quite 
as complete or pronounced as Foucault sucGests. 
A reading of the "instructions relating to entry and leaving of 
magazines and laboratories" (Army Form G949) reveals that so-called 
"safety-procedures" were much more than rules designed to protect the 
battery's occupants. Certainly, the hattery contained an inherent 
danger to the lives of those who lived within its walls. Nevertheless, 
"safety procedures", rather than signalling a conscious desire on the 
part of the military authorities to keep those engaged in everyday 
activity policed, confirms that we ~re dealing with a system of 
discipline (which itself involves a specific modality of power) that 
cannot be traced back to an originating source or conscious intention. 
The consequent effects of the system of power which operated in the 
battery were to induce a degree of self-awareness in those who worked 
and lived there. 
The Army Form is a micro-technique of discipline and control based on 
an intense codification of space and time. It is also an attempt at 
programming the actions of the suhject to such a degree that they come 
to resemble the actions of a mindless hody. I use the word "hody" in 
the sense that I understand it to be used by Foucault: a programmahle 
mass stripped of consciousness. In an important way however, the form 
constructs more than a hody, it constructs a unique suhjectivity. We 
will explore this contradiction in the course of the section which 
follows. 
One of the most highly-charged and thus intensely codified of spaces 
within the battery was the portion of space between the corridor and 
the shell-stacking room. In a movement which corresponds to the quest 
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for the "correct" genealogical perspective this space has been 
"enlarged" in the form of a diagram, Army Form G949. I use the word 
"enlarged" cautiously for I am drawing the reader's attention to the 
difference in scale between the architectural drawing of the battery 
and Army Form G949. 
The drawing is, of course, a figured representation and thus in 
relation to it we might suggest that the Army Form G949 is "doubly" 
metaphoric. Scale however is not the only defining characteristic for 
between the architectural drawing and Army Form G949 there is also a 
difference in perspective and detail; the Army Form is a condensed and 
highly detailed representation dra~n in "deep focus" with depth of 
field being a noticeable characteristic. In contrast the architectural 
drawings are "flat" and confined to either one or two dimensions. The 
appearance of a third dimension with the Army Form is congruent with a 
definition of power as "a political anatomy of detail".6 Power has, 
through the medium of a three-dimensional diagram, managed to 
construct a greater degree of knowledge about space. Power over 
"emergent" space is thereby enhanced, for a more detailed space is 
necessarily a space which is easier to control and ultimately. 
discipline. 
The visual depiction of disciplined space is also supplemented by a 
series of instructions and prohibitions. It is the aim of the 
prohibition to exclude certain items ( matches, tobacco, lighters) from 
the space beyond the barrier wall. The instructions seek to regulate 
action and behaviour to such a degree that every act ( at least 
theoretically) will basically be the same. The main intention of the 
prohibitions and regulations is to prevent anything foreign and 
dangerous from entering the magazine or laboratory. This is done not 
by guarding or managing the magazine itself but by monitoring the 
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single entrance/exit to and from the magazine. 
Rather than bein~ watched by those he cannot see the member of the 
workin~-party is forced to watch himself and his co-workers who in 
tum watch him. The ruse is thus complete because disciplinary 
surveillance has become "democratised". There is no distance or 
hierarchical division which separates the seer from the seen. for the 
worker has, in the name of not simply his life but the life of others, 
become self-regarding. This (illusory) democratic moment posits the 
importance of the unique individual for he alone is responsible for 
his own well-being and safety. The mechanism demonstrates no 
disciplinary heavy-handedness for the worker is barely aware of the 
ritual containing a disciplinary function. The ruse functions in a 
highly intelligent manner, all the more so for supposedly being 
"innocent". It can thereby be seen that it is not merely life without 
that is being protected but it is life within that acts as a prior 
condition for the disciplinary technology which literally permeates 
through the entire battery as it selectively animates certain key 
thresholds, certain spaces between spaces. 
In conjunction with the movement of the body in and out of the 
magazine there is an accompanying alteration in the identity of the 
subject. This alteration is arguably slight but the situation does 
require that, outwardly at least, there is a formal shift in the sense 
of a change in clothes and designation. Furthermore, civilian space 
( read the public sphere) ends at the barrier. After the barrier, and 
closer to the magazine, space becomes private to all but the correctly 
attired. The magazine itself has not been foregrounded or rendered 
visible in the same way that this threshold between spaces has and 
thus we are able to conclude that for discipline to function it is not 
space per se which needs to be scrutinized but the marginal space. the 
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joint which exists between two heterogeneous laq~er spaces. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that the economy of repetition 
which we see embedded in the Army Form encourages an unchanging ritual 
of self-regulation. This ritual is specific and can be maintained in 
no other space but the battery. Contrary to Foucault. who contends 
that specific techniques become generalised and thus get spread across 
the repressive institutions of society. this micro-technique is not 
~uaranteed a life outside of the battery. The reasons for this are as 
follows: the battery is a unique space which requires a unique 
disciplinary mechanism. As a closed structure both space and 
subjectivty can be controlled to a ~reat degree, and thirdly, coersion 
(in the form of an ideology of responsibility) can be practiced 
without constraint. 
4.4: TECHNOLOGY AND THE AL TERA TI ON OF TIME/SP ACE RELATIONS IN 
BATTERY 
In the context of altering the time/space relations in the battery 
(and the rest of the Colony for that matter) I would like next to 
analyse the influence of new technolobry like the telephone and machine 
gun (see Appendix F). Appendix F shows that the telephone shelter was 
completed in February 1898, and the machine gun store was completed in 
March of the same year. If space was intelligently arranged and 
created in the battery prior to the invention of the telephone and 
machine gun these two additions were able to radicalise the time/space 
relations in the battery overnight. 
As a method of communication the telephone had the effect of allowing 
speakers who were removed from each other in space to imagine that 
they were standing side by side. The telephone is an example, 
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therefore, of the nullification of space over time. Before we go any 
further we should distinguish first between the telephone as an 
internal or external means of communication. As an internal means of 
communication, within the confines of the battery that is, the 
telephone was able to bring the various sections of the battery closer 
together, see for example the telephone link between the magazine and 
the quick-firing gun. The telephone thus had the effect of "shrinking" 
the objective space of the battery: of temporarily bringing spatially 
distinct places closer together. The telephone also had the effect of 
symbolically uniting spaces on different planes: one thinks here of 
the underground and reasonably protected space of the magazine as 
compared to the exposed, higher space of the emplacement. From the 
point-of-view of information gathering and knowledge the telephone was 
also revolutionary because it allowed information to be disseminated 
very quickly. This information could then be used to strategise 
accordingly, and reaction times could then be shortened. As a conveyor 
of information the telephone was thus able to transform the battery 
into a more effective reactive unit. In concrete spatial terms this 
meant that the battery was able to monitor and protect Table Bay with 
greater speed and accuracy. 
We are liable to interpret the existence of a telephone in the battery 
through terms which suggest a progressive strengthening, with the 
disciplinary system becoming all the more effective as a result of its 
influence. This argument might also suggest that knowledge-gathering 
and relaying capabilities would be improved as a result of the 
telephone etc. There is of course an argument which runs counter to 
the one outlined above. It might progress as follows: the telephone 
was an object which could be used to convey incorrect information, 
creating tension and confusion and thus immobilising the communicative 
system. The spatial consequences of this confusion would have entailed 
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a corresponding degree of stasis in both the space from which the 
message was sent and in the space (another battery perhaps) in which 
it was received. There was thus a very real possibility of paralysis 
if incorrect information was transmitted from one position to another. 
This paralysis would ultimately have weakened the defensive 
capabilities of the entire system. With the invention of the telephone 
distance was suddenly no longer a hindrance to conversation~ space 
could disappear in the time it took to crank a handle. This meant that 
the greater Cape Town area theoretically became a reinforced network 
of forts and batteries in which information was systematically relayed 
from one strategic location to another. I use the word reinforced 
intentionally in the sense that with.the installation of the telephone 
in the battery the defensive capability of the sea-facing defences was 
greatly increased. The wall of communication which the system of 
telephones provided was the modern technological equivalent of a 
medieval wall of stone: both linked the unprotected spaces between 
structures. An actual wall would have presented an integrated system 
of interlocking defences to aggressors out at sea. The "metaphorical" 
wall of which we have been speaking was even stronger, for it managed 
to integrate a series of absences in such a way that they remained 
invisible. Such was the power of modern technoloLD'.: to paradoxically 
stren~then military defences by preservinii: the absences between them. 
It was in the British interests to keep the sea surrounding the 
greater Cape Town area under constant surveillance. Although the 
invention and subsequent installation of telephone's would not 
necessarily have improved the process of observation, they certainly .~ 
helped in the speedier transmission of order/sand information. In a 
sense therefore, altough targets could not he magically produced -
they had to objectively exist first - their location might be more 
quickly and generally known as a result of the telephone. The 
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strenghtening of the communicative network certainly had the effect of 
limiting reaction time and making strategy potentially more coherent. 
In spatial and temporal terms the telephone linked all the British 
positions together without presenting the enemy with a united target. 
In terms of the military's ability to police the sea surrounding Cape 
Town the telephone was a distinct advantage. 
Another object which was the result of the inventiveness of the 
nineteenth century was the machine gun; itself a fine example of 
science and technology being objectified in a final product. The 
battery had three such guns which were stored in a specially built hut 
(See Appendix F). The machine g~m was particularly effective and 
frightening because of the speed with which it fired its bullets. It 
was able to reproduce the action of an infantryman, multiply it tens 
of times, and then condense this increased rate of fire into less time 
then it would have taken the infantryman to fire his rifle in the 
first place. 
When analysing the machine gun, one realises that one is not only 
dealing with a killing machine therefore, but a labour-saving device; 
a machine that annihilated space on the one hand. hut on the other 
actually increased the battery's size. This was possibly more than 
subjective effect as the machine gun required only two men to operate 
and took up less space than the gun which it replaced. Machine guns 
also had other advantages: they were mobile, thus allowing for 
concealment from the enemy, they were relatively light, and they had a 
rapid rate of fire, finally, they were supposedly foolproof, in that 
they didn't require much skill to operate. The presence of machine 
guns on the battery meant that the battery was better equipped to deal 
with frontal assault and was thus a more completely defended space. 
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An additional feature of the machine-gun was the fact that it 
swivelled on a stand. This ability to move across a plane that was 
roughly horizontal with the earth was linked to a corresponding 
alteration in the language of war, one now spoke of advancing 
infantrymen being "mown down" or "cut down". The introduction of a 
swivel mechanism allowed the machine gun to "spray" a broad area with 
fire. The major consequence of this scythe-like movement was not so 
much that it covered a segment of space indiscriminately but rather. 
in so doing. it radically re-altered the spatial parameters by which 
militazy encounters were understood and fought. 
After the invention of the machine-gun frontal assaults became 
increasingly suicidal (witness in this regard the catastrophic results 
that even staggered assaults had in the First World War) and 
cavalry-charges became all but redundant. Whereas heavier artillery 
only had the ability to pound deep space, the machine gun had the 
capacity to utterly transform immediate space (which in this case was 
the area which surrounded the battery) in a lethal and comprehensive 
manner. This destructive capacity ensured a complimentary shift in 
tactics; a shift which cannot be artificially separated from other 
military inventions of the modern age. like the tank. the aeroplane 
and the armoured car. When considered as an entire paradigm this new 
technology smashed not only the way in which wars had hitherto been 
understood but also the ways in which they were fought. 7 
The machine guns of the period were not only susceptible to jamming 
and over-heating, they were also notoriously inaccurate. This is 
intriguing because it suggests that during a certain moment in the 
history of military technology the issue of accuracy ( and the 
attendant skills such as map-reading etc) arguably ceased to be 
defining principles. Certainly, one might hold that over a short range 
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accuracy becomes less important. However, the creative principle 
behind the invention of the machine gun could perhaps be: move beyond 
but do not forco the concept of accuracy in order to hit anythinc that 
moves within a civen area: do not analyse space in order to use it 
accurately. overwhelm it to cain maximum efficienc:y. In this respect 
the machine-gun could be called an egalitarean weapon: a symbol for 
both the creative and the destructive energies of the age. The gunner 
didn't need a great deal of expertise to fire one; the experience of 
firing a machine gun wasn't linked to specific forms of expertise, 
like "marksmanship" for example; in fact the machine gun was in many 
ways a "lower" weapon, vulgar like the spirit of the age. 
We should remember that the machine gun was a weapon of limited 
mobility and was thus used in a defensive capacity (the three Craig's 
Battery guns were no exception to the rule). This meant that it forced 
space, in a sense, to rush magnetically towards it. In fact, the 
machine gun functioned by first exerting a tremendous pull on the 
space immediately in front of it and then raking that "compact" space 
with bullets. This "squashing" of space suggests corresponding 
temporal changes: the machine gun alters the time of war in its 
ability to divide time into progressively smaller fractions: it 
manages to do more in less time. This means that it uses time in a 
fundamentally more economical, and consequently more modern way. This 
in turn causes both an experiental and a representational problem, 
i.e. how does this unique shattering of time come to he represented 
aesthetically and how does the subject make sense of this new 
tern porality'? 
For heavy guns the atmosphere was nothing more than a medium without 
boundary, a "space" through which to accurately plot the trajectory of 
your shells; for the inventors of the machine gun, space was imbued 
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with definite properties. One of these properties was a negative one: 
emptiness. The machine gun is ahsolutely imperious in its attitude 
towards empty space and this leaJs one to suggest that either its 
invention rested on a fundamentally different conception of space to 
that of the cannon or the heavy artillery piece or, it revolutionised 
the time/space relations of the age in such a way that war was never 
understood in quite the same way again. 
The definition of what constituted a target also shifted as a result 
of the invention of the machine gun. For instance, the 9.2 inch guns 
in the battery would have needed to have their target located 
precisely in space. The machine gu_n needed no such co-ordinates if it 
was to function effectively. The machine gun stood at the beginning of 
a different causal system entirely; for the machine guns "target" was 
only ever roughly defined as that which happened to present itself 
within a certain band of space before it. We can also presume that the 
absent target at the end of the system was human, the absent target in 
the case of the machine gun was the body. The anonymous body of the 
enemy soldier but a body nevertheless. 
There can be little doubt that the evil chattering of the machine gun 
altered the way in which war was subjectively experienced. By dint of 
its very functioning - to comb a limited space more-or-less randomly 
with bullets - the machine gun had the ability to make an already 
terrifying affair seem all the more arbitrary. It also had the effect 
of transforming war into a battle between machines that increasingly 
came to follow their own grotesque logic, a logic which seemed to have 
little to do with conscious human intent. Here the very name 
"machinegun" is instructive, because it suggests that this invention 
was more than ever technologically alien, a mechanism stripped of all 
the softer and redemptive human virtues. All these factors doubtless 
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contributed to the existential dimension of what both Gertrude Stein 
and Picasso called the first Cubist War;8 a war which altered 
time/space relations and human consciousness thereof in a definitive 
and all-encompassing way. 
In the context of Craig's Battery, however, the machine gun represents 
an innovative technological response to the problem of how to protect 
immediate space; a crude and unselective response but an effective one 
nonetheless. Like another invention of the modern age. the telephone, 
the machine gun contributed in many ways to the revolutionary 
alteration in time/space relations in the battery as well as ( and this 
is particularly the case with the telt;phone) the time/space relations 
in the greater Cape Town area. 
The phrase technological threshold is useful in the sense that it does 
give an indication of the changes in the battery that were caused as a 
result of the telephone and the machine gun. The changes resulting 
from the addition of this new technology were manifold but basically 
they changed the "subjective space" both within and without the 
battery itself. We cannot understand the influence of new technology 
then, without at least implying the existence of a "hypothetical" 
subjectivity. The telephone and machine gun changed the day-to-day 
experience of life in the battery and, by extension, the experience of 
war as well. In changing the experience of those in the battery. the 
new technology would also have helped to reinforce the disciplinary 
regime within the battery itself. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have attempted in the last two chapters to offer contrasting 
analyses of the way in which two institutions codify, use and create 
space and time. The first section of this chapter ( 4.1. Some thoughts 
on a map of Cape Town.) was an attempt to substantiate the idea that 
the pre-conditions for the birth of capitalist modernity existed in 
the Colony in embryonic form from approximately 1860. In distinction 
to this, Craig's Battery was an ambiguous space in relation to the 
birth of capitalism in the Colony. This was for the following reasons: 
on the one hand the outer shell of the battery pre-dated, as it were, 
capitalist modernity. On the other._ we note that many of the spatial 
practices within the battery itself were certainly congruent with 
certain spatial and temporal practices within modernity itself. 
4.2. Space and Time in the Battery is thus an analysis of the 
disciplinary technology which animated the battery, particularly at 
the level of reproduction, repair and ordinary day-to-day functioning. 
The section concludes that the intense and highly functional ordering 
and deployment of space ( and the position of the subject within it) 
reveals a remarkably high degree of control. 
The general analysis of repair work etc becomes a pointed 
consideration of regimes of self-surveillance in ( 4.3 An Archaeolo~ 
of Self-Regulation). The section consists of a painstaking analysis of 
a form which is a discursive manipulation of certain "safety 
procedures". I conclude, before turning to a consideration of 
modernist weapons of war, that the Army Form G949 advanced a 
remarkably effective diagram of discipline and power, all the more so 
for not being reducible to any particular source. And, contrary to 
what Foucault would have us believe, this mechanism certainly appeared 
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to be an articulation of power that was confined solely to the 
battery. 
Modernist technology and its deployment in the battery is the subject 
of the final section ( 4.4. Technoloc;y and the alteration of Time/Space 
relations in the Battery). I argue in this section that the telephone 
and the machine gun revolutionise the time/space relations both within 
and without the battery. Their presence in the battery makes the space 
therein definitively modern and undoubtedly contributes to the 
institutions status as a fully developed modern institution. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity; An Enquiry into 
the Origins of Cultural Change. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) 
p.23. 
2. With respect to Craig's Battery there appears to he a manifest 
contradiction between the walls which were thick and almost 
medieval and the relatively modern system of discipline which 
operated within the walls themselves. Foucault seems to forward 
only two basic systems ( or images) of discipline, neither of 
which conforms to the Craig's .Battery example, 
There are two images, then, of discipline. At one extreme, 
the discipline-blockade, the enclosed institution, 
established on the edge of society, turned inwards towards 
negative functions: arresting evil, breaking communications, 
suspending time. At the other extreme, with panopticism, is 
the discipline-mechanism: a functional mechanism that must 
improve the exercise of power hy making it lighter. more 
rapid, more effective, a design of suhtle coersion for a 
society to come. 
Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
trans., Alan Sheridan. (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1986 ), p.209. 
3. lbid.,p. 135. 
4. Army Form G949 is a diagram with a series of instructions heneath 
it. The diagram shows two halves of a wall frontage. Facing the 
viewer on the left hand side of the diagram is space A. Upon 
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entering space A, the artilleryman is instructed to wipe his 
boots on a mat and then take them off. Then he is instructed to 
take off either his civilian clothes or uniform and hang it on 
the pegs provided. He is then required to pass over a barrier in 
his underclothes. Having entered space B, he is instructed to 
change into his magazine clothes and boots and then proceed into 
the magazine itself. The diagram then states that these 
procedures are to be followed in reverse when the Artilleryman 
leaves the magazine. Beneath the instructions for "Working 
Parties" are another set of instructions for "All other persons", 
in which they are required to, "l. Turn down ends of trousers and 
brush them clean. 2. Wipe your boots or shoes as clean as 
possible on mat B. 3. Place each foot in succession past the 
barrier into an over boot or galosh over your ordinary footwear". 
Finally, a note reminds the working parties that there is to be 
an absolutely rigid preservation of spatial difference between 
the two halves of the entrance to the magazine. 
The above quotes are taken from a brochure produced by the Fort 
Wynyard Museum, entitled, ''The Fort Wynyard Museum of Coast and 
Anti-Aircraft Artillery", obtained from the Museum itself. 
5. Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison. 
trans., Alan Sheridan. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) p. 209. 
6. Ibid., p. 139. 
7. Foucault urges us to see the invention of the new political 
technology of discipline not as a sudden discovery, but as that 
which was created "in response to particular needs: an industrial 
innovation, a renewed outbreak of certain epidemnic diseases, the 
invention of the rifle or the victories of Prussia." 
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Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison, 
trans., Alan Sheridan. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) p. 138. 
8. Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity; An Enquiry in the 
Origins of Cultural Change. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1989) 
p. 278. 
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CHAPTER 5: A LIMINAL INSTITUTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The House of Mercy was an institution devoted to the "rehabilitation" 
of coloured prostitutes. The House was situated on the lower reaches 
of Devil's Peak. It was maintained and governed by nuns from the 
Anglican Church, or what was later to become the Church of the 
Province of South Africa. The House was originally on a site in St 
George's Street, Oranjezicht, and, because of overcrowding and the 
encroachment of suburbia, it was moved to the boundary of the 
Woodstock Municipality. 
I suggest in this chapter that in the transition from St George's 
street to the House of Mercy, Liliebloem, we 're able to detect the 
formation of a more sophisticated rationality which underscored 
discipline in the latter house. Although neither institution made 
creative use of space or architecture as a means of control, 
discipline in the House of Mercy was nevertheless unique, combining 
Christian notions of Mercy with a practice that was aimed at 
encouraging the women to enter another class. Thus the only hope for 
"freedom" beyond the immediate freedom of having completed one's 
"sentence" was to enter the realms of another class; that is. to 
become a respectable petit-bourgeois subject. The training given in 
the House was directed towards this ideal and was thus 
transformative. I suggest that there was hardly any possibility for 
self-purification ( through the menial task of washing and ironing, 
for example) and that the only hope for another life was to become a 
"new", self-conscious subject, who was encouraged to indulge in the 
pleasurable and mildly aesthetic pursuits of needlework. Whether 
153 
entry into the lower reaches of a "better" class could provide the 
former prostitutes with a substantially altered subjectivity based on 
a new identity and different sense of themselves remains to be seen. 
5.1: THE ALLURE OF TRANSITIONS 
This foundation stone of S. Mary Magdalene's House of Mercy, 
Leliebloem, was laid on All Saints' Day, in the year of our Lord, 
1886, by His Excellency, General Torrens, the Administrator of 
the Government of the Colony; the stone having been previously 
blessed by the Most Reverend William West, Lord Bishop of 
Capetown, and Metropolitan. The house is being erected by public 
subscription, and when finished, it is to be set apart for the 
recovery and reclamation of poor fallen women who may desire to 
be trained in the ways of penitence. 
The institution will be administered by the All Saints' 
ministers, of S. George's Home, Keerom St. 1 
I suggest that far from simply attempting a "textual excavation" of 
the foundation stone, in other words a traditional exegesis. the 
method required to activate meaning from the stone in all its 
productivity is the genealogy. In unlocking the words on the stone in 
one particular way, (there are necessarily many other ways) I hope to 
draw attention to the House of Mercy as an institution which had its 
own political technology of the body and its own specific regime of 
discipline which cleverly combined the Christian tenets of mercy with 
a rehabilitative project centred around representations of 
petit-bourgeois femininity. At no time do l offer this ·perspective as 
<'..l.$ 
an accurate portrait of historica1 truth but N ratheren attempt to 
read the "event" of the laying of the foundation-stone and 
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deciphering its meaning-effects through a phantasm which hovers over 
it like an incorporeal cloud. It is rather to be understood as a 
continuation of a project which seeks to undermine all claims to a 
facile correspondence or identity between the past and the present. 
The opening three words, "This foundation stone", are, I helieve, 
resonant in ways beyond their denotative meaning. First, the laying 
of a foundation stone is the culmination of an extremely theatrical 
ceremony. And second, although the foundation stone is presumably 
heavy and immobile, an actual condensation of authority, it in a 
sense participates in the lingering theatricality of the event, for 
not only does it "act" commemorat.ively but it inaugurates a 
distinctive phase of a particular administrative and moral practice. 
It does so by keeping the following illusion in circulation: that a 
regime of discipline can be compared to and represented by an 
apparently innocent epigrammatic statement. The functional anonymity 
of the disciplinary project is thus foregrounded, cleverly divorced 
from the brutal actualities of imprisonment. In reading the words 
within the context of the entire quote we also become aware of the 
implied heaviness, the mock historical solidity of the words 
themselves (I don't believe that this is merely a retrospective 
illusion or a fiction induced by the facts that the words were 
originally etched in stone) because they initiate a specific and 
important vision of a future, they dramatize in a highly 
self-conscious and convention-bound manner the strong relationship 
between history and philanthropy as it existed or was about to exist 
in the House of Mercy. Thus the words quite literally both preserve 
and participate in the "building" of history. 
It is tempting to suggest that the horror of modern discipline is 
inscribed on the "face" of the first stone, that the words on the 
155 
stone are not simply inaugural but offer a paradoxical summary of the 
work that the House of Mercy was about to do. I would argue, however, 
that the "reality" suggested by other available sources and documents 
would imply that discipline as it was applied in the House of Mercy 
was far less uniform than either the writings of Foucault or the 
self-confident tones of the words on the foundation stone would seem 
to imply. This discrepancy is understandable however when one thinks 
that the statement which appears on the foundation stone is 
necessarily detached from the empirical complexities of the 
disciplinary project. However, it is possible to view the stone as 
the material preservation of a dominant memory, a form of knowledge 
sanctioned by those in power, and it is thus something which a 
counter-memory can unobtrusively slip behind. The chapter which 
follows is a tentative investigation into the possible shape of that 
counter-memory. 
During this chapter I will explore the tension-filled space which 
exists between the apparent immobilisation of historical meaning as 
implied by the mute density and finality of the words on the 
foundation stone of Woodstock's 'House of Mercy' and the supposed 
"groundlessness" of genealogical interpretation, 
the more one interprets the more one finds not the fixed meaning 
of a text, of the word, but only other interpretations. These 
interpretations have been created and imposed by other people, 
not by the nature of things. In this discovery of groundlessness 
the inherent arbitrariness of interpretation is revealed. For if 
there is nothing to interpret, then everything is open to 
interpretation; the only limits are those arbitrarily imposed.2 
156 
I would like next to attempt to extend our understanding of what the 
House of Mercy was by devoting some time to an explanation of the way 
in which discipline functioned in its immediate institutional 
predecessor, St. George's Horne in Keerorn Street, Orangezicht. I 
suspect that this will be a valuable exercise because it will enable 
us to trace the outline of a disciplinary logic which in the 
transition from St. George's to the House of Mercy underwent certain 
refinements. 
I would like at this point to comment on why transitions are so 
alluring. I think that one of the reasons for this allure is to be 
found in the logic of false continui~y which the transition inspires. 
This false continuity is animated by a causality based strongly on 
the idea of historical identity. It is precisely this identity which 
Foucault is attempting via the genealogical method to disturb, 
According to Foucault the task of the genealogist is to destroy 
the primacy of origins, or unchanging truths. He seeks to destroy 
the doctrines of development and progress. Having destroyed ideal 
significations and original truths, he looks to the play of 
wills.3 
Contrary to notions of historical development based on an identity 
between words and things I suggest that the transition signifies a 
moment of difference. This is not to suggest for one moment that 
penitentiary discipline functioned "seamlessly" in the House of Mercy 
for this chapter will amongst other things contend that discipline as 
applied in the House appears to have functioned in a primitive and 
clumsy way. The analysis of this transitional period will investigate 
the textual evidence ( correspondence, reports etc.) which, in drawing 
attention to the limitations and inadequacies of the St. George's 
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Street Home, anticipated a future in which discipline was more 
rational and thus more effective in the House of Mercy itself. 
What I am suggesting therefore is that, comparatively, the 
application of discipline as practised within the House was an 
advance on the form of discipline practised at St. George's. 
Nevertheless it remained eccentric and was imbued with its own 
peculiarities. 
The Church of the Province of South Africa archives contain a file 
entitled "Early Material 1886-1930". One of the many anonymous items 
in this file refers to St. George's Home as follows:-
(a) in the present House there is no possibility of separating 
the lower class of women from those who are more educated, and 
whose station in life is higher. There is also no place for 
keeping separate those who need a probation on first entering 
before mixing with the other inmates. A Penitentiary ought to be 
arranged with a view to classification; and classification. if it 
is to be effectual makes a considerable demand on space. 4 
Both the first and the second sentences are noteworthy; the first 
because it refers to class as a distinguishing characteristic in the 
categorization of inmates and thus hints at a set of shifting 
criteria whereby knowledge was produced. I am fully aware that the 
word "class" is used in a slightly different sense but I am only 
concerned with it insofar as it signifies class-ification. The second 
sentence adds another qualification to the suggested division of 
inmates who were no longer viewed as an undifferentiated homogenous 
mass, but as a group containing different elements. The third 
sentence, which is a distillation of the first two is undoubtedly the 
most fascinating. The sentence can be read in at least two ways; we 
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can interpret it as a description of a hoped-for and improved 
institutional alternative. And yet this understanding can quite 
conceivably be expanded to incorporate the sentence as an ironic and 
unconscious depiction of the workings of discourse, for is not 
discourse, in this case the discourse of the Anglican Church, that 
which enables classification to take place'? And does not discourse 
have a spatial dimension in which a progressively more advanced form 
of classification enacts itself? We are thus witnessing a supreme 
moment of self-reflexivity, where discourse unknowingly comments on 
its own workings and appears, ghost-like, to write itself. 
The next point reads as follows:-
(b) Moreover the penitents need a great deal of supervision. When 
a number of young women are brought together, who have all more 
or less fallen into the same degrading sin, every precaution has 
to be taken, otherwise more harm than good may result from their 
stay in the House. The buildings have to be arranged so that the 
girls can be constantly over-looked and over-heard. This 
necessitates a considerable number of workers, for whom rooms and 
other accommodation must be provided.5 
The above quote candidly admits to a problem which has haunted the 
reformer's imagination since prisons and reformatories were a 
relatively common sight on the social landscape. The problem is this: 
there is an inherent danger in bringing 'sinful' women together under 
one roof, for might not their proximity to one another create more of 
a disturbance, more sin than existed formerly, and might not their 
profanity he contagious?6 The problem requires that reformers 
suddenly be attentive to the disciplinary implications inherent in an 
intelligent use of space through creative architecture. What we are 
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dealing with then is a prototype for a simple "disciplinary machine". 
The increased need for a thorough observation of the penitents 
provides its own problems however; at best the division of space 
seems to be partial for instance. We are told that the "girls" must 
''be constantly over-looked and over-heard"7, but at the same time, 
"this necessitates a considerable number of workers, for whom rooms 
and accommodation must be providect"8. Are we to understand that 
these women were policed twenty-four hours a day in spite of the fact 
that "( d)" suggests that:-
( d) The present House does not admit of anything but an open 
dormitory, whereas it is an acknowledged fact that in 
Penitentiaries each girl should.have a cubicle to herself.9 
We might therefore draw the following conclusions from the above 
series of quotes; while reformers were aware of the problems relating 
to space and discipline these issues were never successfully 
resolved. We might suggest that the lack of architectural planning 
prior to the building of the House was fatal in that it initiated a 
system of contradictions which, when combined with a muscular, 
philanthropic Anglicanism created a system of laissez-faire 
discipline. This idea becomes even more difficult to reject when one 
considers the substance of the Anglican commitment to zealous 
humanism. A superficial reading of the available documents would seem 
to indicate that not only did the Church have a historical interest 
in human improvement but the rehabilitative aspects of their 
disciplinary project did not hinge on the utter negation of the 
subject that tends to distinguish certain brutal institutional 
regimes. I suspect that a reading which is a little more 
"historically sensitive" will not be unduly influenced by the many 
myths of innocence generated, even nowadays, by the commonsensical 
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reverence of all that is associated with the Church. I am asserting 
therefore that the system of discipline and the political anatomy of 
the body as it functioned in the House of Mercy was specific and 
certainly somewhat idiosyncratic but finally it was no less culpable 
for its historical crimes than any other institution of its kind. 
Item (c) in the article from which I am quoting asserts:-
(c) As far as possible, everything which is needed has to be 
provided within the enclosure of the House and its grounds. There 
must be a laundry and a drying-ground, with rooms for 
needle-work, class-rooms for instruction, a kitchen, refectory, 
infirmary, store-rooms, bath-r~oms, a chapel, etc. IO 
I do not wish to devote too much time to the above quote except to 
forward a number of simple ideas which will be embellished later. It 
can be noticed that it is thought advisable to keep the House 
self-contained. The House of Mercy was geographically isolated and 
spatially excluded, removed, not only to the upper-border of 
Woodstock (Leliebloem) but consigned to the rim of public 
consciousness as well. 
Another extract from a similar article (perhaps written just before 
the one quoted extensively above) puts forward the following 
information and I will quote here in full:-
The Refuge has been fuller than ever this last year; at one time 
there were 27 inmates instead of 22, our full number. One girl 
had to sleep in an outhouse, and one in the lock-up room, and one 
in the laundry. Several cases have been refused from want of 
room; a married woman given to drinking, an educated woman 
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formerly a governess, both intemperate and immoral, an upper 
class girl from a distant part of the colony, a woman from 
Kimberley whom the clergy there wished to send in. 11 
I suspect that we can plausibly locate the emergence of a signif-
icantly altered disciplinary regime in the chaos of the transition 
from St. George's to the House of Mercy. We are not only witnessing 
confusion on the level of practice but are also able to recognise a 
comparable degree of stress on the normative criteria which are in 
themselves integral components of any system of classification. What 
we are reading then is a description of dissonance, of fragmentation. 
The field which served as the basi<:_ grid for categorization is unable 
to inte~rate and thus make sense of examples which are so far apart, 
examples which vary from a former governess, an alcoholic. to an 
upper-class girl from a distant part of the Colony. The criteria for 
admission appear to be predicated on a savagely indiscriminate 
rationality which threatens to explode the entire disciplinary 
process from within. Overcrowding within the House of Refuge is 
paralleled by a discursive "overcrowding" which threatens to render 
the entire classificatory project meaningless. 
The erection of the House of Mercy is thus a stabilization of a 
pre-existing disciplinary rationality, an inflexion from within which 
tightens the table of representation and rejects the importance of 
certain subjects (alcoholics), in favour of a heightened awareness of 
others (prostitutes). In fact, the transition from St. George's Home 
to the House of Mercy represents a significant reorganisation rather 
than a progression within the corpus of disciplinary knowledge, 
particularly in terms of economics and the rehabilitative capacities 
of labour; the utilization of space and the organisation of time. In 
the next section we will attempt to take our textual analysis of the 
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words on the foundation stone a little further. Our genealogical 
analysis will analyse the meaning-effect of the words and then relate 
them to a provisional reconstruction of the disciplinary technology 
in the House. 
5.2: THE STONE EYE 
I would like next to analyse the following section taken from the 
foundation stone, 'was laid on All Saints' Day, in the year of our 
Lord, 1886, by His Excellenc..-y, General Torrens, the Administrator of 
the Government of the Colony; the stone having been previously 
blessed by the Most Reverend William West, Lord Bishop of Capetown, 
and Metropolitan.·12 The above extract is exemplary because beneath 
the play of signification it reveals certain attitudes which 
influence and participate in the creation of history. These attitudes 
may be expressed as variants of the idea that history and historical 
sources are, however unconsciously, cast, imbued with a 
point-of-view, a perspective which excludes others, and a culturally 
defined view of the world. History and the sources which contain and 
preserve that history are "constructions" which order. utilize and 
often foreground certain types of information. So. for example. the 
specific combination of religious and governmental/administrative 
language powerfully asserts that history is confined to a register of 
knowledge which is unquestionably and righteously imperial. 
We are able, after carefully scrutinising the words on the foundation 
stone, tentatively to put forward a list of the information which the 
extract contains: 1. The religiosity and religious elements within 
the extract put forward a culturally specific understanding of time: 
that of a calendar year punctuated by dates which have religious 
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significance (All Saints' Day). I believe that there is a strong 
sense of imperial destiny associated with this linear chronology. We 
are thus reading a formal confirmation and an acknowledgement of a 
civilizing mission, the collective desire to stamp a certain set of 
values on the surface of an alien world. 2. The quote also 
demonstrates the fallacy that great men make history. The extract has 
a masculine bias and thus reflects approximately the patriarchal 
nature of the imperial power complex. The men were not only the 
cultural custodians and legitimators of imperial discourse hut they 
were the substance of history. We can thus conclude that one of the 
essential elements of imperial/religious discourse was a patent 
inability to negotiate matters of di~ruptive identity. This may he a 
somewhat obvious point hut the above extract reveals the problem that 
imperial/religious discourse has when representing and receiving 
either sexual or cultural identities that are not its own. 
The House is being erected by public subscription, and when 
finished, it is to he set apart for the recovery and reclamation 
of poor fallen women who may desire to he trained in the ways of 
penintence. l 3 
I would like to assess and attempt to come to an understanding of the 
above extract in terms of how this process of 'recovery' and 
'reclamation' took place and then I would like to put forward some 
ideas on the pervasiveness of a certain conception of middle-class 
femininity, and the way in which this conception functioned as a 
regulative ideal. The women who either voluntarily "surrendered" 
themselves or were interred in the House of Mercy were mostly 
prostitutes. At no time however have I been able to ascertain how 
thi~ blithe stigmatization was arrived at. The information which I 
have managed to compile at no time offers a comprehensive breakdown 
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of the criteria on which imprisonment was grounded but this is not 
surprising given the commonsensical fixing of identity to which all 
"fallen women"14 were submitted. I think that without attempting to 
be definitive or even all that accurate we can safely assume that a 
high proportion of the women concerned were 'coloured' and of 
"reclaimable" age, which at an estimate would probably have been 
under thirty. The tenuous nature of these generalities should however 
be underscored by the following:-
The House of Mercy, so much needed, would be the House to which 
those young women would be taken who are really wishing to be 
rescued from lives of shame, a_nd to become penitents after having 
been led astray. None can tell but those who are brought 
constantly into contact with the sin that abounds here, what are 
the temptations besetting young girls who go out to service, and 
young women arriving from England, many of whom are led into a 
life of sin almost immediately after their arrival. A seaport and 
garrison town is bad enough in England; here in Capetown we have 
the addition of a large Mahomedan and heathen population. Many of 
the bad houses in Capetown and at the Diamond Fields are kept by 
Malays.15 
This certainly indicates that the percentage of white women 
imprisoned at the House could have been higher than originally 
thought. The above quote does not merely furnish an alternative 
proof, however, and it is worthwhile examining for a variety of 
reasons. I would like to comment on two items in the above quotation 
which are, I believe, closely related. The above·quote mentions, 'the 
sin that abounds here' 16 and later on, 'A seaport and garrison town 
is bad enough in England; here in Capetown we have the addition of a 
large Mahomedan and heathen population·.17 Against the backdrop of 
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these two quotes I would like to contrast a passage from Discipline 
and Punish:-
A port, and a military port is - with its circulation of goods, 
men signed up willingly or by force, sailors embarking and 
disembarking, diseases and epidemics - a place of desertion, 
smuggling, contagion. It is a cross-road for dangerous mixtures, 
a meeting-place for forbidden circulations.1 8 
Cape Town, being 'a seaport and garrison town' 19 is thus extremely 
dangerous because it contains various threatening possibilities. it 
has a frightening identity which can only put health authorities, 
philanthropists, and the morally watchful in a state of perpetual 
vigilance. It is certainly possible that informal structures of 
observation and surveillance existed in both the city and the 
municipality in a well-developed form. It is Foucault who reminds us, 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes 
them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the 
power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he 
becomes the principle of his own subjection. 20 
We should ask ourselves for instance, how exactly did the House of 
Mercy manage to "attract" its penitents, particularly if the moral 
force of the House was neither powerful nor extensive? Did it rely on 
a system of informers? To what degree were the local police involved 
in the monitoring of "fallen women"? 
In our continued investigation of the 'substance' of 'recovery' and 
'reclamation' I would like to draw attention to the nature of the 
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work process in the House of Mercy. One of the many unremarkable 
items in the CPSA Files states the following:-
Little remunerative work can be expected from the girls for the 
first ten months, the greater number are young and quite 
untrained. The majority are employed in washing and ironing; and 
it will be seen, by referring to the Annual Report, that the 
laundry receipts far exceed all other sources of income. yet ts 
impossible for the House of Men..-y to be altogether self-
supporting, and many more subscriptions and donations must be 
garnered in if any enlargement of either kitchen or Chapel is to 
be attempted. 2 l 
The key-word in the above extract is 'untrained', for training 
requires discipline and a hierarchy of tasks endlessly repeated. 
Training also relies on the formal division of the day and a series 
of penalties constructed 'around' time. But before we descend too 
deeply into the realm of historical supposition, it should be noted 
that to be trained requires that someone be prepared to teach and of 
course teaching requires observation. In this case training, once it 
has been completed, is doubly functional for not only is training 
effective in its numbing, boredom-inducing regularity but training 
allows the House itself to offer the service of washing laundry and 
thereby becoming financially independent. The House is not simply a 
prison but it is a small-scale factory. When viewed in isolation 
washing and ironing might not appear to be all that peculiar but when 
compared to the portrait of Victorian femininity which the House of 
Mercy authorities were trying to achieve outside of the laundering 
situation, either one or the other is bound to appear slightly 
incongruous. 
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With reference to leisure experience we are told:-
In connection with the recreation, the sisters would be most 
thankful to any ladies who would send scraps of material for 
patchwork, old ribbon, wool or cotton for knitting, as well as 
any quiet games that could be used indoors. 22 
With a slightly different emphasis recreation could be pronounced, 
re-creation. The process of recreation as evidenced above does not 
seem to be essentially transformative, particularly when one 
considers the probability that 'quiet games that could he used 
indoors' were hardly universally fa!11iliar to all the women who lived 
in the House. Thus the transformative practice was not limited to the 
labour process but extended toward an activity which can tentatively 
be described as 'leisure'. Furthermore, the idea of respectability so 
prevalent in petit-bourgeois conceptions of the municipality ( and 
extensively discussed in chapter two) seems to be resurfacing in the 
above quote. What we also notice in the above quote is the prevalence 
and supposed desirability of attaining ( or at least progressing 
toward) an extremely limited and restricted conception of bourgeois 
femininity. It is not surprising that the prisoners were gently 
nudged towards a virtuous and respectable feminine ideal. which was 
in itself both actually and symbolically restrictive. hut the 
question that needs to be asked is at what expense'! Certainly at the 
expense of any culture or language which was at odds with the 
rehabilitative ethos epitomised by the dominant ideal. As hinted at 
earlier, it can be seen that this ideal was regulative - in that it 
tended to order and heirarchise the range of possibilities which 
circulated around it, but was at the same time a mean around which 
the system revolved. 23 
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I would like now to unpick the following extract from the "body" of 
the message which appears on the foundation stone and then. word by 
word, attempt to twist meaning out of the phrase, "of poor fallen 
women".24 The dominant purpose of the words on the foundation stone 
preclude them from participating in any kind of analysis. They are in 
a sense thus blank, for the words themselves are victims of that dull 
monotony which one has come to associate with official language, a 
language which through patient repetition has, strangely,come to mean 
nothing at all. For instance, we can only reach the following 
conclusion - that it is by no means beyond debate that 
women are "poor" because they have "fallen". For there remains a 
strong possibility that they have "f<\,llen" because they are poor -
at the expense of abstracting the words, of re-investing them with 
meaningfulness which they have long ceased to have. It is precisely 
the political economy of prostitution which the anonymous utterance 
( the words on the foundation stone) are by definition precluded from 
expressing. It is this barely hidden dimension which this 
"counter-memory" would hope to, however imperfectly, render 
intelligible. 
Let us return, if only momentarily, to a discussion of the word 
'poor'. The word can be understood narrowly, that is. in its economic 
sense, yet it can also take on a variety of related yet different 
meanings. It can for example be interpreted as meaning spiritually 
impoverished or it can be understood as being an expression of 
sympathy. It is in the supposed innocence of 'poor' as an expression 
of sympathy that the rehabilitative project first asserts itself 
however, for to be identified and then labelled as someone who is 
poor means that a case for aid is slowly (and perhaps imperceptibly) 
being created. Finally then; to be referred to as 'poor' insinuates 
that those who are poor have possibly lost ( or are about to lose) 
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; 
control of their own lives. Thus control has to be assumed by others 
(the charitable, the kind) and as we know the foregoing of personal 
control, even if it is limited, brings its own penalties. 
If, in the eyes of the Church. an individual's true self is a 
likeness of God, then to fall signifies a betrayal of this likeness 
and thus is ultimately a rejection of God. To have 'fallen· also 
means to have had sexual intercourse either prior to or outside of 
the sanctity of marriage and this the Church considered virtually 
unpardonable. The word 'virtually' is vital because it allows room 
for possibility, for hope, and it is one of the cornerstones of faith 
to be 'eternally' hopeful, for withol}t hope it becomes difficult to 
envision an improved future. Without hope religion has no meaning. 
The word can also be understood in a far more general way as 
initiating a descent into sin, moral collapse and degeneral)'. Perhaps 
more significantly the word connotes a certain independence - a 
choice which contests the right to oppose (no matter how naively) the 
influence of the Church. 
Anglicanism is part of a long and established tradition in our 
cultural inheritance which affirms and perpetuates men's power over 
women. Take for example the now cliched quote from Genesis:-
Lord God called unto the man and said unto him, 'where are thou'?' 
and he said, 'I heard thy voice in the garden, and I was afraid, 
because I was naked, and I hid myself ... Unto the woman God 
said, 'I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception: in 
sorrow thou shall bring forth children; and thy desire shall he 
to thy husband and he shall rule over thee. 25 
A quote which establishes that women are capable of a desire in a 
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strictly limited sense, that is, their desire is a desire to be 
oppressed, not a desire for anything, particularly not for sexual 
gratification or fulfilment. Historically it is cultural/textual 
residues like the one above which help to legitimate and reproduce 
interpretations of women and femininity which have no qualms in 
claiming that only women, never men, have the capacity to "fall". The 
neat circularity of these and similar interpretations can be 
demonstrated as follows: to be designated as someone who has "fallen" 
further reinforces the idea of women as the gender at fault, women 
are innately culpable and inferior because historically it has always 
been so. 
The final word of this artificially isolated section, "of poor fallen 
women" is somewhat redundant for to have 'fallen' is to he a woman, 
for by definition men cannot fall. Thus women are oppressed 
discursively. Discourse categorizes normatively, for it does not 
provide for the possibility of women altering the historical 
conditions by which they are victimized in the first place. Phrased 
differently, if what is natural is eternal and difference is 
"natural" then difference is certainly eternal, fixed for evermore. 
I would like next to submit the final words of the sentence in 
question - "who may desire to he trained in the ways of 
penitence"26 - to a detailed analysis. In this regard the use of 
the words "who may desire" is interesting because the words suggest 
the preservation of the possibility of choice on the part of the 
penitents. It is difficult to retroactively ascertain just how wide 
their choice was, but commonsensically I would suggest that a great 
deal of pressure was brought to bear from formal and informal 
quarters, on identifiable groups of individual women. Furthermore, 
the possibility of choice mitigates against the earlier implications 
171 
of helpless passivity contained in the words "poor fallen women". The 
"true" significance of the phrase is its own fictiveness however, for 
as I've already suggested, it is an illusion to believe that the only 
factor operating in self-admission was free choice and secondly, the 
sentence evidently fails to draw the readers' attention to the fact 
that on admission free choice simply ceased to exist. I am asserting 
therefore that the words 'who may desire' are a rhetorical strategy 
which on the one hand seeks to reduce the House of Mercy's role to 
one of relative innocence and on the other to forward the significant 
idea that a moral victory precedes the women entering the 
institution. For if women as free agents can actively choose to 
imprison themselves (without being coerced) then surely their act 
proves the enduring influence of the Church, and by implication, the 
word of God. But as originally thought (rather than demonstrated) the 
Church was not in a position to allow free choice in any absolute 
sense, because its power was not confined to the House of Mercy but 
was stretched across the fabric of the municipality as a whole. 
Finally I would like to comment on another implication embedded in 
the three words. The words 'who may desire' reverberate with false 
official humility, with the open and thus public acknowledgement that 
basically it is the penitents who are responsible for their own 
futures and thus, ultimately, for the success of the rehabilitative 
project. The words turn the latent doom which exists in all such 
ventures to their advantage because, firstly, they foreground the 
possibility that the period of incarceration may not be entirely 
satisfactory, that it is the penitents who mig~t return to their old 
ways and, secondly, they perpetrate an extremely subtle 
sleight-of-hand by hinting at the idea that there are limits to the 
House's own coerciveness and limits to its own disciplinary project. 
At the same time, they confirm that the limits are not theirs, for 
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the limits are defined by those who enter the institutions rather 
than those who govern the institution itself, the limits of 
discipline are thus the limits of the patients' desire to improve 
themselves. 
The above gives an indication of the way in which power tends to 
change emphasis within discourse, how at moments it recedes as it 
moves perceptibly towards a vanishing point, how it appears almost to 
take shelter behind the alihis and myths produced by Official 
Knowledge. On other occasions, however, power comes forward and, as 
it were, introduces itself and asserts its productive brutality. It 
is this facet of power which I will e~amine in the section which 
immediately follows this one. 
It is impossible to "read" the word "trained" without at some stage 
referring to the relationship which exists between power and the 
body. This relationship is described by Foucault as follows:-
The historical moment of the disciplines was a moment when an art 
of the human body was born, which was directed not only at this 
growth of its skills, or at the intensification of its 
subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the 
mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes useful, and 
conversely. What was then being formed was a policy of coercions 
that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its 
elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human body was 
entering a machinery of power that explores it. breaks it down, 
and rearranges it. A "political anatomy", which was al~o a 
"mechanics of power", was being horn; it defined how one may have 
a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one 
wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the 
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techniques, the speed, and the efficiency that one 
determines. 27 
We know that discipline is the political anatomy of detail hut it is 
precisely these details which elude us, for without detail we cannot 
undertake an analysis of training in anything hut the sketchiest of 
terms. What follows does not only consist of an analysis of training 
however, but is combined with a brief investigation of the manner in 
which the body was trained, that is, the ways of training. One of the 
items contained in the CPSA archives states:-
The day and night constant supervision required over every set of 
girls, and the peculiar strain of this Penitentiary work, demand 
that provision should be made for six workers at least, that is 
two or three sisters with assistants, such as a laundry matron, 
needlework matron, and kitchen matron. 28 
The constant need for supervision underlines the idea that the girls 
and women who were imprisoned in the House of Mercy were trained, in 
various ways. throughout their stay. They were trained to he obedient 
and conscientious. They were trained to work and trained to worship: 
Besides the Sunday services, the girls have regular religious 
instructions and attend the daily prayers in the Chapel. They 
attend Night School three or four times a week: the other 
evenings are spent in choir practice or recreation. 29 
The above quotes as well as those used earlier on in the chapter help 
to arrange an idea of an "average day" in the penitents' lives. Given 
that our tentative recreation is at best partial and inadequate it 
would be best not to read the following as an accurate and truthful 
174 
representation but rather as a system of probabilities based on 
guesswork and deduction. We have thus far ascertained that the House 
of Mercy was not simply a prison as it incorporated features of both 
those ignoble institutions the factory and the school. In all 
likelihood therefore the best part of the penitents' day was probably 
occupied with the undignified and menial work of washing other 
people's, as well as their own, clothing. The process of washing 
dirty linen is an example of a certain style of punishment. 
Admittedly we are not concerned here with the horrific and brutal 
torture of the regicide Damiens described hy Foucault in Discipline 
and Punish30, but with a careful aqd sedate economy of punishment 
instead. The gentitlity of the clothes-washing scene is belied hy the 
fact that the "penitents" are not merely washing clothes: 
symbolically, they are also washing themselves. Washing therefore is 
a political allegory, it is a rite of prolonged self-purification. 
Whether the disciplinary economy within the House recognised the 
"soul" as a constituent element within the self is a matter for 
debate. Whatever it was that was being cleansed - the former 
"prostitute's" impoverished soul or the visible stigmata of her past 
- there was a temporal incompatibility between washing clothes and 
cleansing oneself. Every act of washing is both self-contained and 
linked in a series to the acts that have passed before it. Self-
purification is, however, not guaranteed in advance. In fact, the 
possibility of attaining a state of purity was remote. If this is the 
case, the cumulative time of the combined acts would he rendered 
worthless. It is one of discipline's prime functions to dominate 
entirely and even blackmail time, 
Discipline says to the idealists: the whole is nothing hut the 
sum of its parts. All temporal dispersions will he integrated in 
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the mathematically defined series. Disciplinary capitalism will 
defy the dreams of Wordsworth, Bergson and Poulet. whose sense of 
organic temporality is either mere fantasy or. depending on our 
place in the struggle, a fundamental criticism, a cry from the 
heart against capitalism's transformation of human existence. 
Time thus mediated and invested hy power is (like disciplined 
space) not only time made useful, hut time made safe. 3 J 
The quest for self-purification is a functional ritual within 
disciplinary logic. At the end of the "penitents'" term however, it 
makes way for their "freedom". But as we know freedom is an ahsolute 
impossibilty, particularly if we accept power's renowned capacity for 
the creation of division within the disciplined suhject; a psychic 
fissure which is occupied hy a self-policing suhjectivity. We herehy 
reco~ise the sinister evil of disciplinary power for, in strivin~ 
for the false ideal of a supposedly obtainable hut actually 
infinitely suspended purity, the former penitents have, without 
realizini, enslaved themselves to an even ~reater dei:ree. And if we 
are to believe Foucault, they have done so in a copyhook manner. 
Power has not heen forced, in its heavy solemnity, to assert itself. 
It has remained all the more insidious for heinc unohtrusive. The 
penitents have therefore hecome. "the principle of their own 
suhjection".32 
Furthermore. this ritual demonstrates a crude if not impoverished 
definition of the law in which distinctions hetween the severities of 
various "crimes" are not considered relevant. The punishment of 
prostitution cannot he a matter of degree for prostitution is the 
absolute transgression of "acceptable" boundaries. We are witnessing 
therefore a form of penal Jaw that appears to he cumhersome in the 
extreme, a system that is utterly lacking in imagination. 
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Consequently, and as might be expected, the CPSA Archives contain no 
clinical knowledge of the inmates and thus one is led to believe that 
the penitents' biographical details, in short their lives, did not 
become objects of disciplinary attention or knowledge. Foucault 
maintains that the prisoners' life-history was a key element in the 
process of individuation - a means of constituting the marginalised 
as objects of knowledge within disciplinary schemas - which in turn 
led to the production of delinquency. Did the House produce 
delinquency? Did it produce prostitution'! Official history is unable 
to provide us with the answer. Shying away from the more radical 
implications of the penultimate section of Discipline and Punish, 
Frank Lentricchia does however remind us: 
Crime is the work of the poor. Let that be known to all. In this 
way potential collectivization and radical action are 
forestalled, disadvantaged pit themselves against disadvantaged, 
and constant internal warfare is encouraged amoung groups ranging 
from lower to middle classes. And from this follows the ultimate 
hegemonic effect.33 
The best part of the penitents' day was probably devoted to "washing 
and ironing" but as we have already seen the day was divided into 
specific segments for meals, sleep, worship, education and 
re-creation. There can he little doubt that the above "activities" 
were highly codified and hound hy a system of correct attitudes. 
positions and poses, particularly those of the body, for the 
penitents would have heen required to learn where their bodies were 
the most useful on the has is of being 'trained' in ways of obedience. 
The details of the disciplined body will, as already mentioned. 
necessarily escape us hut a brief catalogue of prohahle positions 
can, I think, be attempted. 
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One forms the idea of discipline in the House creating a hunched 
body, a body grotesque and disproportionate, a hody fighting to 
uncover itself and straighten its spine. Perhaps this 'hunched hody' 
was the sum total of a powerful system of reductions for were the 
prisoners not bent over their daily labour ( at the sink or ironing 
table)? Did they not arch over their food as they arched over their 
knitting? Were their bodies not cramped in desks, did they not kneel 
in Chapel? If the malleable, twisted hody was not the everyday mean 
then why was a walk in the Gardens seen as so necessary - for it 
indicates a double return to both the relative freedom of the 
'outdoors' as well as to "normal" posture. Even the Anglican 
authorities recognized the importance of both relative isolation from 
the community and the necessity of exercise. 
It was necessary to acquire a site sufficiently large to prevent 
the House of Mercy being surrounded by other houses, overlooking 
the yards and grounds, and also to secure that from time to time 
the penitents could he taken for (walking exercise) without 
trespassing on other people's land.34 
CONCLUSION 
In accordance with the aims of my introduction, I have attempted in 
this chapter to reconstruct the political technolob'Y of the body as 
it operated within the House of Mercy - an institution suspended on 
the very edge of the municipal boundary. I have also attempted to 
"recreate" this technology in terms of intelligibility rather than 
truth. In attempting to "reconstruct" the "meaning-effect" of a chain 
of events I have scrutinised a textual trace ( the foundation stone) 
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in order to say, "look at those bodies. look at the power that is 
mapped out on them". In so doing, I have both acknowledged my desire 
as a student who has a literary background to bring to the study of 
the past, and I have drawn attention to the idea that everything -
and here I include the human body - has a history. This is in 
contrast to forms of traditional or orthodox history which, I would 
suggest, are prepared to neglect the study of the body because to 
respect its difference ( and emergence within different discursive 
contexts) would require an altogether different set of methodological 
assumptions. 
During this chapter, I suggested t~at the Church of the Province of 
South Africa disciplined mainly "coloured prostitutes" by directing 
their subjectivity towards petit-bourgeois ideals such as femininity, 
domesticity and purity. These projected values were in all liklihood 
culturally alien. The "penitents" had to struggle therefore. not only 
against imprisonment, hut against a culturally alien form of values. 
In the final case-study which follows. we will see how the Woodstock 
Suburban or Cottage Hospital struggled against a similar form of 
cultural imposition: in their case it was a codified and repressive 
form of temporality. The positive evidence of having overcome the 
discursive imposition of time was the construction of a modern 
hospital, but this is a story best left for the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: TOW ARDS A MODERN GENERAL HOSPITAL 
INTRODUCTION 
Through a network of reports and schemes, I hope in this chapter to 
provide the reader with a fleeting glimpse of the political 
technology of the body which characterised the Woodstock Suburban or 
Cottage Hospital. I also hope to demonstrate how certain discursively 
created objects came to surface in reports, and how writing about the 
hospital had a definite disciplinary dimension. We will see, 
particularly in the first two sectioqs, how the hospital was created 
as a site for knowledge, and by extension, how those within it would 
have submitted to an institutional regime of discipline. This regime 
would have forced those seeking care and health to occupy certain 
positions in space, to submit to temporal divisions of the day, and 
to behave in prescibed ways. As a result of the care that they 
received, the patients' bodies would have been scrutinized and 
controlled. This discipline would have been imposed under the guise 
of the patients' health. Thus we see the paradox at the centre of 
this case-study; hospitals exist to return the sick and poorly to 
health, and by extension, to keep the population healthy. They do so, 
however, at the expense of negation and objectification. 
Allied to this I ask certain questions about the relationship between 
imperialism and temporality. It is axiomatic, I suggest, that as a 
discourse, imperialism has a vested interest in keeping colonial 
subjects oppressed. One aspect of this oppression takes the form of 
locating colonial subjects in what I refer to as a "time of 
otherness". In other words, a time which is other to prevailing 
and dominant European time. In the context of this temporal 
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dis-equilibrium the desire for "a modern General Hospital" can 
therefore be seen as a negation of the time of otherness. For to be 
modern, I argue, is in effect to be contemporary and to strive for 
equality (particularly if equality is defined according to a European 
norm). Unfortunately, however, medical power is part of a Western 
imperial rationality which is not entirely utopian. 
I contend in section 6.1, therefore, that the hospital as well as the 
immediate space surrounding it surfaced and was constituted as a 
visible and policed institution through a series of official reports 
which were undertaken by both the Medical Officer of Health and his 
assistant. 
In section 6.2 I will suggest that the analysis of an ongoing episode 
in the hospital's history, namely the debate as to whether Woodstock 
Hospital should be altered or rebuilt, is revealed to be a productive 
undertaking, because the submission of what was known as the "Fresh 
Air Scheme" forwards a comparatively advanced conception of 
disciplinary power. A close reading of the proposals contained in the 
scheme suggest that the institutional technology within the hospital 
hinged on both economic and broadly political factors. I am not 
moving my explanation in the direction of "an economic in the final 
instance" type answer. I am simply asserting that, when seen against 
the backdrop of British Colonial indecision, there were bound to be 
ramifications for disciplinary procedures within the hospital itself. 
In all probabilty these ramifications took the form of a unique type 
of institutional technology best suited to the hospital and its 
everyday peculiarities. 
I also suggest during section 6.2 that the "Fresh Air Scheme" can be 
understood as an expression of the continuing struggle against 
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backwardness, dirt and the "primitivism" of Africa, that is, the 
"time of otherness". The scheme was fatally flawed, however, for it 
did contain a sophisticated - though hidden - account of 
disciplinary power and thus a highly repressive institutional 
technology. The "Fresh Air Scheme" was never put into operation, 
though, and thus the quest to challenge imposed backwardness through 
modern-isation was a failure. The hospital was forced to do the best 
it could as it continued to serve the community, despite any 
disruptions that the "Fresh Air Scheme" might have caused. 
My analysis of administrative texts in sections 6.1 and 6.2 gives way 
in 6.3 to a consideration of the epi_stemological and practical 
significance of the accident. I assert that the accidental shooting 
of Police-Constable Logan - a shooting which occured on the margins 
of two highly-disciplined and organised spaces - allows the scholar 
a privileged insight into the workings of, amoungst other things, 
disciplinary writing. The writing of the event also gives us an 
ephemeral and valuable glimpse of how disciplinary knowledge is 
created. and equally. illustrates how a crisis initiates a 
corresponding adjustment in power. One can then hypothesize ahout the 
effects that this adjustment has on the institutional technology of 
the hospital itself. 
6.1: A TIME OF OTHERNESS 
The following section is an investigation into the ramifications of 
two contradictions. The first involves Dr Mitchell (who was the 
Medical Officer of Health) and his attempt to improve the Woodstock 
Hospital to the extent where it was fully modern. Through an analysis 
of two major reports conducted by Mitchell and his department I argue 
that despite his intentions, he was implicated in a rationality over 
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which he had little control. 
The second concerns an issue that is vital to an understanding of the 
chapter as a whole. The issue revolves around the idea of control, 
and if cast in the form of a question, it might be, "how can control 
in the hospital be seen as negative if the hospital works for the 
benefit of the community'?" The answer to that question is as follows: 
we know from former chapters that discipline is not gratuitous. 
Discipline functions in certain institutions because it can thereby 
assure both progress and obedience. In the context of a hospital, 
progress can be equated with the production of health. In order to 
produce health, the hospital need~ to impose a disciplinary regime on 
patients and staff. If discipline can produce health discreetly. in a 
cost-effective manner and also accumulate knowledge on the 
population, sewers and quality of air in the municipality, then the 
outcome of this rationality will be potentially oppressive and 
restrictive. 
The quotes which follow are selected from a report of an inspection 
of the Woodstock Hospital on 7th March 1904. The inspection was 
conducted by Dr. Mitchell himself. 
As a result of my inspection and after careful consideration of 
the matter in all its bearings, I have come to the conclusion 
that the present buildings, with the exception of the Nurses' 
Quarters, are very unsuitable for the purposes of a modern 
General Hospital.1 
On the one hand I suggest that this quote can be interpreted as a 
bald statement about the non-discursive, about buildings within 
space. Allied to this we realise that it is a statement about 
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pre-modernity, about a failure to reach a perceived modern threshold. 
On the other hand Dr Mitchell is also making a statement ( unbeknown 
to him) about medical-administrative practice. In other words he is 
making an epistemological reflection about the status of knowledge. 
Perhaps he is suggesting that he has found the reason or rationality 
underlying the concrete institution somewhat underdeveloped, in other 
words, pre-modern. Can we therefore presume that the knowledge which 
underscored the hospital's medical and administrative practice was 
also inadequate to the demands of modernity'? And of what exactly did 
modernity consist'? This quote therefore introduces the elusive 
spectre of modernity, an image which was, as we shall see, to haunt 
the minds of doctors and administ!ators throughout the "primitive" 
early years of this century, particulary as they played their part in 
a comic farce known as the "Fresh Air Scheme". 
Before we continue, however, it is necessary to clarify what I mean 
by modernity. First of all, I am using it in a weak sense and it is 
unrelated therefore to the epistemological periodisation that 
Foucault ~;,~,
1
~~ in the Order of Things. I am not refering to the 
margins between the modern and the dimly perceived post-modern but am 
asserting that modern is really synonymous with contemporary. We can 
characterise the quest for modernity therefore as an attempt. through 
institutional self-improvement, at transcending backwardness. In this 
respect we may note the similarities between modernity and 
modernization (for a brief discussion of modernization see chapter 
four). The "quest" therefore attests to the powerful influence of a 
prior discourse of inferiority. This prior discourse can be partially 
explained by reference to the Cape's colonial status. to Woodstock's 
somewhat tawdry appearance (see chapter two), and its racially 
heterogeneous, if "colourful", past. The need to be taken seriously 
can also be understood as a response to the lingering influence of a 
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narrative trope which intimates that Woodstock, to a lesser or 
greater extent, exists to be forgotten. Finally, modernity as a 
signifier is congruent with the growth of the productive apparatus. 
This does not mean that it is a superstructural reflection of an 
enabling economic base, it simply means that its genealogical 
emergence is an analogue to a stage in the local development of 
capital. 
Ultimately though, discourses of inferiority are attributable to 
constructed inequalities. One of the elements in this imperial 
construction is the temporal - the Cape exists in a different time 
- a time which is other to the modern. It is the function of . 
imperial discourse to "induce" collective inferiority because it is a 
form of passivity which continues to presume the existence of a 
superior power, which in this case is England. This unequal 
relationship can be questioned and even resisted. Dr Mitchell 
demonstrates that to create a modern General Hospital involves 
superceding (in Hegelian terms this would be called the negation of 
the negation) the temporal limitations imposed by imperial discourse 
and creating a hospital which is genuinely modern. To he modern is 
thus to question the temporal dimension of imperial discourse in a 
very real way. 
Dr Mitchell's desire for "a modern General Hospital" can be 
interpreted as a minor act of resistance. Unfortunately, Mitchell 
occupies a compromised position within the power complex, and whilst 
this enables him to enunciate that which retrospectively appears to 
be mildly subversive, he is also the servant of a repressive system, 
insofar as the effects of power are often censorious and oppressive. 
I would like to spin out this basic contradiction during section 6.1 
and in following the thread of the contradiction draw the reader's 
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attention to the debate which lurks beneath us. It is a debate about 
the function of resistance in Foucault's work. Is resistance always 
incorporated into power as part of the way in which it functions or 
do acts of resistance manage to authentically escape the clutches of 
power?2 
It is necessary however to return to the report as quickly as 
possible. During the next few pages I will be concerned to trace the 
emergence of the hospital and its grounds into administrative 
discourse. I will also attempt to embellish what I have just 
identified as a contradiction of central importance: that of Dr 
Mitchell's solution to the complexities of enforced colonial 
backwardness. Mitchell's solution is, as we shall see, deeply 
reformist.3 We have already established that the need to he modern 
is in one sense a struggle against the temporal hegemony of 
imperialism. The struggle takes place within an imperial rationality 
that the hospital as an institution is destined, with certain 
amendments, to reproduce however, and thus we witness the 
contradiction within Mitchell's solution. The modern-isation of the 
hospital is unlikely to usher in a period of freedom from power hut. 
rather, we are bound to see within Mitchell's reformism, the capacity 
of power to incorporate acts within institutional settings. which 
strive for greater autonomy. 
In the aforementioned report of March the seventh, 1904. Dr Mitchell 
suggests the following under a heading entitled "Recommendations and 
remarks": 
The drainage system should be thoroughly tested and overhauled, 
and the water closets put in good .order and repair. the openings 
at the back of the closets should be built up leaving only an 
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aperture for ventilation which should be provided with a 
ventilation grating of suitable pattern.4 
This particular quote attests to the importance, to both the hospital 
and the municipality, of a healthy and reliable system of drainage. 
Comparisons between the human body and the hospital's drainage system 
are perhaps cliched, if not to say distasteful, yet we may note that 
the underside of the municipal "body" held all manner of horrors for 
administrators, planners and health-officers, in short the 
"medico-administrative complex". Was their fear not the traditional 
fear of the hidden and invisible'!, the taboo placed on the ritual 
evacuation of waste'!, and what exactly were the components of this 
horrible economy that was only aliowed to rise to the surface of 
discourse in the form of words cleansed and purified; drainage, 
closets, water-closets etc.'! 
Point ten of the report suggests that, 
More effective measures should be taken to disinfect mattresses, 
pillows etc. used by cases of enteric fever, such articles should 
be thoroughly sponged over with some suitable anti-septic 
solution and exposed to air and sunlight until thoroughly 
5 dry .. 
Enteric fever or typhoid is a severe inflammation of the intestines 
caused by bacteria lurking in drinking water. The existence of 
typhoid patients in the municipality at the time illustrates, in a 
slightly different way, that the drainage system was far from 
perfect. 
Furthermore we are able to witness the perpetual struggle which is 
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waged against germs in the name of life and health. This 
sterilization is not simply thorough, in the mildly suspicious 
neutrality of the word, it is extreme. The preservation of health, 
order and cleanliness requires a regime of surveillance, a constant 
watchfulness on the part of doctors, nurses, orderlies. It is a 
regime which is scrupulous in its extremism because nothing, no 
germs, no dirt, no waste is theoretically allowed to escape its 
exhaustive gaze. 
We must not forget, however, that the hygienic measures (which are 
presumably the end product of the exhaustive gaze) taken by the 
hospital staff were in themselves "useful" and "positive". It is the 
consequences or effects of these useful or positive measures which 
are susceptible to Foucauldian critique. We must not be seduced by 
the double-edged rationality at work, for to be cured also means to 
be objectified, and to be hospitalised inevitably means to be 
carefully watched. 
Also, there is a certain index of embarrassment in having to register 
the existence of patients with enteric fever. Their illness attests 
to the fundamental simplicity of the drainage system which in turn 
reinforces notions of both pre-modernity and lower-class poverty. As 
it circulates within the body of the patient. illness is thus a 
living reminder of iniquity and filth. The poverty within a certain 
strata of the social formation is surely the antithesis to the 
hygiene and implied purity underscored by the quest for "a modern 
General Hospital". 
The recommendation which succeeds point ten states, 
Notes of all post-mortem examinations performed at the Hospital 
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should be kept in a suitable book reserved for the purpose.6 
As I noted in the hrief section devoted to The Birth of the Clinic in 
my introductory chapter it is what Foucault refers to as the "medical 
gaze" which is one of the defining characteristics between two types 
of medicine. This medical gaze was different to the medical vision 
which preceded it in that it now "saw" in terms of depth, it saw 
quite suddenly into the body itself whereas nosolo!:,ry had merely 
attempted to discern disease by ("reading") surface effects. I am 
aware that the "opening up of a few corpses" is not synonymous with 
"all post-mortem examinations"; but the quote is significant in the 
sense that not only does it provide. a "transparent" example of the 
medical gaze, but is also complemented by a corresponding 
formalisation of medical knowledge that, even in death, the body is 
trapped in the web of discourse - numbered, named. examined and 
stored indefinitely in a "written" afterlife. 
In point twelve Dr Mitchell remarks, 
the present arrangements for the supervision of the patients 
during meals appear to be unsatisfactory; the nurses should 
remain in the wards until the patients have finished their 
meals.7 
This particular quote reveals the relentlessness of supervision and 
the degree to which patients are rendered passive and objectlike 
under the nurses' constant and watchful eye. We are also given an 
indication of a similar attitude towards time between the House of 
Mercy (see chapter five) and the Woodstock Suhurhan or Cottage 
Hospital. Yet this is not to suggest that the daily schedules were 
the same or even similar, for "hospital time" is notoriously 
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idiosyncratic, particularly as meal-times are "ahead" of "regular" 
eating hours, visiting time is more often than not limited and the 
entire day in fact appears to incline towards ordered reclamation of 
time from the beginning of the day itself. Thus the events which 
create the rhythm of a hospital "day" take place before they 
"normally" do in the world beyond the hospital walls. 
The penultimate item which appeared to he interesting proceeds as 
follows, 
More attention should he paid to the training of nurses; 
arrangements should be madt: for the Superintendent or other 
Medical Officer to give regular courses of lectures to nurses 
with the object of preparing them for the examination for the 
certificate of competence in Nursing of the Colonial Medical 
Council.8 
Almost immediately, the key signifiers spring out at us: training, 
regular, examination. The quote is fascinating because it gives 
evidence of a pedagogics within the institution itself. Nurses are 
required to attend lectures and acquire sufficient knowledge to carry 
out their everyday duties correctly. In all probability this 
knowledge is retained or memorized and in due course it is probably 
examined before it can be applied. The examination is. as we know, a 
strategy which, 
combines the technique of an observing hierarchy and those of a 
normalizing judgement. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance 
that makes possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. It 
establishes a visibility through which one differentiates them 
and judges them.9 
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Foucault is correct to stress that there are those who occupy the 
ambiguous middle terrain of the power hierachy. In this instance 
those subjects are nurses, individuals who are "supervisors 
perpetually supervised". IO Foucault continues, 
The power in the hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is 
not possessed as a thing, or transferred as a property; it 
functions like a piece of machinery. And, although it is true 
that its pyramidal organization gives it a "head", it is the 
apparatus as a whole that produces "power" and distributes 
individuals in this permanent ?nd continuous fidd. 11 
The final excerpt relates to the economics of importation and the 
question of a dispensary. 
The question of whether more economical arrangements cannot be 
made for the supply of Drugs, Dressings and Surgical Appliances 
should be considered. It seems to me that the best plan would be 
to import supplies of such articles direct from Europe. 
Dispensing Superintendent or other Medical Officer or 
arrangements might he made for a qualified chemist to visit the 
Hospital and do the dispensing work daily.12 
Unfortunately we can only imagine the state of affairs being 
described. One suspects that in the supply of drugs the Assistant 
Medical Officer of Health thought it necessary to cut out the 
"middleman" and thereby reduce costs. It is more difficult to 
ascertain the circumstances surrounding the dispensing of drugs. 
Perhaps the A.M.0.H. felt that a standardization of the dispensing 
procedure was necessary because drugs were being wasted or were 
194 
finding their way into a blackmarket economy. Given that we cannot 
adequately reconstruct his rationale it is advisable to note that his 
recommendations certainly attempted to define a set of ruks as 
opposed to an apparently vague system of makeshift or informal 
knowledge. Rules operate successfully in that they become general 
knowledge which is practiced and rules supposedly refine the overall 
system. Could this be an example of the quest for a foolproof 
rationality which was the inevitable corollary of a painful movements 
towards, "a modern General Hospital"'? 
In order to transcend what I referred to earlier as the "time of 
otherness", Dr Mitchell bravely at!empted a modern-ization of the 
Woodstock Cottage or Suburban Hospital. To modernise the institution, 
however, was a thankless task for the very logic of modernization was 
implicated in a medical-administrative rationality, the effects of 
which were deeply restrictive. The repressive dimension of these 
effects are susceptible to Foucauldian critique. The strongly 
pessimistic tenor of this critique points to a core of unfreedom, 
lurking in the folds of a Western reason which is presumed to he 
enlightening. The contadictoriness of Dr Mitchell's reformist 
solution can he expressed as follows: To improve the hospital meant 
that it had to he modernised. In modernising it. Dr Mitchell was 
obliged to use a series of techniques (such as inspections and 
subsequent reports. etc.) which were congruent with Colonial medical 
practice. He was obliged, in other words, to police it as an 
institution. In doing so, the hospital was still locked in a 
repressive relationship with hoth the Colonial administration and the 
metropolitan power. 
The following few pages. therefore, will continue with the intention 
expressed earlier; to spin out these contradictions, and to examine 
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the contents of another report written four years later. 
According to the Assistant Medical Officer of Health, 
As instructed I made an inspection of the suburban Hospital, 
Woodstock, on 22 May last and have to report thereon as 
follows.13 
As already stated, I will analyse extracts of the above report in 
detail in an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of the 
prerogatives of a medical-administrative rationality that was so 
dangerously double-edged. The fr?llowing extract offers a fine 
illustration of the importance of the hospital grounds. The extract 
reads as follows, 
The Hospital Grounds proper shew very little indication of care, 
are in an unkempt and untidy condition, and littered with rubbish 
in places. A new gate has been constructed opening on to Mountain 
Rd so that funerals no longer have to pass in front of the 
Hospital. 14 
The first section of the quote is interesting because one suspects 
that the "Hospital Grounds" could stand metonymically for the entire 
hospital, the grounds therefore betray the "reality" of inner chaos. 
administrative ineptitude, confusion. Furthermore we may remember 
that long walks in the grounds of the House of Mercy were an 
important element in the rehabilitative project. However. what I am 
really implying is the possibility that we have just crossed a 
discursive threshold of emergence. What has "emerged" into discourse 
is the administrative importance of space in the form of the hospital 
grounds. I am not suggesting that the hospital grounds were invented 
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by the A.M.O.H.'s over-active imagination, nor am I saying that the 
space has, miraculously, just appeared. I am suggesting that for the 
"hospital grounds" to emerge at all discursively means that there has 
been a corresponding shift in administrative knowledge. The 
momentarily missing term in this brief theoretical detour is power, 
for power (through knowledge and discourse) is productive. It has 
literally invented the hospital grounds as a site for administrative 
knowledge. In conclusion we may note that the grounds stand in 
figurative proximity to the funerals that used "to pass in front of 
the Hospital", 15 for doesn't the funeral "litter" the entire homely 
scenario with the truth of death, nature's revenge'? 
The space which surrounds the hospital acted as a form of 
"punctuation". This "pause" between spaces allowed subjects to 
negotiate the transition between the institutional (the hospital) and 
the public ( municipal) spheres. However, the hospital grounds can 
also be compared to an introduction: if the grounds are clean and 
welcoming they might serve to humanise the frightening experience of 
visiting hospital by reducing the scale of the institution. 
I would like next to quote a particularly long extract in full and 
then relate it to the topic of hygiene in the hospital itself as well 
as discussing hygiene in the broader context of the wider municipal 
area. 
The yard gutters are defective. holding in place small pools of 
stagnant slop-water. At the back of the nurses' quarters is a 
pool of offensive slop water in a hollow of the ground which 
could easily be drained and surface waters be allowed to run off. 
The sanitary conveniences remain in the unsatisfactory condition 
described in my last report. The openings in the drain pipes 
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outside the closet walls therein described still remain; that in 
the drain from the European female closet is plugged with cement; 
that from the Native closet is open. There is no slop closet on 
the female side so that bed pans have to be carried along the 
passage past the operating room and Nurses dining room to one or 
other of the closets on the male side. The closets and sinks 
drain to the stormwater sewer in Mountain Rd which is of fire 
clay pipes terminating near Woodstock beach in an open brick and 
cement culvert. I am informed that the closets at the Hospital 
are the only ones within the Municipal area draining to the 
system of stormwater sewers. There appears to be no proper system 
of ventilating the drains to the old part of the Hospital and as . 
the Institutions stands at about the highest point of the system 
of sewers, there is grave risk of the entrance of sewer air into 
the building; I would recommend that the drains be carefully 
tested and proper means of ventilation and disconnection 
provided. 16 
Initially, I would like to stress the necessity of a clean and 
germ-free hospital. For what if by some horrible and perverse irony 
the hospital starts to infect by means of sewerage. water or air. the 
community it is supposed to serve'? Reading through the reports of the 
A.M.0.H. between 1904 and 1911 this fear certainly appears to he a 
realistic possibility. It is the constant presence of this fear which 
animates the M.O.H's every utterance. every gesture. every action. 
The anxiety of the authorities is expressed hy Foucault thus. 
It is also necessary to organise the internal space of the 
hospital so as to make it medically efficacious, a place no 
longer of assistance hut of therapeutic action. The hospital must 
function as a "curing machine". First. in a negative manner. all 
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the factors which make the hospital dangerous for its occupants 
must be suppressed, solving the problem of the circulation of air 
which must be constantly renewed without its miasmas or mephitic 
qualities being carried from one patient to another, solving as 
well the problem of the changing, transport and laundering of bed 
linen. 17 
The A.M.0.H. is attempting to identify precisely, "all the factors 
which make the hospital dangerous", he quotes, "the pools of 
slop-water" and the "sanitary conveniences" 18 to name but several 
objects of attention. The hospital. however. cannot be viewed as 
being separate from either the m~nicipal area of the city - this is 
in marked distinction to the House of Mercy where separateness is an 
a priori requisite for its effective functioning as an institution 
- and thus we witness the importance of urban space and population 
as categories for the medico-administrative project. (They will be 
dealt with at length in the forthcoming section.) It is Foucault who, 
under the heading, "the privilege of hygiene and the function of 
medicine as an instance of social control". writes, 
First of all, control of the urban space in general: it is this 
space which constitutes perhaps the most dangerous environment 
for the population. The disposition of various quarters. their 
humidity and exposure, the ventilation of the city as a whole, 
its sewerage and drainage systems. the siting of abattoirs and 
cemeteries, the density of population. All these are decisive 
factors for the mortality and morbidity of the inhabitants. The 
city with its principal spatial variances appears as a 
medicalisable object. Whereas the medical topographies of regions 
analyse climatic and geological conditions which are outside 
human control, and can only recommend measures of correction and 
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compensation, the urban topographies outline. in negative at 
least, the general principles of a concerned urban policy. 19 
I have suggested in this section that it is possible to view the 
quest for modernity as a fatally compromised search for institutional 
and political autonomy. Reformist solutions are traditionally unable 
to recognise the epistemological difficulties involved in quests for 
self-improvement. Although Dr Mitchell was a "progressive" 
administrator. he occupied a position within medical and Imperial 
discourse which was severely limited. It was limited because his 
position within the medical administration of the Colony required him 
to utilise techniques and strategie~ of power which had repressive 
effects. Even as certain spaces and a certain range of objects 
surfaced in reports about the hospital and its grounds. so the 
hospital became a more observed and disciplined institution. Thus was 
the double-edged nature of the rationality with which hoth the 
administrators and the patients had to deal - a rationality which. 
as I mentioned earlier on. repressed as it cured. 
6.2: THE FRESH AIR SCHEME 
The second section of chapter six will trace the development of an 
administrative debate which arose around the issue of whether the 
Woodstock Hospital should have been extended or re-built altogether. 
I believe that this debate can he profitably analysed as an extension 
of the quest for a modern General Hospital although it is vital that 
we view the debate in the context of the following categories: 
population. urban space and bodies. They are, as we shall see. 
crucial if we are to investigate the social and disciplinary 
dimension of the hospital with any degree of accuracy. as they are 
key terms in the expanding biological awareness of the population as 
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a resource for capital. The necessity for the new hospital is 
expressed in the following way. You will note that the aforementioned 
categories of urban space, bodies and populations make a definite 
appearance. 
2. The highway to the suburbs passes through Woodstock, and the 
amount of vehicular traffic is enormous. 
3. Five hundred trams and 250 trains pass through Woodstock 
daily. 
4. Between 250 and 300 in-patients and ahout 840 out-patients 
from Woodstock are treated by the New Somerset Hospital yearly, 
and about 860 out-patients at. the free dispensary. 
5. Numbers of patients have had to be refused admission 
through want of accommodation.20 
Using an editing style that is definitely modernist in its amhition, 
I would like to use the technique of montage and to "cut" this quote 
almost immediately against a quote from Foucault himself. 
The return of the hospitals, and more particularly the projects 
for their architectural, institutional. and technical 
reorganization, owed its importance in the eighteenth century to 
this set of problems relating to the urhan space, the mass of the 
population with its biological characteristics, the close-knit 
family cell, and the bodies of individuals. It is in the history 
of these materialities, which are at once political and economic, 
that the "physical" process of transformation of the hospital is 
inscribed. 2 l 
In his characteristically elegant fashion, Foucault's description of 
the "technical reorganization" of the hospitals in the eighteenth 
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century might almost apply to the situation in Woodstock during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. The quote prior to the one 
above gives some indication of the sheer numbers of people clamouring 
for hospital attention and care. We will also see, as the chapter 
continues, the increasing importance of the categories of urban space 
(note the M.0.H.'s comment on the hospital ground in section 6.1 ), 
and human bodies in the burgeoning medical rationality of the day. 
What we will be concerned with in this section, therefore, is nothini: 
more than a project for the Woodstock Hospital's "architectural, 
institutional, and technical reorganization" and to analyse the 
difficulties that the reori:anization posed . 
. 
Rather than quoting the report in full and numbing length, I will 
summarise the necessary sections of Dr Mitchell's report and quote 
the more important sections. Dr Mitchell's report (7th March 1904) 
notes that the first scheme for the hospital's extension was 
forwarded to the government in August 1902. The plans were forwarded 
later and suggested the establishment of one twenty-bed capacity 
ward, a private ward and certain structural alterations to the 
existing buildings. Of the sixteen hundred pounds raised, roughly 
half was done by the hospital trustees and this amount was then 
matched by the government. However, in the report Mitchell states 
unequivocally that, 
As a result of my inspection and after careful consideration of 
the matter in all its bearings, I have come to the conclusion 
that the present buildings, with the exception of the Nurses' 
Quarters, are very unsuitable for the purposes of a modern 
General Hospital. 22 
The reasons given by Mitchell are as follows: that the hospital is 
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cramped in the upper section of its grounds, which are very close to 
the boundary fence. Furthermore, the hospital buildings, 
are very faulty as regards arrangement, corridors, lighting, 
ventilation and circulation of air; there is practically no open 
air accommodation for patients; the sanitary bathroom and kitchen 
accommodation is unsatisfactory in the extreme; the buildings are 
old, badly out of repair, and are swarming with insect pests.23 
Mitchell reaches the conclusion that, "additional accommodation"24 
is an absolute necessity and he forwards the following alternatives • 
. 
Two schemes may be suggested - either the erection of a new 
Hospital on a new site or on the lower part of the present 
Hospital grounds, or the building of a new Hospital on the 
present or on an adjoining site so as to render possible the 
continued utilisation of the present buildings, demolishing and 
replacing them by new and more suitable structures as funds 
permit or circumstances render necessary. The question is whether 
the present buildings can he conveniently utilised in this way; 
I am of the opinion that they can be. 25 
Before we pursue the debate, as it uncoils itself across reams of 
official paper, I would like to pause and analyse briefly some of 
Mitchell's contentions and their implications. Mitchell contends that 
the then current buildings can still be used but that they should be 
upgraded and improved. His vision implies a remedy to the nightmare 
world which is other to the modern. This world is characterised via a 
Kafkaesque reference as one which swarms "with insect pests"26. The 
appearance of insects adds a sinister note to the report, the echoes 
of which move in the direction of devolution and degeneracy. As a 
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node in the complex unfolding of knowledge and power. Mitchell has 
dramatised the urgent need for intervention. As a messenger of 
benificent rationality he makes suggestions which will move the 
hospital out of its cramped conditions towards a well-organised 
spatiousness. We note that this discursive moment cannot develop a 
self-critical awareness of itself through its interaction with 
ignorance and the mildly African textures of decay. For example. 
Mitchell wrote, "the buildings are old, hadly out of repair"27. 
Were Mitchell able to shift the angle of his investigation, he might 
have been able to mobilise a different language against what I, 
retrospectively, have identified as power and discipline. The 
consideration might be pursued as follows: how effective was medical . 
power in a situation in which "the hospital buildings are crowded 
together at the upper part of the grounds, and close to the rear 
boundary fence"28, as compared to its influence in the new, modern 
version of the hospital. Foucault draws our attention to two images 
of discipline in Discipline and Punish, 
There are two images, then, of discipline. At one extreme. the 
discipline-blockade, the enclosed-institution, established on the 
edges of society, turned inwards towards negative functions: 
arresting evil, breaking communications, suspending time. At the 
other extreme, with panopticism, is the 
discipline-mechanism. 29. 
I contend that whether it took the form of the written word or the 
administrative gaze the hoped-for version of the hospital was the 
ideal site for discipline with a barely-recognised deftness and 
terrible lightness of "touch". This "touch" certainly put the 
hospital into the latter category of "discipline mechanism" 
(presumably the original version would be closer to the discipline 
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blockade), but it is the intangible properties of the power which 
animated this "touch" that requires our attention. In order to 
analyse this power it is necessary to return to the debate directly. 
The entire debate is underwritten by a pervasive sense of economic 
and political uncertainty which at times appears to be of critical 
proportions. The complexity of both the administrative and economic 
aspects of the situation is evoked in the following summary. 
In or about 1904, and owing mainly to the report of Dr Gregory on 
the urgent need for a new hospital about 1,000 Pounds was 
collected and earmarked as a building fund. This has accumulated 
(compound interest), and the amount at present available for 
building purposes is approximately 1,300 Pounds. In March 1909, a 
deputation interviewed the then Colonial Secretary, and produced 
a plan of a proposed new hospital. The Colonial Secretary then 
stated it was impossible for the Government to grant any money to 
any hospital under the present state of things, and that, owing 
to the impending unification of the various colonies, the Cape 
Government had no control over the matter. but he could hold out 
no hope of assisting the Board. 
The Government intended to consider the question of building one 
large central hospital for the Peninsula. in which case the 
grants to the present state-aided hospital would. in all 
probability, be withdrawn. Under the circumstances the Colonial 
Secretary strongly advised the Board not to proceed for the time 
being. The Matter was thereafter discussed from time to time. and 
it was decided, as mentioned above. to again approach the 
Administrator with the object of soliciting help in obtaining 
Government aid to improve the existing building.30 
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The above quote provides the bedrock for our analysis. Unfortunately 
it does go a little beyond itself, however, for the substance of this 
section necessitates that we go back to 1909, the date when the Board 
of the Suburban Hospital submitted the "Fresh Air Scheme".31 
Although the scheme was bulky and over-ambitious. I contend that an 
intelligent close-reading reveals that the proposals contained an 
unconscious yet remarkably sophisticated conception of power and its 
workings. I do not for one moment believe that the "authors" of the 
"Fresh Air Scheme" had any idea that their ideas contained anything 
like a conception of power, but I ~ontend that it is possible to 
understand the workings of medical power as if it flowed like air or 
light. For both air and light stand in a relation of contiguity to 
the workings of power. I am suggesting therefore that by means of a 
simple substitution we can replace the words light and air with that 
of power. However, this simple "substitution" is somewhat crude, 
Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain 
concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights. gazes; in an 
arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in 
which individuals are caught up.32 
There appeared in Badham's Rediscovering Woodstock a number of 
references to that traditional and persistent comparison, that wind 
connotes unease and sometimes even danger. In distinction to this 
common-place association I contend that there is a conception of 
power (I am reluctant to say theory) ingrained within the very title 
of the scheme, for "Fresh Air" implies a domestication of the 
violence inherent in an angry wind. Furthermore it signifies a 
taming, for "Fresh Air" represents a controlled and pleasant 
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circulation as it situates the imagined functioning of the hospital 
within the context of therapeutic benevolence. In order to 
demonstrate just how conscious the secretary of the Woodstock 
Suburban Hospital was about the negative effect of the wind, the 
following extract is taken from the section entitled "exposure", 
It will also be observed that the disposition of the Ward blocks 
leaves a minimum area of the building exposed to the South East 
wind while the stoeps are throughout in perfect shelter from the 
same violent element, 33 
and under the title "Ventilation" we read, 
A system of natural ventilation is recommended for all 
compartments and corridors, and special attention has been given 
to prevent the possibility of draughts in the Wards.34 
In the above one notices that once the threat of the wind outside has 
been curtailed then attention can he brought to hear on the 
circulation of air within the hospital itself. The importance of air 
cannot be explained simply in terms of the ability to transport stale 
odours away hut I believe that generally free-flowing air stands in 
structural proximity to light, which in turn is of course a prime 
component of a visual discourse which supports institutional 
discipline. A,; Foucault stated in a conversation with Jean-Pierre 
Barou and Michel Perrot, 
in examining the series of different architectural projects which 
followed the second fire at the Hotel-Dieu in 1772, I noticed how 
the whole problem of the visibility of bodies, individuals and 
things, under a system of centralised observation, was one of 
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their most constant directing principles. In the case of the 
hospitals this general problem involves a further difficulty: it 
was necessary to avoid undue contact, contagion, physical 
proximity and overcrowding, while at the same time ensuring 
ventilation and circulation of air, at once dividing space up and 
keeping it open, ensuring a surveillance which would be hoth 
global and individualising while at the same time carefully 
separating the individuals under observation. 35 
For do not both air and light serve the same purpose in relation to 
spatiality? Do they not hoth "illuminate", scan surfaces, and reach 
into corners undiscovered'? Is it, t~erefore, that peculiar to suggest 
that air "makes visible" and provides a secondary element to a visual 
metaphoric of which light is the most important feature'! 
The Operating Theatre. Anaesthetising and Electric treatment 
rooms, and the Drug Store and Laboratory form an isolated block 
in a central convenient position with light from the most 
suitable quarter.36 
Furthermore. several items wit; .1 the "Fresh Air Scheme" also contain 
examples of a remarkable administrative sensitivity to the ordering 
of space and the positioning of objects therein. 
The Kitchen and Domestic Offices are situated in a position 
convenient for the conveyance of food to the Nurses and Medical 
Staff quarters and to the several wards.37 
and, 
The two near beds of each ward are divided off hy light screens 
and would be glazed to the corridor side. These beds would he 
used for patients immediately after an operation. and would 
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therefore avoid any discomfort to the other ward patients. 38 
The quotations ahove seek to demonstrate that although the "Fresh Air 
Scheme" might have heen a failure in other respects (see helow) it 
certainly did forward a relatively intelligent hlue-print for the 
possible construction of a "modern General Hospital". A,; we shall 
soon see, however, the scheme never met with official approval. After 
a thorough analysis of the scheme, the Department of Puhlic Health 
commented thus, 
These arrangements are entirely unsatisfactory and would he found 
impossible in practice. The g~neral remarks already made 
regarding the scheme as a whole apply to this part of it: in my 
opinion it will serve no useful purpose to go into it in detail -
the whole matter should be considered afresh. 39 
some time later an alternative to the "Fresh Air Scheme" was 
mentioned in a Cape Times article of November I 911, 
A rough plan has heen drawn by Mr Grant, architect. which 
provides for the erection of a new building as nurses' quarters, 
and for the conversion of the existing buildings into a 38-hedded 
institution. By thus centralising the wards. the hospital could 
be maintained by a very slightly increased nursing staff.40 
This improvised alternative attempted to short-circuit the economic 
problems via "centralisation" and a "slightly increased nursing 
staff'. It was rejected by the Provincial Secretary who helieved. at 
a time when money was scarce, that the cost of the "nursing-home" was 
prohibitive. According to the Provincial Secretary, 
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The new nursing-home at Woodstock cost, or is to cost, 1,835 
Pounds. It was erected against the expressed wish and advice of 
the Administrator out of the funds raised by the Board for 
building purposes. The Government has not contributed towards the 
expenditure. Unfortunately they went ahead on their own and have 
placed the building too close to the old buildings. so as to make 
it almost impossible to convert the latter into a really 
satisfactory hospital. They then submitted a scheme of 
alterations for the old buildings to cost 1,450 Pounds. This had 
to be condemned altogether.41 
This very letter continues as follows, 
Eventually the Government Architect and Medical Adviser went out 
to see what could be done, and devised two alternate schemes to 
cost 2,3CX) Pounds. Neither of these are really satisfactory, but 
the best that would appear possible in view of the fact that the 
Nurses' home has been placed where it is. The Board are now 
considering the matter. They will have a balance of 450 Pounds 
left over from their building funds and a sum of 500 Pounds voted 
on our current estimates, making it about 950 Pounds altogether. 
Both schemes devised contemplate some increased accommodation and 
new wards. A portion of the re-construction can he carried out 
without materially increasing the present accommodation. 42 
In a letter from the Acting Honorary Secretary of the Woodstock 
Hospital to the Provincial Secretary on February 5th, 1913, Mr F. 
Hartnady writes, 
A complete survey of the building has been made by the Architect, 
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Mr Grant, and the builder, Mr F Hewitt and they estimate that the 
alteration will not cost more than 800 Pounds; in fact Mr Hewitt 
is prepared to perform the work for that price.43 
The Administrator lent his approval to the proposed alterations but 
in April of that year funds ran out and the Provincial Secretary was 
asked for 150 Pounds to add, "the range, sinks and piping for hot 
water supply.1144 This was granted and in August 1913. The Secretary 
of the Cape Hospital Board recommended to the Provincial Secretary 
that there be the, 
erection of a new ward for coloured patients at the Woodstock 
Hospital.45 · 
On the 9th September 1913 the Administrator of the Province replied, 
The Administrator has requested me to obtain an assurance from 
the Board on this point as "naturally" he does not feel disposed 
to authorise expenditure or additions to any institution whilst 
there is a probability that he may be asked later to agree to the 
abandonment of the institution and the erection. within a few 
years of another hospital in its stead.46 
And thus, for our purposes at least, the debate comes to a close. I 
hope therefore to have demonstrated that the economic and political 
uncertainty of the period was. along with bureaucratic ineptitude. a 
contributing factor to the rejection of the "Fresh Air Scheme". This 
was in spite of the scheme's latent conception of power. a conception 
which appears to. in some ways. he a refinement to the power which 
characterised the institution prior to the possible implimentation of 
the scheme. If anything, therefore, it attests to the continued 
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importance of more traditional concepts such as the economic and 
political and their lingering influence within the history of both 
Colonial policy and the Woodstock Municipality. 
6.3: AN ACCIDENT AL SHOOTING 
This short and final section of chapter six is "about" the untimely 
death of Police-Constable Logan, a policeman who was accidentally 
shot by a friend on the night of the 17th December 1902. I argue in 
this section that Logan's death can be understood as creating a 
problem for what I loosely refer to as administrative knowledge. 
There are two reasons for this; I s~ggest that the writing which 
emanated from the Woodstock Suburban Hospital. that is, from the 
hospital to which Logan was admitted, is an instance of what Foucault 
refers to as disciplinary writing, a form of writing which situates, 
immobilizes and observes subjects, a writing which freezes them in a 
symmetrical net of words. Disciplinary writing has several defining 
characteristics but for the purposes of this section I will confine 
myself to naming two of them; the "fact" of death is relentlessly 
excluded from the discourse of disciplinary writing. In the records 
which survive today, whether they take the form of registers of 
admissions, reports from inspections conducted by the Medical Officer 
of Health or matron's reports, death is only mentioned as an abstract 
figure in a lonely column of its own. And secondly. disciplinary 
writing is characterized by the failure to ordinarily admit 
incidents, behaviours, actions that are in any way threatening, or 
anomalous. In other words anything which disrupts the ordered field 
of disciplinary writing (the foundation upon which administrative 
knowledge is built) and I contend it is precisely the accident which 
falls into the space of the threatening and anomalous. One of the 
main reasons why Logan's death is so difficult to accommodate within 
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administrative knowledge is because his death is the result of an 
accident. For it is the death without advance warning, the death 
without the harmony of preparation and the comfort of religious 
ritual. His is the unexpected and horribly sudden death of the 
accident. A death which hy its very "nature" negates the possibility 
of self-knowledge through revelation. I argue that it is with great 
difficulty that the "event" is remembered at all and that this 
administrative memory is the inevitable consequence of a certain 
scrambling of identities, times and positions, for the incident is 
characterized by an incredible sense of confusion which culminates in 
the eventual appearance of that which lends "objectivity" and dignity 
to the prevailing chaos of an accigental death, namely the discourse 
of the law. 
Furthermore - and this is the second reason - Logan's death 
demonstrates the inherent disorder present within all ordering 
systems.47 Logan's accident disorders the tahle of administrative 
knowledge from beneath because it draws attention to the fundamental 
fragility of a discursive system that is predicated on an arbitrary 
relationship between words and things. Thus the accident hrietly 
illuminates the horror vacui at the heart of our language (discourse) 
for there is nothing hut a void at its origin. Yet we must not 
interpret the existence of the "void" in too conventional a manner, 
for, as David Carroll states, 
The void itself is not an origin or end for discourse. It is the 
place from which discourse is repeatedly regenerated, where what 
has not yet heen said or figured takes form.48 
Thus the accident is that which has not yet heen figured. Yet as we 
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learnt in the section devoted to the construction of a methodology in 
chapter 1 ( at best an unwise and perilous undertaking) it is the 
function of the institution to limit the innate restlessness of 
discourse. In this instance the Logan accident is reclaimed by the 
functioning of the master-discourse, the law within the 
institutionalized context of the hospital. 
As I have already mentioned the entire incident was uncommonly 
complicated. In order to explain in greater detail the sequence of 
events I will quote from several sources. The first quote is taken 
from evidence given at the inquest into Logan's death. According to 
Police Sergeant John Jones, 
I saw Constable James later that same night. I then asked him for 
a statement and cautioned him that he need not say anything that 
may criminate him and that what he said may be used in evidence 
against him. He then made statement. He said Constable Logan came 
to his room as they were both off duty and were going out that 
night. They had arranged to meet at the Merry-go-Round at 9 p.m. 
Logan asked him for a box of matches. He gave him the matches and 
then Logan asked him for the loan of his revolver. He got the 
revolver from its hox and said, "I don't think it is loaded". He 
(James) stood in middle of the room and Logan was standing on his 
left front. He snapped the trigger twice and when he snapped it a 
third time there was a report. James stated that he was pointing 
revolver towards the ground and holding it loosely in his hand. 
He said he was facing towards the door. As soon as the revolver 
went off Logan said. "James you've shot me in the stomach". Logan 
then walked out of his room (Jameses) toward his own room. James 
followed him and said, "shew me where you've been shot. and I'll 
fetch a doctor". Logan pulled up his shirt and shewed him the 
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wound etc.49 
At the same inquest Albert James - the man responsible for shooting 
Logan recounted, 
I went to the box and took out my revolver. I said to Logan 
"there is nothing in it Peter," and snapped the trigger to shew 
him it was empty. I snapped the trigger twice and when I pulled 
it a third time it exploded. Logan put his hand to his stomach 
and said "My God James its through my stomach". I told him not to 
joke as it might have easily entered his stomach. He walked 
towards the door and met P.<;. 255 coming in. Logan said "Mate, 
I'm shot". I said to Byrne, "Don't believe him mate, he's only 
larking". They both walked towards Logan's room. I followed them. 
When we got to Logan's room, I said to Logan "shew me where you 
are shot. I don't believe you". He pulled up his shirt and shewed 
us his wound in his right side about three inches from navei.50 
The story is taken up by the Assistant Medical Officer of Health for 
the Colony. What is about to follow appeared in a letter he wrote to 
the Provincial Secretary on August 6th 1903. Before quoting from this 
letter I think that it is important to note that it was as a result 
of this letter that an inquest was held into Logan's death. The 
Assistant Medical Officer of Health writes, 
From the evidence it appears that P.C. Logan was shot in the 
stomach at 7.45 p.m. on the evening of the 17th December. 1902. 
Brandy was given to him immediately afterwards hy P.C. James, and 
Dr. Hewat was sent for. He arrived, a few minutes later. 
afterwards. He found it was a serious case and required an 
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immediate operation and gave instructions that the wounded man 
was to be taken to Woodstock Hospital and went home. 
Logan was admitted to the hospital at 8 p.m. The constables who 
removed him were under the impression that Dr Hewat was following 
them to the hospital and they told the Matron so. The latter 
waited for him for an hour and a quarter after the admission of 
the patient, then sent a message enquiring whether he was coming; 
he replied that, "he did not attend at the Hospital, hut if the 
man's life was in danger, and if there was no-one else available, 
he would come". On receipt of this message the Matron telephoned 
Dr Pettavel at 9 p.m. or 9.30 p.m. (Matron) or 10 p.m. (Dr 
Pettavel and P.C. Lang). Dr Pettavel arrived at 10.25 (p.m. or 
(10.30 p.m. Matron); found Logan "in a very had state, caused hy 
internal bleeding"; operated, found two wounds in the stomach and 
six in the intestines, with profuse haemorrhage and 
extravastation of intestinal contents into abdominal cavity. The 
wounds were stitched up and artificial blood given. But the 
patient died three hours afterwards. Dr. Pettavel states, in 
evidence, that "had the deceased been attended immediately after 
the wounds were received there would have been some chance of his 
recovery".51 
The above extracts provide us with an outline of the event, the 
people who were involved, as well as a confirmation of the final 
tragic outcome. Before continuing I think that it is necessary to 
take a slight detour and provide some clarifications and definitions. 
The introduction suggested that Logan's "accidental death" was 
problematic for administrative knowledge because this knowledge is 
predicated not so much on the failure to admit to the "reality" of 
death, but is "committed" to the safe, clean death, a death within 
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the confines of the hospital walls. What I am saying therefore is 
that Logan's death could not be sanitised and thus forgotten. it was 
too out-of-the-ordinary, in its distinctiveness it lingered. 
Disciplinary writing according to Foucault relies on a "power of 
writing". He contends that this "power of writing". 
was constituted as an essential part in the mechanisms of 
discipline. On many points it was modelled on the traditional 
methods of administrative documentation, though with particular 
techniques and important innovations. 52 
It is part of the internal structure pf such writing to reduce the 
disruptive difference of the event of Logan's death to something that 
can be securely fixed in the transparency of administrative 
knowledge, a knowledge which has as a regular and common expression 
the register and the documents of admission and discharge. 
Administrative knowled~e is characterized by a normative mean which 
homo~enizes incidents which it cannot anticipate in advance and it is 
precisely the exceptional nature of the Logan incident which 
threatens the system of knowledge to such an extent that statements 
of responsibility are forced out of it. Such statements are extremely 
rare and in their rarity one is ahle to glimpse the shiver of 
discursive introspection: the refinement and examination of 
procedures: the circumscription of roles. the re-interpretation of 
the rules. In fact the entire reconstitution of administrative 
knowledge as it stabilizes itself to do the work of another day. 
Why does the accident provoke such concern'! The accident creates a 
discursive disturbance for several reasons; accidents actively resist 
categorization because they incorporate aspects of an element which 
can variously be called chance, fate or coincidence. The field of 
administrative knowledge cannot incorporate the possible 
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irrationality of the accident with anything approaching ease because 
it rests upon fundamentally rational assumptions about events and the 
world. It merely re-affirms that it is securely bolted to the same 
problematic, the same basic conception of knowledge and therefore it 
cannot pose (let alone answer) the following related questions: what 
are the conditions-of-possibility for knowledge in general and 
administrative knowledge in particular'? 
Hopefully I have managed to draw attention to the fact that an 
accidental shooting at a certain place and time, and within a 
specific set of historical circumstances, once provided an acute 
problem for administrative knowl~dge. I would suggest. however, given 
the logic of knowledge produced in institutions like hospitals that 
administrative procedures would have heen refined so as to prevent 
the event from re-occuring. The event could not he repeated because 
institutional measures such as the reference of emergencies to the 
casualty ward of the Lord Somerset Hospital or, the tighter more 
precise definition of administrative practice would have 
significantly reduced the future possibility of finding 
administrative procedures inadequate. I am assertini;. therefore. that 
historians cannot only he sensitive to those events which threaten 
the representational capacities of administrative knowledi:e hut 
should interpret this "moment" as that which. given the codification 
of power. will become increasingly rare if not impossible -
particularly since institutions such as the Woodstock Suhurhan 
Hospital tend to consolidate rather than relinquish the holds they 
have over bodies and events. 
I do not, however, wish simply to round-off on this point because I 
believe we can extrapolate from this accident and. with the aid of a 
detour, we might he able to come up with some tentative conclusions 
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about accidents and the quest for modernity as expressed in the 
phrase, "a modern General Hospital". 
In a review of Francois Ewald's, "L'Etat Providence", Paul Rahinow 
writes, 
it would be perfectly ligitimate to see the puhlication of 
J'accuse by Zola and the creation of L'annee sociolo~ique as the 
outstanding political and intellectual events of 1898. However, 
Ewald, a bit laconic, announces the central thesis of his hook as 
if it were self-evident: "I discovered on this occasion a 
significant philosophical even~ the law of 9 April 1898 
regarding liability for work accidents." This law. which is at 
the heart of the book. turned on its head the liheral conceptions 
of individual responsiblity, of liberty, of law and society. This 
law, which was dehated for eighteen years, declared that 
industrial risks were not accidental risks. With this law the 
accident became social.53 
What bearing does this seemingly random quote have on the accidental 
death of Constable Logan'? Well, the quote suggests that the 
"socialisation" (I use the word in the sense used ahove) of accidents 
rendered them relatively harmless. Unlike the incorporation of the 
accident into the everyday functioning of French Law, Logan's death 
was, as I hope to have demonstrated, uniquely disruptive. One of the 
consequences of this disruption was that the metalanguage of the law 
was called upon simultaneously to assign meaning and to fix the trope 
of responsibility. In other words the accident in this period in 
legal history was not yet subsumed under the rubric of the law. This 
unremarkable point might have little significance except that I 
suspect that it can tell us something very important ahout the nature 
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of municipal power. 
It can, for example, tell us that municipal power has not socialised 
accidents to the extent that the" 'Vere dealt with hy a legal 
discourse, which was subsumed under municipal power. In fact, 
municipal power was such that it was not "attentive" to the 
sincularly disruptive potential of the accident in any way at all. 
The accident eluded the workincs of municipal power and thus we are 
able to conclude that the structure of municipal power meant that it 
did not sense that it was necessary to incorporate the accident. The 
accident continued to he a practical and epistemolocical nuisance. 
However, another extract from Rahinow's review is in order, 
Instead of relying upon individual foresight, the enlightened 
classes turned to a politics of prevention and collective 
assumption of risks: "Against penalization is posed prevention, 
which is none other than individual foresight made obligatory. 
Henceforth, under the aegis of the social, morality absorbs law 
and merges with politics. Everything becomes political. The 
contract of solidarity no longer obeys this juridical regime: it 
gives the State - now the Welfare State - the object of civil 
life itself. and assigns it the task of formulating the duties of 
morality which now govern the most private details of the life of 
every individual." 
All this gives rise to a new social contract. Since society is 
only an insurance against the risks engendered by its own 
development, it achieves its truth when it organizes itself as an 
insurance apparatus.54 
I have attempted in this chapter to trace the contours of a debate 
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about a movement towards modernity. Furthermore I have suggested that 
the image of "a modern General Hospital" was not a viable one during 
the period. This was due to the uncertainty surrounding the Cape 
Province's status as a Colonial possession, the potential lack of an 
administrative future for many hospitals within the Cape Peninsula 
and the resulting reluctance on the part of the Colonial authorities, 
as a result of these problems, to finance hospital alterations in any 
complete way. 
I would like. by way of a provocative parallel. to reinforce my 
original conclusion. that the early history of the Woodstock General 
Hospital is the history of the failure to reach modernity hut I would 
like to do so by building on the two quotes above. Taking our 
direction from Ewald, let us examine the following provisional ideas; 
the Logan incident demonstrates that life in the Woodstock 
Municipality at the turn of the century manages to elude the grasp of 
the law, in the sense that accidents are not subsumed under it. 
Following Ewald, we are also able to conclude that if modernity is 
"actuarial", ("Ewald sees in the birth of an actuarial society the 
theshold of our modernity: the Welfare State"55), the greater 
Western Cape area had no chance of attaining modernity ( according to 
Ewald's definition) until accidents were incorporated into the law 
itself, instead of the law being relied upon as a last resort as in 
the Logan shooting. 
There are, however, a series of corresponding conclusions which are a 
result of this original identification. Contrary to Foucault's 
anti-theory of hio-power, the Logan incident also "demonstrates" that 
life can possibly he understood as escaping the discursive attention 
of hio-power. Were life integrated into the hio-power. state. law. 
nexus at the time. the state would have been ahle to practice a moral 
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politics of responsihily. in which accidents would have heen 
institutionalized within the amhit of an "actuarial" modernity. As we 
know. this was not the case as responsibility was not immediately 
forthcominc so. in a sense. it had to he found. We are thus ahle to 
arrive at a series of provisional conclusions ahout the local 
manifestations of the state. the development of insurance law. and 
the possibly limited influence of hio-power. In usinc his disciple 
(Ewald) acainst Foucault. we micht he ahle to draw attention to the 
functional limitations of an applied theory of hio-power. for the 
"theory" relies on a notion of life hecominc an ohject of 
administrative concern or. and perhaps this conclusion can he 
sustained a little more easily. I merely suggest that on the level of 
insurance practice. hio-power was a force of negligible concern. 
CONCLUSION 
My central argument in section 6.1 was this: although hospitals are 
essentially designed to help the community they serve. the methods 
and techniques whereby they return patients to health are susceptible 
to critique. These methods can he critiqued because they are 
articulations of a rationality and power which has negative effects. 
I drew attention to the almost heroic attempts of a Dr Mitchell to 
guide the hospital in the direction of modernity. I asserted that. 
although this was a fundamentally honourable ambition, it was flawed 
because the use of procedures like "inspection" have their drawbacks. 
For instance, "inspections" tend to produce objects which, on the one 
hand, might lead to hetter health for all. On the other, however. 
this health might only he achieved at the expense of the 
objectification of those that the hospital was supposed to cure. 
The quest for modernisation hrings with it another repressive 
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side-effect; the attempt to overcome discursively-imposed time 
creates a moral economy. This moral economy, which slowly starts 
discriminating around "harmless" distinctions (like clean/dirty, 
pure/impure), quickly hecomes a moral politics. This moral politics 
not only seeks to estahlish itself as truth hut also is at its most 
dangerous when it starts to moralise ahout race, gender and class. 
The second section analyses another expression of the quest for 
modernisation hy reading the "Fresh-Air Scheme". I argued that the 
scheme's rejection must he interpreted as a historical irony. This is 
because, I suspect, that it contained a hidden (yet nevertheless 
sophisticated) hlueprint of institutional power, the ordering of 
space, and the positioning of hodies within that space. It thus seems 
that issues of Colonial importance won the day against local 
initiatives towards modernisation. 
In the third section I analysed the results of an accidental 
shooting. I was thereby able to come to a basic understanding of a 
"power of writing" and its relationship with administrative 
knowledge. In the last few pages of the section I extrapolated from 
the accident, and, in using a disciple's thought against him. was 
able to question the validity of Foucault's theory of hio-power. 
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identify accurately the point at which order is at its most 
vulnerable. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have seen how the "invention" of the Woodstock Municipality was an 
event congruent with the consolidation of a new form of power. This 
form of power, or discipline (which is a specific articulation of 
power), utilised a panorama of techniques in order to govern the 
municipal population. Some of these techniques were effective. For 
instance: the municipality employed the twin strategies of census 
taking within its boundaries, and the issuing of permits to those who 
lived beyond the municipal border. The result of such interventions 
was that they policed certain sectors of the local population. In the 
case of the permit, the subject was virtually obliged to carry a 
permit at all times. The permit functions as a ghostly second version 
of the self, constantly subjecting the holder to a form of ( self) 
scrutiny. It is thus remarkably effective as a form of control, for 
not only is it cheap but it is invisible. The permit also functions 
effectively as a form of social "management", because it does not 
remove the permit-holder from "everyday life" but hinds them to 
official knowledge and, ironically, thus to life itself. 
Altough the Woodstock Municipality managed to "float" several schemes 
which were highly repressive, it did not succeed as a disciplinary 
institution. It was too open, too deeply ensconced within the ambit 
of the law, and too committed to the flow of commodities through its 
borders for it to he an institutional articulation of unfreedom. 
Craig's Battery however, was a closed institution committed to the 
reproduction of existing order within. One feature of its regime of 
discipline was a mechanism which inspired a system of 
self-surveillance, and thus self-regulation. The mechanism. which was 
encoded in the G949 form, ensured that the Royal Engineer became a 
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self-regarding, obedient, and conscientious subject. 
The Woodstock House of Mercy contained no such mechanism of 
self-regulation. Rather, the sisters therein were the conduits 
through which a highly moral "discipline of mercy" was passed on to a 
group of so-called "penitents". Unlike the totalizing form of 
discipline which dominated the battery however, the House of Mercy 
was an institution with a rather ramshackle sense of discipline tied 
to an infinitely more coherent sense of mission. The ultimate 
impression conveyed by an analysis of events suggest a sense of 
confusion and an irregular disciplinary regime. 
This irregularity and confusion finds an echo in the Woodstock 
Cottage or Suburban Hospital. In its attempt to produce both health 
and obedience, the hospital was relatively successful. In its attempt 
to transcend the projected "time of otherness" however, the hospital 
administrators were unable to reach an agreement as to how to improve 
the hospital sufficiently to make it "a modern General Hospital". The 
history of a series of events in the hospital itself seem to indicate 
that although administrators were becoming aware of the potential of 
space and the population as objective categories for broader 
municipal analysis, the history of the hospital was a story of 
bureaucratic confusion. This was enacted within the context of 
British Colonial indecision about the future of the Colony. as well 
as the future of peninsula hospitals. 
What the four case-studies suggest is that far from this new economy 
of power seeping unaided into the very fahric of Woodstock life. and 
far from power heing infinitely generalised through society. power 
was unable to secure any wide or recognisable "foothold" in the 
Municipality between the years 1882 to I 913. In certain cases we have 
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witnessed remarkably sophisticated expressions of discipline coming 
to the fore. In others. we have seen how disciplinary mechanisms or 
technologies have heen unable to sustain themselves and link together 
in order to maximize their effects. This is despite the existence in 
the municipality of a range of repressive institutions. Such an 
"empirical" refutation of Foucault is not without its problems 
however, and I would like to pursue this issue next. 
I will demonstrate that there are difficulties in attempting an 
"empirical refutation" of Foucault's work, particularly from within 
the methodological context of a genealogy. One of Foucault's 
commentators, Paul Rahinow, has recently written a Foucault inspired 
book entitled, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social 
Environment. The book is an attempt to analyse the norms and forms 
that were "invented" between 1830 and 1930 in the hope that they 
would regulate French society and help steer it towards modernity. 
Early on in the book, Rahinow tells us that the hook is an attempt to 
"diagram some of those relationships (between government, men, 
administration, things), interpreted as a history of the present". 1 
Although Rahinow doesn't mention directly the word geneaklb'Y, I argue 
that the book can he read as a genealobry, given that Foucault has 
always conceived of his genealogies as histories which have effects 
in the present. In Discipline and Punish Foucault writes, 
I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the 
political investments of the body that it gathers together in its 
closed architecture. Why'! Simply because I am interested in the 
past? No, if one means hy that writing a history of the past in 
terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of 
the present. 2 
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The sub-title of Rahinow's hook is, Norms and Forms of the Social 
Environment and it is with the somewhat elastic and traditional use 
of "Forms" as a category that I begin to feel a little uneasy. 
Rabinow tells us that the, "discursive field opened by these 
debates"3 ..... about the definition and classification of form. "is 
one element of what has come to be known as modernity". 4 He thus 
locates the debates about form squarely within the period of 
modernity. In this regard he adds, 
Foucault later complicated his analysis of modernity; he 
identified a field of power relations composed of both discursive 
and non-discursive practices, ~hich he called 
bio-technical-political. In English, welfare would be a better 
term. Foucault was in the process of adding an analysis of 
welfare to Marx's analysis of capitalism and Weber's of 
bureaucracy, forming a third leg of modernity, when he died. This 
book continues the exploration, in its own way, of some of the 
contours of modern power and knowledge Foucault had begun to 
map.5 
The Rabinow hook can be read as an attempt to understand issues of 
norm and form in relation to the emergence of welfare in modern 
France. Ao; I mentioned earlier, however. the manner in which Rabinow 
uses the category of "form" leaves me a little uneasy. For example, 
on page 324, Rabinow refers to Albert Thomas, the French Minister of 
Armaments during the first World War, who sought out new "forms" of 
contractual relationships between industry and labour.6 In this 
example Rabinow seems to return to an understanding of form as being 
created by the subject. Rather than form emerging as a principal of 
regulation between different discursive regimes, "pragmatic 
technicians"7, like Thomas, were creative in their response to 
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concrete problems. Is one to interpret this as a return to 
subjectivism, the subjectivism which Foucault had done so much to 
distance himself from theoretically? Was it not Foucault who wrote, 
I would call genealogy ... a form of history which can account for 
the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects 
etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is 
either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs 
in its empty sameness throughout the course of history['?]8 
In another revealing example, Rabinow cites the approach that a 
French Beaux-Arts architect called Albert Laprade brought to 
re-designing the old habous quart~r in Casablanca.9 Laprade's brief 
was to reconstruct the medina in a manner which was congruent with 
the specificities of everyday Moroccan life. Rabinow describes the 
task facing Laprade in the following manner: ''The task was to 
decompose the charm into its architectural and urban elements and to 
learn how to recompose them into new forms combining modern 
technology with these socially rich stylistic elements. Laprade and 
his friends hunted for revealing details - the habit of placing 
olive trees next to white walls, vines against walls, and wells in 
the shade. The aim was not only to recreate beauty. hut to identify 
the constituents of the sensibility these forms embodied." 10 
Laprade, via a heightened cultural sensitivity, was to recast these 
"enduring" forms in a culturally "acceptable" and modern way. His 
position seems to he analogous to that of the Leavisite ideal reader: 
within Leavisite discourse a close and empathetic reading confirmed a 
shared subjectivity between poet and reader. It seems that for 
Laprade and his friends a rigorous and empathetic scrutiny of 
Moroccan architectural forms would be enough to guarantee 
understanding of the forms and textures of Moroccan life. From the 
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starting point of a "close reading" therefore, the paternalistic 
project of recasting new forms could proceed. 
There can surely be little doubt that in this example the French 
architects, were, like poets for F R Leavis, unified and creative 
subjects. If so, it seems important to ask what position "Form" as a 
whole ocupies in Rahinow's work. In his introduction. Rahinow draws 
attention to Sir Ernst Gomhrich's, "Norm and Form: The Stylistic 
Categories of Art History and Their Origins in Renaissance 
Ideals".1 l According to Rahinow the Gomhrich book contends that the 
classification of artistic styles can be traced historically to 
whether "one was either for or ag~inst the classical". 12 In the 
wake of the classisists' victory, the debate ceased to have validity. 
but the schema whereby styles were understood remained very much the 
same. One of the crucial debates which followed subsequently was a 
debate about the scientific definition of form. According to Rabi now, 
Some historians sought universal morphological principles as the 
means to unify and ground the burgeoning historicist catalogue of 
difference. Others emphasised a plural unity within each of a 
multiplicity of cultural or historical periods; each era had its 
own internally coherent norm( s) and form( s ). 13 
What Rabinow seems to do in French Modern then, is to write of the 
emergence, across a number of parallel fields, of norms and forms. 
However, and this is particularly the case with his utilisation of 
the concept of form, form sometimes "reads" as a traditional 
aesthetic category wedded to a teleological version of history; a 
version of history which, unlike the genealogy, presumes a 
homogeneous theory of time. In his invocation of form. it seems as if 
Rabinow is leading the radically anti-historicist Foucault hack in 
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the direction from whence he came - towards the History of 
Ideas/Styles. 
Like Foucault in The Order of Thin~s, Rahinow also appears to have 
difficulty in accounting for historical change.14 I suspect that he 
tries to outflank this problem by introducing the idea of crisis into 
his history of the present. On the final page of his introduction he 
writes about the "pragmatic technicians" who sought "to find 
scientific and practical solutions to public problems in times of 
crisis".15 Crisis is that which propels "pragmatic technicians" 
during times of "middling modernism" 16 to seek out new 
architectural and discursive forms. I don't take issue with Rahinow's . 
notion of crisis per se - altough I think that crisis has, over the 
last few years, become something of a critical commonplace - but I 
do wonder to what extent the whole notion of crisis is tied up with a 
unilinear theory of time ( and homogenous theories of history) which 
tend to read crisis as a form of dialectical deviation which, 
paradoxically, contributes to the "march" towards a telos. 
If rigidly Foucauldian terms are applied to the analysis and 
evaluation of French Modern the book must be considered as something 
less than a theoretical success. I find it most ironic to note that 
Rabinow's attempt at a history of the present has returned in the 
direction from which the master came: Foucault's entire project can 
be characterised as an attempt to outflank forms of traditional 
history. In fact he goes as far as to say that traditional or 
continuous forms historiography are coupled with the knowledge gained 
from an experiencing subject, 
The Archaeology of Knowledge thus analyses the shift in 
historiography of which Foucault himself is the most powerful 
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contemporary representative. As epistemic hreaks go. however, it 
seems to be a slow one: Foucault attributes its hesitancy to a 
fundamental reluctance to think difference rather than the 
reassuring form of the identical: it is, he comments, " as if we 
were afraid to conceive of the Other in the time of our own 
thought". Here we encounter the continuing dominance of the 
philosophy of the subject, which, according to Foucault. was 
specifically introduced in order to provide a "shelter for the 
sovereignty of consciousness" against the intrusion of 
heterogeneity. Continuous history and the subject are thus 
dependent on each other. 17 
In its reversion to the security of continuous forms of history, 
French Modern poses the following problem: how are we to receive 
Rabinow's assertion that the book is concerned to analyse the 
relationship between government, men, administration and things, 
"interpreted as elements in a history of the present"'? 18 The 
purpose of a Foucauldian genealogy is to write a history of the 
present. This is done by identifing genealogically the 
discontinuities and points of emergence of that which is considered 
unchanging, like the hody or sexuality. for instance. Both Discipline 
and Punish and The History of Sexuality are thus attempts to identify 
genealogically the emergence of new objects or discursive domains 
within the context of new economies of power.19 In the same manner, 
this thesis is an attempt to write the genealogy of a new economy of 
power, an economy which found expression in the formation of the 
Woodstock Municipality. 
According to Foucault, the genealogist projects ( and finds) 
difference in the past. This is in order to criticize the present. In 
his orthodox history, Rabinow has sacrificed the critical dimension 
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of the genealogy by reading the past as if it were the present. He 
has thus committed the ultimate Foucauldian sin: "he has written a 
history of the past in terms of the present". 20 If viewed in 
rigorously Foucauldian terms. Rabinow's history of the present is 
therefore nothing more than a passing reference to the Foucauldian 
method of ~enealoG,,Y. However, the issue of genealob'Y as a valid form 
of historiographic critique does not end here, as Rabinow's dilemmas 
demand to be taken further. 
A more sympathetic reading of French Modern is possible. It is 
possible to understand the book as an index of the theoretical 
difficulties involved in practicing~ Foucauldian genealogy, if one 
understands the genealogy as an attempt to identify events, analyse 
their meaning-effects and arrange them in series against a 
generality. In fact. one can read the book as evidence of the virtual 
impossibility of applying the genealogical method in a manner which 
does not imitate, yet nevertheless honours Foucault. How exactly does 
one identify and arrange events for instance'? And how does one 
constitute the "meaning-effect" of an event without it appearing to 
function in exactly the same way as meaning itself? Furthermore. how 
does one narrate history and keep events locked in separate and 
unigue temporalities of their own. when the vezy act of writing seems 
to push one. against one's will. towards greater unities of meaning 
located within "conventional" time-scales'? 
The immense difficulties involved in actually practicing a genealogy 
- as opposed to using it as a form of critique against the writer's 
of orthodox historiography - have alerted this writer to the 
possibility of theoretical booby-traps within Foucault's work. Both 
Robert Young and Alan Megill have drawn attention to the . 
self-critically subversive nature of Foucault's text's. 21 Young 
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(following Dews) suggests that the epistemological undermining of the 
status of his own work might well involve Foucault in a practice 
which booby-traps his work with, "simulacra, or ghostly bad 
copies".22 In fact Young asserts that such a practice would be 
theoretically consistent with someone who's work was alert to the 
unifing function of "the author". 23 M iGht not the genealo~ he 
designed in exactly this manner, seductively offering those critical 
of conventional historioGraphy a method hy which they can practice 
histozy without fallini: into the traps of orthodoxy'? Mii:ht not the 
"reality" of actually havini: to practice a i:enealo~ sui:i:est however, 
that the genealo~ is only valid as as a polemical program rather 
than the concrete application of a.methodoloto''? 
I suggest that the argument above goes some way to explaining why 
Rabinow, who has been involved with Foucault's work for some time 
now, and is widely acknowledged to be one of Foucault's most 
respected American commentators, has neglected the genealogical 
dimension of Foucault's work in French Modern. I also believe that 
Rabinow "reverted" to a form of conventional history because the 
theoretical demands of writing a genealo!,'Y - posing specific rather 
than universal problems, within the context of specific conjunctures 
- ran counter to his ambitions, which were to write a longditudinal 
history of the emergence of certain norms and forms within the 
history of modern France. 
Far from being a willful detour, I believe that the analysis of 
French Modern was necessary in order to help us prohlematize the 
issue of the possibility of writing a genealogy. If the hook is read 
in relation to the admittedly limited terms and stated ambitions of a 
Foucualdian genealogy, then it must be understood as a regression. 
It thus demonstrates in a paradoxical, yet incomporahly erudite way, 
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the perils confronting those who practice genealogies. 
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APPENDIX A 
CREATIVITY. DESTRUCTION AND MODERNISM - THE CASE OF THE FORT 
PHOTOGRAPHS. 
INTRODUCTION 
I would like, during this appendix, to analyse several photographs of 
Fort Knokke, a small, relatively insignificant fort, adjacent to the 
larger Craig's Battery. I regret that copies of the photographs are 
not available to me for inclusion in the thesis. I have therefore 
provided desciptions of them below. I find the photographs intriguing 
because they are obscure, and thus, although they now languish in the 
Cape Town Archives, they seem in their undistinguished way, if not to 
escape history entirely, to cling to it with an degree of attractive 
precariousness. This obscurity is compounded by the fact that they 
were taken by a little known Victorian photographer called Arthur 
Elliott; a photographer who had his hour of fame with the publication 
of a piece of twee sentimentalism called "The Sandpiper". All in all 
the photographs of Fort Knokke are surrounded by a cluster of slightly 
negative qualities - ordinariness, mediocrity, lack of distinction 
- which we have come to associate with the very antithesis of 
history. It is thus apposite that they should, in repaying our 
attentive gaze, come to yield such an interesting story, a story I 
have decided to call, "Creativity, Destruction and Modernism - The 
Case of the Fort Knokke Photographs". 
We have already encountered the idea that modernism can be interpreted 
as a wide-ranging aesthetic response to a unique experience of space 
and time. This experience of space and time was based and mediated 
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through the wave of technological advance that we have come to 
associate with the birth of European capitalist modernity. One object 
which manages, like none other, to encapsulate the spirit of 
modernity, is the camera. This is because the camera allows the 
subject to understand reality ( and hence time and space) in a 
fundamentally new way. A photograph, for instance, is a condensation 
of space wrested from the onward flow of passing time; we might thus 
refer to it as a spatialisation of time. 
The nineteenth century was supposedly a century which was preoccupied 
to a great degree with the exact shape and contour of history. As we 
know, history is a cultural convent!on, a particular way that the West 
has decided to domesticate and order time. One way of refering to 
history is, in other words, to refer to it as a temporalisation of 
space. Reporting on this very theme, Michel Foucault asserts and then 
adds, 
The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, 
history: with its themes of development and suspension, of crisis 
and cycle, themes of the ever-accumalating past, with its great 
preponderance of dead men and the menacing glaciation of the 
world .... The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of 
space. We are in the epoch of simeltaniety: we are in the epoch of 
juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, 
of the dispersed. I 
The camera combined the power to alter the ontological foundations of 
the world with the nineteenth century's passion for all things 
historical. In fact, Roland Barthes suggests that technology could 
well have played its part in making history "one of the nineteenth 
century's great obsessions" when he tells us that, 
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Perhaps we have an invincible resistance to believing in the past, 
in history, except in the form of myth. The photograph, for the 
first time, puts an end to this resistance: henceforth the past is 
as certain as the present, that we see on paper is as certain as 
what we touch - and it is the advent of the photograph - and 
not, as has been said, of the cinema - which divides the history 
of the world. 2 
The photograph thus stands, somewhat imperiously, on the other side of 
the history of the world. We may, for convenience sake, refer to this 
other side as modernity or modernism. What follows next is an 
investigation into the specific meaning of this new history of the 
world, this other side. By implication, it is also an analysis of 
modernism, as well as the unravelling of a narrative, a story which 
has its roots in a quotidian world, a world which is not only new, but 
equally, verges on the obscure. 
A.1: A PERIOD OF UNDECIDABILITY 
If there is anything which manages to reinforce the sense of obscurity 
which radiates from both the photographs and their position in the 
Cape Archives, the place in which they are currently kept, it is the 
overpowering sense of neglect which they convey. One of the first 
things that one notices about the photographs is that all of them are 
bereft of human detail. This lack of human detail is exaggerated by 
the presence of the words, "nou gesloop", which mean literally, "now 
demolished", which are stamped across the photographs themselves. This 
administrative intervention underlines the fact that the archives are 
serving a vital purpose by historicising potentially obscure 
photographs. The administrative trace also serves as a device whereby 
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the power of institutional desire is written on the photographs 
themselves, silently reminding us that obscurity is no hindrance to 
those legitimately interested in pursuing the truth of the past. 
Obscurity and neglect are to be seen everywhere within the photographs 
themselves: even a casual glance at any one of the five photographs 
confirms the bareness and incipient decay evoked by the weather-worn 
sentry boxes (Elliott Collection 3533) or the forgotten hose-pipe, 
ladder and petrol pump, all ciphers of neglect which appear in Elliott 
3531. In fact, very little within the photographs dispels the 
impression that they consist of anything but the spent husks of 
modernity, the hidden "other side" of an industrial culture which . 
produced both the machine gun and the telephone. 
After gazing at the photographs for a time, one arrives at a position 
in which a basic tension manifests itself: it appears as though 
historical knowledge is striving to confer meaning upon that which -
by virtue of its very obscurity - resists the imposition of the 
"correct" historical meaning in all but the most basic of ways. The 
"nou gesloop" (now demolished) injunction furthermore, creates a 
period of undecidability between the time of the photographs' taking 
and the time in which the archive decided that the photographs needed 
to be stamped with a "nou gesloop" sign. In attempting a definitive 
closure, historical knowledge has in fact opened up this ambiguous 
period or period of undecidability which outflanks the 
institutionalised will to finally lay the issue of historical meaning 
to rest. This is because the photographs will always be "haunted" by 
the fact that that which they represent no longer exists, for it has 
already been demolished. 
The alternative of leaving the photographs as they were would solve 
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the problem of ambiguity but in so doing would court the accusation of 
historical inaccuracy; this would clearly be problematic within the 
context of a discourse which lays claims to fidelity in the 
representation of the historical truth. This institutional 
will-to-truth is revealed to have its destructive side, for it has 
conferred ambiguity upon that which is obscure and thus apparently 
unimportant. This "obscurity" has been overshadowed in the sense that 
we are told that even this unimportant fort, with its average set of 
modern relics, no longer exists. In replacing obscurity with the false 
transcendence of closure, the archive has inadvertently prohlematised 
the issue of accuracy and thus meaning and truth. In fact, in its 
desire to anchor the trope of historical meaning. official historical 
knowledge has authorised a spiral of indeterminancy which functions on 
at least three counts: we do not know when the photograph was taken; 
we do not know when the fort was actually demolished: we do not know 
when the custodians of official knowledge in the Western Cape saw fit 
to "damage" the photograph with the words "nou gesloop". In marked 
contrast to this "spiral of indeterminancy". one senses that had the 
photographs been left alone. then a single question might he asked; 
the question would simply he, when was this photograph taken? 
We might tease out this disruptive "period" still further by noting 
that the words "nou gesloop" act metaphorically on the reality which 
they are meant to represent. In other words, they help to 
metaphorically "demolish" the fort (and thus history) in a manner 
which is dialectically opposed to the constructive and preservative 
ambitions of official historical knowledge as housed in the archive. 
This paradoxical combination of destructive creativity is one of the 
prime components of modernism and this is well demonstrated in Douglas 
Crimp's extension of Walter Benjamin's famous quote, 
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This collage strategy was itself an image of the "break-up", the 
"disintegration" of civilisation in the modern world, relevant to 
one of Benjamin's most famous formulas: "Allegories are, in the 
realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things" (Tragic 
Drama, 178), the premise being that something becomes an object of 
knowledge only as it "decays", or is made to disintegrate 
( analysis as decay). 3 
In charting the radical ambiguity which arises as a result of the 
disjunction of image and word, we are able to note that the story of 
Elliott's photographs participate in Benjamin's definition on both 
counts: the "original" photographs. represent a decaying structure (the 
fort) and its subsequent "demolition" is paradoxically hastened in the 
archive's desire to confer an accurate interpretation on that which is 
no longer there to be interpreted. 
Another modernist writer who commented on the theme of creative 
destruction was George Simmel. He believed that ruins anchored one's 
identity in the new, flux-ridden world, a world that was rapidly 
destroying the old. Notice how his evocation of, "this instant of an 
aesthetically perceptible present", gestures perfectly toward the 
fractured temporality, if only in the form of the photograph itself, 
that was the consequence of "modern" inventions like the camera. 
Ruins, according to him, were places where "the past with its 
destinies and transformations has been gathered into this instant of 
an aesthetically perceptible present".4 
We can see therefore, how the archive, which is considered a 
quintessential site for the disinterested pursuit and conservation of 
knowledge, actually participates in the act of writing. In distinctive 
modernist fashion, the archive, which historically is an "animal" of 
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the modern age, alters one representation of history in order to 
present a more "accurate" version of the same representation. This 
re-writing, in itself a process of creative destruction, is not 
normally associated with an institution that it is simply supposed to 
preserve. Finally, the textual intervention which we have just noted 
puts pay to the myth that archives (and their modernist counterparts, 
like museums) do not contribute to the active construction of history. 
A.2: INCOHERENCE AND THE ARCH IV AL PROJECT 
The "period" that I have identified as existing between the time of 
the photograph's taking and the time of the addition of the "nou 
gesloop" caption introduces a note of palpable instability into the 
archive's classificatory system. The instability manifests itself in 
the fact that the words appear to be a negation of the apparent 
accuracy of the photograph. Conversely, the photograph appears to be a 
negation of the apparent accuracy of the words. The ceaseless 
cartwheeling of meaning (and, incidentally, remarkably Nietzschean 
interplay of truth and the lie) has particular disruptive effects and 
it is those effects which I would like to examine in part three of the 
appendix. 
Tautologically, we can never see beyond the "nou gesloop" injunction 
because it is already there, constantly irritating the eye with its 
presence. Thus we are reminded that there can be no return to the 
pristine simplicity of the "original" photograph; in fact, the "nou 
gesloop" stamp unintentionally reinforces the idea that there can be 
no "original return", for the viewer is doubly distanced: the 
ontological status of the photographs prevent the viewer from viewing 
an original ( the.re are no original copies in the modern age of 
mechanical reproduction) and the "now demolished" stamp puts pay to 
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any residual desire to be able, almost against hope itself, to view a 
first copy. 
The example of the Elliott photographs gives us an indication of the 
fundamental incoherence at the very heart of the archival project. The 
strategy used by the archivists to overcome this problem was to return 
to the determining role of the author, or in this case, the 
photographer. The photographs were thus catalogued - and still are 
for that matter - in a series of files marked "Elliott Collection". 
Despite the contradictions within parts of the system, the Elliott 
ouevre is lent overall coherence by being gathered under the sign 
"Arthur Elliott". We might in fact go further and explore the 
possibiltiy that "Arthur Elliott" is the construct that archival 
knowledge deploys as a matter of course, in order to lend legitimacy 
and structure to its own taxonomies. 5 
Certainly, attribution of a kind of "authorship" does serve to limit 
meaning and signification which, as we have demonstrated, in certain 
instances spill over the sides of the classificatory systems which are 
supposed to order and manage them. We must he careful to offset the 
impression that the function of authorship is evoked knowingly hy the 
archivists to plug this tumbling excess of meaning. What I am 
suggesting however, is that the function is released habitually. as an 
administrative reflex, which inheres in the warp and woof of knowledge 
itself. This is in spite of the fact that we have just found a 
contradictory example which seems to require a set of special 
procedures. 
Of course we acknowledge the structural, epistemological and practical 
impossibility of a system of special procedures, in the sense that it 
would raise the exception to the status of a rule; for to deal with 
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the archival fictionalisation of history (is the photograph more 
truthful than a lying caption, or is the caption historically accurate 
in relation to a lying photograph'!) would be to do two things. It 
would mean having to entertain not only the possibility that 
photographs can lie, particularly when they appear in conjunction with 
captions, and thus threatening Barthes' earlier comment about 
photography dividing history because it can guarantee the certainty of 
the past, (i.e. the truth). It would also precipitate utter crisis 
within the very musculature of Official Administrative Knowledge. 
A hypothetical crisis senario suggests itself: the Administration 
realises the inherent limitations o( the system which they use to 
order and stabilise meaning. If signification is revealed to be 
excessive, then the archive itself is shown to be complicit in the 
production of truth. This does not square with its avowed intention to 
simply store knowledge as if it were a kind of raw product. The 
situation is further complicated by the fact that the archive has not 
simply produced a truth: in striving admirably for factual accuracy 
- telling us that what we see has been demolished - it has also 
produced a mirage, a fiction. These two terms, as it so happens, hinge 
on each other, and in their mutual dependence they lie in wait: 
threatening to unravel subversively the archival pretension to stock 
documents which purport to record the historical "facts" with due 
impartiality. Of course they also constitute a threat for conventional 
definitions of history because, if nothing else, they demonstrate the 
fact that in this instance truth and the lie are inextricably tied up 
with each other. 
It is instructive to note that the words "nou gesloop" have no author. 
In. their anonymity they come from nowhere; they are not the product of 
an original guiding consciousness and they don't seem to need the 
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spurious function of "authorship" to be placed by their side. Is the 
nowhere from which they come, and the anonymity of the hand in which 
they are written, an analogue to the supposed disinterest of the 
archive as an institution? And why is it that the stamp of authority 
is an utterance without an author? Is it perhaps because authoritative 
utterances can be repeated, time and time again, without ever losing 
their shape? Or is it perhaps because they do not stand in an 
acceptable relation to the imagination? Perhaps it is because the 
words "nou gesloop" are part of a discourse which contains no author 
function? 
It does seem that these words wit~out origin are, however, part of a 
discourse which, when found in combination with other discourses, is 
able, with the aid of a suitably inclined historian, to produce 
"fictions". These "fictions" are produced by the historian, who, in a 
sense, creates (that is, fictions) a history not quite yet in 
existence on the basis of a current political reality ( and here I 
include the state of historiography in the South African Academy) that 
would, I suggest, pass over the case of the Fort Knokke photographs 
without interest. 
Expanding upon this somewhat, we note that from the point-of-view of 
myth the archive cannot tell lies; neither can it produce history, or 
preside over disorder. The ideology of the institution is such that 
even the involuntary fiction - the latent fiction which is created 
when a palimpsest is written over a photograph, thus producing a fatal 
ambiguity - is ultimately "covered-up" in the interests of a 
coherent body of knowledge based upon a profound will-to-truth. The 
basic rationale for the genealogical project exists herein: to replace 
dominant myths with dissociating myths; to demonstrate that the 
archive does tell lies, the archive does produce history, and that it 
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is possible to find examples of epistemological disorder. This is what 
Foucault is suggesting when he commands us to fictionalize a history 
not yet in existence in terms of a political reality and, I would add, 
an institutional reality, which makes it true.6 
I have just "manufactured" history in the sense that I have written 
something that has never been written before. I have "fictionalized" a 
reality that has allowed me to question some of the supporting myths 
which are propagated by institutions like archives, and inadvertently 
kept in circulation by an entire historiographic apparatus. I have 
also attempted, by implication, to take the genealogy forward into the 
present and suggest that the perio~ of undecidability that I wrote 
about earlier is a period which would not be considered as being 
particularly interesting by dominant historical discourse. I believe 
that the same applies for the Constable Logan incident (see chapter 
six). If an example of dominant historical discourse is needed, we 
need look no further that Andrea Badham's Rediscovering Woodstock. 
CONCLUSION 
This appendix has been an attempted expose of some of the 
unacknowledged contradictions that exist within the Cape Town 
Archives. Via the analysis of a collection of photographs I have 
deployed a self-conscious rhetorical strategy in order to "replace" 
one set of dominant myths with a set of productive counter myths: for 
the myth of epistemological coherence I have suggested the myth of 
epistemological confusion and incoherence. For the myth of the 
disinterested passivity of the archive, I forward the idea that the 
archive actually participates in the construction of history. For the 
myth of accurate and trustworthy periodisation, I assert that the 
archive's will-to-truth actually contributes, on occasions, to the 
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fictionalisation of history, etc. 
I have tried to root the discussion of myth and counter-myth firmly 
within the context of technological advance and modernism. Thus, while 
I was trying to draw attention to certain inconsistencies within the 
supposedly regular table of archival knowledge, I was also attempting 
to keep the argument within the bounds of modernity and modernism in 
general. In fact, the objects which appear in the photographs can be 
"read" as depicting modernity's forgotten side, a world of detritus 
and spent rubbish. Our investigation proceeds from within the sphere 
of otherness therefore, for the photographs depict the destructive 
dimension of the creative/destructive tension which was one of the 
defining characteristics of modernism. 
This "otherness", or neglect, is what makes the investigation into the 
photographs and their history so fascinating, because the photographs 
provide one with a springboard from which to pursue a story which is 
extraordinarily diverse. At the same time however, the story told 
within the appendix is very specific in that it demonstrates the 
recurrence ( and convergence) of an equally rich number of strands. The 
convergence takes place around three crucial yet separate items: the 
camera as a modern means of representation (which stands at an 
epistemological threshold, if Barthes is to believed). The photograph, 
which is the result of that means of representation, and thirdly, a 
collection of specific photographs, which in our case are a series of 
entirely cliched "snaps" of a ruined fort. 
Finally, this polemical detour has been an attempt to suggest that 
historical knowledge is highly reductive and coersive. Through my 
strategic deployment of "fictionalised" history. I have attempted to 
secure a genealogical perspective from which to gaze at the supposedly 
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accurate confi~urations of our historical knowledge. Where I have 
found "re~ularity" and "continuity" I have initiated irregularity and 
discontinuity: believinG that behind the rigidly organised system of 
classification there exists a unease that cannot hope to disguise the 
fundamental void which exists at the heart of the archival project. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Foucault, M. Of Other Spaces, in Diacritics, Spring 1986, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 23. 
2. Barthes, R. Camera Lucida; Reflections on Photography, trans., R 
Howard (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982) pp. 87, 88. 
3. Crimp, Douglas. in the Anti-Aesthetic ed. Foster, Hal. (Port 
Townsend: Bay Press, 1983) p. 43. 
4. Simmel, George. Quoted in Harvey, David. The Condition of 
Postmodemity; An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) p. 272. 
5. Foucault is instructive on the idea that the "author function" as 
he calls it, is used as a device to limit and channel the 
disruptive effects of discourse. In "What Is an Author'?" he 
writes, ''The author also serves to neutralise the contradictions 
that may emerge in a series of texts: there must he - at a certain 
level of his thought or desire, of his consciousness or 
unconscious - a point where contradictions are resolved. where 
incompatihle elements are at last tied together or organised 
around a fundamental or originating contradiction". 
Foucault, M. What Is an Author?, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul 
Rabinow. (Harmondsworth: Peregrine, 1987) p. 111. 
6. In 1977, Foucault told an interviewer the following, "As for the 
problem of fiction, it is for me a very important problem; I am 
well aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do 
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not mean to go so far as to say that fictions are beyond truth. It 
seems to me that it is possible to make fiction work inside of 
truth, to induce truthful effects with a fictional discourse, and 
to operate in such a manner that the discourse of truth gives rise 
to, "manufactures," something that does not yet exist, that is, 
"fictions" it. One "fictions" history on the basis of a political 
reality not yet in existence, one "fictions" a politics not yet in 
existence on the basis of an historical truth. (''The History of 
Sexuality" (Finas Interview), Power /Knowledge, p. 193.) 
Megill then goes on to add that, "Foucault's histories, then, are 
fictions. They are explicitly not representations of a literal 
truth concerning the past. They do not aim to portray the past "as 
it actually was." On the contrary, they have a myth-making 
function. 
Foucault, M. Quoted in Megill, Alan. Prophets of Extremity: 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987) pp. 234,235. 
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APPENDIXB 
ADMIRAL TY MAP OF CAPE TOWN. CIRCA 1858 - 60 
SOURCE: Public Records Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, Great Britain 
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APPENDIXC 
CRAIG'S BATTERY: WORKSHOPS 
SOURCE: Public Records Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, Great Britain 
In file entitled "History of Royal Engineers at Cape Colony" 
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CRAIG'S BATTERY: TOP PLAN 
SOURCE: Public Records Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, Great Britain 
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CRAIG'S BATIERY: MAGAZINES AND EMPLACEMENTS FOR TWO 4.7 INC. 
SOURCE: Public Records Office, Kew, Richmond. Surrey, Great Britain 
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CRAIG'S BATTERY: TELEPHONE SHELTER AND MACHINE GUN STORE 
SOURCE: Public Records Office, Kew, Richmond. Surrey, Great Britain 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































* Arac, J. After Foucault. Humanistic Knowledge. Postmodern 
Challenges, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988) 
* Badham, A. Rediscovering Woodstock. Contree No 21, (Pretoria: 
University of South Afica, 1986) 
* Barthes, R. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans., R. 
Howard (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982) 
* Berger, J. Ways of Seeing. (London: Pelican 1979) 
* Bersani, L. The Subject of Power, in Diacritics, Fall 1977, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
* Bhabha, Homi K. The Other question: difference. discrimination 
and the discourse of colonialism in Literature. Politics and Theory, 
Papers from the Essex Conference, 1976 - 1984, eds, Barker, Hulme, 
Iversen, Loxley. (London: Metheun, 1986) 
* Bickford-Smith, V. Dangerous Cape Town: Middle-Class Attitudes to 
Poverty in Cape Town in the Late Nineteenth Century. Social History 
of Cape Town (4), (Cape Town: University of Cape Town, 1981) 
* Bove, Paul A. Intellectuals in Power: A Genealogy of Critical 
Humanism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 
* Bove, Paul A. Intellectuals at War: Michel Foucault and the 
Analysis of Power. In Substance No.37/38, 1983. 
262 
* Carroll, D. Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, (New York: 
Methuen, 1987) 
* Clifford, J. The Predicament of Culture - Twentieth-Century 
EthnoiU"aQhy, Literature, and Art. (London: Harvard University Press, 
1988) 
* Cousins, Mand Hussain, A. Michel Foucault: Theoretical 
Traditions in the Social Sciences. (London: Macmillan, 1984) 
* Deleuze, G. Foucault, trans. Se~n Hand. (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1988) 
* Dews, P, Logics of Disintegration. (London: Verso, 1987) 
* Dreyfus, H, and Rabinow, P. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism 
and Hermeneutics. (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982) 
* Foucault, M. The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan 
Smith. (London: Tavistock, 1985) 
* Foucault, M. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical 
Perception, trans. A.M.Sheridan Smith.(New York: Vintage, 1975) 
* Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
trans., Alan Sheridan. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) 
* Foucault, M. The History of Sexuality, Volume One: An 
Introduction, trans., Robert Hurley. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984) 
263 
* Foucault, M. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in 
the Age of Reason, trans. Richard Howard. (London: Tavistock, 1985) 
* Foucault, M. Nietzsche, Genealogy. History, in, Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, trans. 
Donald F Bouchard and Sherry Simon. (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1977) 
* Foucault, M. Of Other Spaces, in Diacritics, Spring 1986, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
* Foucault, M. The Order of Things, (London: Tavistock, 1982) 
* Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other 
Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon. (Brighton: Harvester Press, 
1980), 
* Foster, H ( ed), The Anti-Aesthetic (Port Townsend: Bay Press, 
1983) 
* Gilman, S. Difference and Pathology - Stereotvpes of Sexuality. 
Race and Madness, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985) 
* Harvey, D. The Condition of Postmodernity - An Enquiry into the 
Origins of Cultural Change, (London: Basil Blackwell, 1989) 
* Hoy, D. (ed) Foucault - A Critical Reader. (Oxford. Basil 
Blackwell, 1986) 
264 
* Jameson, F. Postmodernism. or, the cultural logic of late 
capitalism, New Left Review, v. 147, September 1984. 
* Lemert, C and Gillan, G. Michel Foucault: Social Theory and 
Trans~ession. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982) 
* Lentricchia, F. Ariel and the Police. (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1988) 
* Mort, F. Dan~erous Sexualities - Medico-Moral Politics in England 
Since 1830. (London: Routledge, 1 ?87) 
* Megill, A. Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche. Heidegger. Foucault, 
Derrida. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987) 
* Poster, M. Foucault. Marxism and History - Mode of Production 
versus Mode of Information. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984) 
* Polan, D. Fables of Transgression: The Reading of Politics and 
the Politics of Reading in Foucault's Discourse, in Boundary 2, v. 
10, no. 3., 1982. 
* Rabinow, P. French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social 
Environment. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989) 
* Rabinow, P. (ed) The Foucault Reader. (London: Penguin, 1987) 
* Rabinow, P. The Welfare State in France, in History of the 
Present, Fall 1987, Berkeley University 
265 
* Rajchman, J. Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1985) 
* Said, E. Orientalism. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) 
* Seltzer, M. Reading Foucault - Cells, Corridors, Novels, Review of 
books by Dreyfuss, Rabinow and Racevskis, in Diacritics, Spring 1984, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
* Sheridan, A. Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth. (London: 
Tavistock, 1980) 
* Sedgwick, P. Psycho Politics, (London: Pluto, 1982) 
* Simon, J.K. A Conversation with Michel Foucault, in Partisan 
Review 2, Volume XXXVIII, Number 2, 1971. 
* Soja, E. Postmodern Geographies - The Reassertion of Space in 
Critical Social Theory. (London: Verso, 1990) 
* Soper, K. Humanism and Anti-Humanism. (London: Hutchinson, 1986) 
* Sprinker, M. Textual Politics: Foucault and Derrida, in Boundary 
2i v. 8, no. 3, 1980 
* Sturrock, J ( ed). Structuralism and Since: From Levi-Strauss to 
Derrida, (London: Oxford University Press, 1979) 
* Tagg, J. The Burden of Representation - Essays on Photographies 
and Histories. (London: MacMillan, 1988) 
266 
* Weeks, J. Sex. Politics and Society. The Regulation of Sexuality 
since 1800, (London: Longman, 1981) 
* Young, R. Untying the text: A Post-Structuralist Reader (Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981) 
* Young, R. White Mythologies: Writing History and the West 
(London: Routledge, 1990) 
267 
